An empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and strategic crisis management : does CSR act as a reservoir of goodwill during a crisis? by Andvik, Elisabeth Eide & Vodahl, Hilde Annikki
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
i 
 
20/06/2011 
Bergen, Spring 2011  
Advisor: Proff. Leif Hem  
 
MASTER 
THESIS 
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY & 
MANAGEMENT 
 
"This thesis was written as a part of the master program at NHH. Neither the institution, the supervisor, nor the 
censors are - through the approval of this thesis - responsible for neither the theories and methods used, nor 
results and conclusions drawn in this work." 
 
An Empirical Investigation of the relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Strategic Crisis Management 
 
Does CSR act as a reservoir of goodwill during a crisis? 
 
 
 
 
Authors:  Elisabeth Eide Andvik & Hilde Annikki Vodahl 
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
ii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
The process of completing this Master Thesis has been an exciting journey, filled with times of joy, cooperation, 
inspiration, learning and satisfaction. On the other hand, there have been times of frustration, challenges, hard 
work and focus. However, we have developed a deep passion and interest for the contemporary fields of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Crisis Management. The process has led to a strong commitment 
to further explore the synergies between the two disciplines, and the interest remains strong as we commence on 
our careers. 
 
We are grateful to all those who made this thesis possible. First and foremost, our deepest gratitude extends to 
our beloved ones, Christian Eide Andvik and Samrand Jeydi, for their endless love, patience and support. We 
also thank each other for the cooperation and friendship that have evolved throughout the process, especially in 
regards to overcoming the hurdles that appeared on every corner. We are forever grateful to JKLgroup and 
TINE whose financial support enabled us to study a subject we both have a deep, personal interest in. We would 
like to acknowledge our advisor, Leif Hem for encouragement and guidance, and extend our gratitude to the 
support received from Siv Skard, Herbjørn Nysveen, and Nina Iversen. A special thanks to the Ph.D. student, 
Alexander Sandvik, who has contributed both socially and academically. It has been a pleasure to work with 
many inspiring individuals at the Department of Strategy and Management at NHH.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bergen, June 2011   Elisabeth Eide Andvik             &               Hilde Annikki Vodahl 
  
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
iii 
 
Abstract  
Recent times have witnessed a proliferation of crises damaging corporate reputations as well as their 
stakeholders. In this context, the fields of Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Crisis Management are 
of increasing importance. The theoretical progression has evolved in parallel in different disciplines and 
research has failed to investigate their potential synergies. 
 The thesis consists of a primary and secondary study. The major findings were obtained through a survey 
conducted by Norstat of Norwegian executives in various industries (N=206). The primary research question is: 
“Does Corporate Social Responsibility have a positive effect on Strategic Crisis Management?. The study 
explores the concept and nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in relation to the process of strategic 
crisis management (SCM). This is a relatively neglected area of research within academia and the authors‟ aims 
to redress the imbalance and reduce the research gap. Mitroff‟s five stage SCM model and the SOCRATES 
categorization of CSR represent the core literature utilized. The quantitative analysis utilized a factor analysis, a 
multiple regression and ANOVA. The results revealed a symbiotic relationship between the two communalities; 
CSR has a positive effect on organizations SCM. The data suggested modifying some of the concepts components 
CSR was found to consist of five components; strategy, product, diversity, employee, and non-US-operations. 
The SCM model was revised to contain four stages; detection, prevention/preparation, containment/recovery, 
and learning. The symbiotic relationship benefits stakeholders in terms of being able to recognize companies as 
trustworthy and responsible, and benefits corporations in maintaining a positive stakeholder-organizational 
relationship which enhances companies‟ SCM. The thesis underpins that society judge business from a moral 
perspective and presents an ethical and strategic approach to managing organizational crises. The thesis 
suggests that organizations SCM should emphasize an integrated stakeholder approach pre-, during and post-
crises. As a contribution to reduce the gap between the two concepts, the authors introduced the term “social 
responsible crisis management” (SRCM). It underpins that leading a corporation through a crisis requires an 
integrated stakeholder approach and takes a step towards developing a stakeholder approach towards SCM. 
The secondary research question is: “Does CSR impact stakeholders‟ assignment of blame in a product-harm 
crisis?” The authors‟ employed experimental manipulations of prior CSR on the sample, and explored whether 
CSR impacts stakeholder assignment of blame in a product-harm crisis. In addition, we investigated whether 
CSR moderates the relationship between SCM and blame in light of a PHC, and explore whether attributions 
mediate the relationship between CSR and blame. The quantitative study utilized ANOVA, regression and 
Bootstrap analyses. It reveald that a positive CSR reputation impacts the resilience to negative information 
during a product-harm crisis, thus functions as a halo-effect that acts as a shield protecting the company against 
reputational harm. Hence, a positive CSR reputation enacts as a reservoir of goodwill, while irresponsible 
social organizational activities enhances stakeholders‟ attribution of blame. The findings indicated that CSR 
represents a moderator as hypothesized, however it does not mediate the relationship between SCM and blame. 
Commercial findings in relation to CSR and SCM are also outlined to explore the concepts position among 
Norwegian executives. 
Key Words: Strategic Crisis Management, Corporate Social Responsibility, Organizational Culture, Crisis Communication, Crisis, 
Stakeholders, Organizational Learning, Corporate Reputation, Socially Responsible Crisis Management, Blame, Attribution Theory.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Background Information 
“If crises have taught the world anything, it is that a crisis in business can occur today with little or 
no warning, anywhere, anytime. It can happen to any company, large or small, public or private. 
The safest assumption is that a crisis looms on the horizon”                (Fink, 1986b:813) 
The world‟s present business context is characterized by continuous dynamic changes and 
complexity. One of the leading issues in this scenario is corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
The stringent regulation to which society hold corporations responsible for their actions is 
becoming increasingly more difficult to accommodate as a result of globalization (Cramer et 
al., 2004, Tombs and Smith, 1995, Godfrey and Hatch, 2007). CSR “reflects the 
organization‟s status and activities with respect to its perceived societal obligations” (Brown 
and Dacin, 1997:68). More than ever before, the Medias spotlight highlights corporation‟s 
failures to meet CSR standards, potentially bringing the organizations into disrepute and 
imperilling its future profitability and growth, possibly its very existence (Lerbinger, 1997a). 
Increased transparency makes it more difficult to ”stick your head in the sand”, and as a result 
fewer crises remains unpublished as the number of society‟s watchdog‟s increases (Fern-
Banks, 2002).  
Merck, BP, Enron and Apple are all reminders that no organizations are immune to crises. 
Organizations and humans have their limitation, and thus every organization should be 
prepared (Coombs, 2007a, Heath, 2001). Increasing attention to understand the dynamics of 
crises, such as the triggering cause and factors which affects the strategic crisis management 
(SCM) is therefore essential in order to protect the company‟s vital resources. The erosion of 
a company‟s vital resources such as the reputation, customer and employee loyalty are in 
great danger in a crisis (Kvåle and Wæraas, 2006). As a result, corporations increasingly 
attempt to improve their SCM, because crises can severely disrupt operations and 
significantly undermine organizations legitimacy in public opinions (Kovoor-Misra et al., 
2000). Questions regarding legitimacy express concern for a corporation‟s image (Clark, 
2000). Meeting stakeholder expectations is therefore vital for organizations in order to 
achieve a “license to operate”, i.e. the legitimacy needed to operate.  
Many real-life examples underpin that society judge business from a moral perspective. A 
great number of business practices have experienced the detrimental consequences of 
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disregarding their social responsibilities. The confectionary company Cadbury suffered a full 
blown media attack in the British press in 2000, when news leaked that the company was 
buying slave-farmed cocoa beans from West Africa (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). Moreover, 
other examples (e.g., Nike, Toyota, Coca-Cola, Ford/Firestone) aid the link between CSR and 
SCM. In addition, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez and BP reinforce the connection between failing 
to meet CSR principles (environmental degradation) and corporate crises. In a national 
context there are several cases where companies‟ inability or failure to meet established CSR 
principles have resulted in corporate crises. Statoil‟s reputation experienced negative publicity 
due to its corruption crisis in 2002, known as “the Horton scandal”. Tine, Norway‟s dominant 
dairy company, suffered financial and reputational losses when the news revealed that Tine 
tried to muscle a smaller rival dairy firm, Synnøve Finden, to exit the market in 2005. 
Allegedly, Tine had bribed the largest grocery chains to solely market Tine‟s brands and 
remove rival dairy products off the grocery store shelves (Berglund, 2005). In an international 
context, a scandal emerged in China in 2008 that shocked the world. Investigators found 
contaminated milk from three of the country‟s top dairy companies. The concentration of the 
ingredient melamine was too high which caused the sickness of 53 000 children and the 
decease of four babies (Volkskrant, 2008). This is a perfect example of a product-harm crisis 
(PHC) that can be devastating to a company and harmful for society (Dawar and Pillutla, 
2000). PHC is defined as a well-publicized incidence wherein products are found to be 
defective or dangerous (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000). Hence, these cases shed light on how 
fragile company‟s images can be when a corporation is accused publicly of misbehavior. 
For centuries the Chinese have embraced the concept that there is a positive side to crises. The 
Chinese word for crises, “危機“(wei-ji), is a combination of two words, “danger” and 
“opportunities” (Lerbinger, 1997b). This is supported by Augustine‟s (1995a:148) argument 
that “almost every crisis contains within itself the seed of success as well as the roots of 
failure”. The way Johnson and Johnson (J&J) handled the Tylenol crisis in 1982 is a classic 
example of capitalizing the opportunities of a crisis and putting a positive spin on a complex 
and uncertain situation. In this case the repercussions transcended organizational boundaries 
and posed serious threats to the company‟s stakeholders. Pearson (1997a) ascribe J&J 
successful handling of the crisis to be due to the close alignment of values and behavior, and 
their stakeholder management. The J&J case shows how important CSR is to brands within a 
global business context, because brands are built on perceptions, ideals and concepts 
appealing to high values (Werther and Chandler, 2006). On the opposite end of the 
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continuum, Enron illustrates the consequences of attending to a very narrow set of values and 
stakeholder concerns, and the dangers inherent to radical innovation when few established 
rules or standards are available. Heath and Ni (2008) underpins this, and claims that CSR can 
advance the organization‟s credibility and character in public policy battles during the early 
stages of a crisis. Related to the stakeholder argument, social capital can be viewed as a 
“stockpile of goodwill” that can aid an organization in responding and recovering from crises 
(Heath and Ni, 2008). 
According to Blowfield and Murray (2008) stakeholder theory is regarded as one of the 
cornerstones of good CSR management. A logical linkage can therefore be applied between 
the fields of SCM, where established stakeholder relationships enables more efficient SCM 
(Ulmer, 2001a) and CSR, where stakeholder management is one of the pillars and most 
important areas of CSR. According to Heath (1998) and Fern-Banks (2002) monitoring and 
responding to the stakeholders‟ needs and desires are emphasized within the field of SCM and 
are looked upon as key success factors. Grunig (1992) has articulated that: “an organization 
can withstand crises better if they have established good, long-term relationships with 
publics”(Paine, 2002:2), and aid the aforementioned statements. Therefore, the authors 
subscribe to the logical linkage that CSR can positively affect the organizations SCM. 
Although there seem to exist shared dimensions between the disciplines, limited empirical 
research have been conducted in the area (Mitroff, 2011, Alpaslan, 2011, Tombs and Smith, 
1995). The authors have mainly been inspired to investigate the relationship between CSR 
and SCM by the courses SCM and CSR at NHH. As a primary objective the authors‟ will 
investigate the potential synergies between CSR and SCM. Secondly, the authors will 
examine whether CSR impact stakeholders‟ assignment of blame in a product-harm crisis. 
Throughout the paper, the authors will be referred to as authors, while the published literature 
sources will be labeled researches.  
1.2 Research Question 
The purpose of the following research is to measure Norwegian corporations‟ abilities and 
aspirations within CSR and SCM. Analyzing the relationship between CSR and SCM creates 
an exciting opportunity to study the underpinnings of each discipline, in order to reveal 
concrete ideas about their impact on the corporate world. The dissertation investigates a 
neglected area of research (Tombs and Smith, 1995, Mitroff, 2011, Alpaslan, 2011) and aims 
to redress the imbalance and reduce the research gap. 
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CSR SCM
Figure 1 Primary over-arching Research Model 
 
Primary Research Question:”Does CSR have a positive effect on SCM?” 
 
The authors have an underlying hypothesis that there exists a positive relationship between 
socially responsible companies and their SCM. The predicted relationship is shown in the 
following research model: 
 
 
 
  
By exploring the concept and nature of CSR and relate this to the SCM process, the authors‟ 
wish to highlight a series of questions which may form the basis of a potentially fruitful 
research agenda. 
When provided with the opportunity to perform a survey on Norwegian executives, the 
authors‟ decided to include a secondary investigation to explore the effect CSR has on 
assignment of blame in a PHC. This area within research have also remained relatively scarce 
(Dawar and Pillutla, 2000). PHC and product recalls can result in negative publicity, 
threatening the company‟s reputation and image (Dean, 2004). A PHC resulting in 
stakeholder blame may cause the erosion of consumer trust, brand equity, and consumers‟ 
willingness to purchase the brand in the future  (Klein and Dawar, 2004). This creates an 
exciting opportunity to research whether cognitive processes of attributions are influenced by 
stakeholder perception of CSR. The frequency of occurrence and the serious consequences of 
PHC‟s demand for more insights concerning the underlying process through which product-
harm crises influence stakeholders‟ assignment of blame. The authors postulate that CSR 
represents a potential halo-effect, i.e. CSR acts as a shield to protect the organization from 
blame in PHC. Thus, the authors speculate that positive CSR priming will result in less blame 
assigned to corporations facing PHC.  
Secondary Research Question: Does CSR impact stakeholders‟ assignment of blame in a 
product-harm crisis?  
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1.3 Structure 
The structure of the thesis is divided into 9 chapters, excluding references and the appendix.  
Chapter 2 presents an overview of theoretical perspectives relevant to the phenomena 
addressed by the research question.  
Chapter 3 comprise the developed hypotheses and research models (primary & secondary).  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology.  
Chapter 5 comprise the data analysis of the primary & secondary research.  
Chapter 6 outlines the discussion of findings,  
Chapter 7 presents concluding remarks.  
Chapter 8 addresses limitations of the study. 
Chapter 9 outlines future research recommendations. 
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2 Literature Review 
The prominent rationale of the concepts CSR and SCM will be presented in the following 
sections. 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
CSR have emerged as a global trend with both practical and theoretical implications as a 
result of rapid globalization where climate change, community health, education, 
development, and business sustainability currently represent some of the most pressing issues 
of our time. During the last decade there has been an upward business trend to mention CSR 
on corporate WebPages (Esrock and Leichty, 1998), releasing sustainability reports, engaging 
in social responsible investments and voluntary environmental programs, as well as partnering 
with NGO‟s (Non Governmental Organizations). An international study conducted by KPMG 
(2008) shows that there has been a global transformation, where the most important changes 
that have occurred are related to the importance of CSR programs. According to the study 80 
percent of the world‟s largest 250 companies report on their social and environmental 
performance, which represent an increase of 30 percent since 2005. This suggests that CSR 
reporting is becoming a societal norm, instead of reflecting the general expectations in global 
companies. The focus of CSR and stakeholder management has increased, and according to 
Midttun et al. (2005) CSR has emerged as a central business agenda, developing into a 
business megatrend with global outreach. 
In today‟s world, companies are under societal, as well as competitive pressure. Midttun et al. 
(2005) argues that extensive societal expectations of responsible corporate behavior voiced by 
governments and interest groups, puts pressure on companies to develop CSR initiatives to 
comply with expectations of corporate behavior. Even though multinational enterprises in 
particular have been in the forefront of developing CSR activities, it has now also been 
incorporated into smaller companies and public institutions. In the midst of this world, 
business‟ is subjected to new levels of transparency and an increasingly media-driven society. 
The concern with brand profiling and reputation effects seem to demand corporate 
responsibility at a new level, as failure to meet CSR standards threaten shareholder 
confidence, brand reputation, product stability, employee trust, and other corporate assets, 
both tangible and intangible (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). 
The public opinion is increasingly less tolerant of corporate malfeasance, and at the same time 
the expectations of business‟ is higher than ever before to rectify perceived weaknesses in the 
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markets concerning sustainability, poverty, inequalities and global warming. A CEO 
described the pressure of competing interests in the following way: “On the one hand, you‟ve 
got Wall Street squeezing you harder and harder for shorter and shorter term performance. 
On the other hand, you have a broader constituent base that wants more than financial 
results”(Blowfield and Murray, 2008:63). Kofi Annan, seventh UN Secretary-General, has 
called on business to play a bigger role in tackling what Baker (2005) calls “Capitalism‟s 
Achilles heel”, within which capital, poverty and inequality are intertwined (Blowfield and 
Murray, 2008). Annan placed social responsibility on the agenda when he invited business to 
partner up with the government in upholding international human rights at the World 
Economic Forum in 1999 (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). This initiative resulted in the 
establishment of the UN Global Compact in 2000, which appeals directly to business for its 
voluntary endorsement of the ten universally accepted principles. In an interview with 
Business Week Magazine in 2004 Annan argues that: “we need business in order to promote 
development. They are the ones with the money, technology, and management. They are the 
ones who can create jobs. You can't create sustainable development without creating jobs” 
(Annan, 2004). CSR is a voluntary initiative which is underlined by Brown and Dacin‟s 
(1997) argument that “CSR reflects the organization‟s status and activates with respect to its 
perceived social obligations” (Kotler and Lee, 2005:207). CSR activities can be traced back 
to the early days of capitalism and according to Blowfield and Murray (2008) CSR is the 
“newest old thing” in business management. Long before the term “CSR” originated, 
corporate responsibility developed through the idea of making a positive contribution to the 
rest of society, i.e. “giving back” through philanthropic donations.  
According to Blowfield and Murray (2008) there is no single commonly agreed upon 
definition of CSR which embraces all the aspects and related concepts of CSR such as 
business ethics, stakeholder management, corporate citizenship and community relations. 
“The concept of CSR is constantly changing as society itself evolves, affecting our 
expectations of business and the ways in which its relationship with society is handled” 
(Blowfield and Murray, 2008:19). Terms such as corporate responsibility, philanthropy, 
community involvement, triple bottom line, and global citizenship are just some of the 
numerous terms applied in relation to CSR which often are used interchangeably, even though 
they can mean different things (Rowe, 2006). In general, CSR maintains that business should 
seek social benefits for society as well as economic benefits for the business. Wood 
(1991:695) states, “The basic idea of CSR is that business and society are interwoven rather 
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than distinct entities; therefore, society has certain expectations for appropriate business 
behavior and outcomes”. Husted and Salazar (2006) argue that CSR is the realization that 
organizations have responsibilities beyond investors. 
Davis (1973:312) presented a classical definition of CSR; “what companies do to a make a 
positive contribution to society above and beyond what constitutes their legal obligations”. 
Vaaland (2008:933) however, describes CSR activities in terms of their content rather than 
plainly making a distinction between legal bound duties and volunteer acts within society; 
“management of stakeholder concern for responsible and irresponsible acts related to 
environmental, ethical and social phenomena in a way that creates corporate benefit”. The 
latter definition is similar to the one presented by the European Commission; “CSR is a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interactions with stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (Blowfield and 
Murray, 2008). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) defines 
CSR as “the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development, while improving the quality of the workforce and their families as 
well of the local community and society at large” (wbcsd.org, 2000). This definition is similar 
to that of the World Bank, whom states CSR as  
“the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, 
working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
improve their quality of life, in ways that are both good for business and good for 
international development” (Petkoski and Twose, 2003). 
Consequently, CSR have been defined in many perspectives, and the use of broad 
conceptualizations has resulted in many and diverse definitions. However, these definitions 
share has a common denominator - the belief that companies have a responsibility for the 
public good. Davis (1973) and the European Commission emphasize that the CSR “umbrella” 
is voluntary in nature. Bearing in mind that there is no commonly agreed upon definition of 
the term, the authors will treat CSR as a field with an array of issues bundled together 
underneath a CSR umbrella. 
2.1.1 Categorization of CSR Activities 
CSR was originally presented in 1953 in Howard Bowens book “Social Responsibilities of 
the Businessman” (Carrol, 1999). Carroll (1979) has developed one of the most cited 
frameworks for understanding the different aspects of  CSR which has emerged. Carroll‟s 
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(1991) research suggests that CSR consists of four main responsibilities (1) Economic, (2) 
Legal, (3) Ethical and (4) Discretionary/Philanthropic (Jamali, 2008). 
 
Figure 2: The hierarchy of CSR (Carroll, 1999) 
The economic element is business‟s responsibility to offer what society demands and to sell 
with profit and grow. The legal component constitutes fulfilling economic missions whilst 
obeying the law. The ethical component represents the business responsibility which goes 
beyond legal compliance, and is thus tightly linked to the societal norms and expectations of 
its stakeholders. Finally, discretionary responsibility refers to philanthropy and voluntary 
initiatives. Together they represent a pyramid of CSR (Carroll, 1991).  
A comprehensive synopsis of various CSR actions is contained in the database SOCRATES, 
The CSR monitor provided by KLD Research & Analytics Inc from Kinder, Lydenberg, 
Domini and Co. Inc. 1999 research (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001b). The database monitors 
various dimension of a firm‟s CSR, and encompasses a rating of over 3000 publicly traded 
US companies in terms of their CSR actions and records. This forms the basis for the Domini 
400 Social Index, which is the first and largest socially screened index in the world (Fishman 
et al., 2005). Socrates categorizes the CSR initiatives into seven domains: (1) community 
support (e.g. support of arts and health programs, educational and housing initiatives for the 
economically disadvantaged, generous/innovative giving), (2) diversity based (e.g. sex-, race-, 
family, and disability based diversity record and initiatives or lack thereof, within and outside 
the firm), (3) employee support (e.g. concern for safety, job security, profit sharing, union 
relations, employee involvement), (4) environment (e.g. environment-friendly products, 
recycling, hazardous waste management, animal testing, use of ozone-depleting chemicals, 
pollution control), (5) non-US operations (e.g. overseas labor practices, operations in 
countries with human rights violations), and (6) product (e.g. product safety, research and 
development/innovation) (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001c) as well as (7) corporate governance 
(Pirsh et al., 2007). 
Discretionary 
Responsibility
Ethical Responsibility
Legal Responsibility
Economic Responsibility
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
10 
 
 
Figure 3 The Socrates Framework (Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co. Inc, 1999) 
CSR policy should function as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism whereby a business will 
monitor and ensure its adherence to laws, ethical standards, and international norms. The CSR 
practices that are perceived as sincere and integral part of a company‟s business strategy, may 
potentially contribute to differentiation in developing a strong, positive corporate reputation 
(Hillestad et al., 2010). The idea that companies have a purpose beyond maximizing profits 
and that companies needs to consider the way within which the profits are made, is a major 
component in understanding CSR in terms of how business relates to society (Blowfield and 
Murray, 2008). If CSR is integrated into the company‟s governance, it contributes to the 
organizations performance and competitiveness, by improving the development perspective 
and reducing the “risk profile”. According to a survey conducted by Argument (2003) 90 
percent of top executives believe that CSR represents a competitive advantage, and 79 percent 
believe that the firm‟s profitability will increase when engaging in a socially responsible 
strategy. A recent A.T. Kearney analysis reveals that companies that show a “true” 
commitment to sustainability appears to have outperformed their competitors‟ in the financial 
markets (ATKearney, 2009).  
2.1.2 CSR in General 
According to Webb (2008), 8 of 10 American stakeholders have an increased consumer trust 
towards CSR profiling companies. Increased attention on CSR in the society has resulted in 
comparative CSR rankings where organizations are evaluated according to a given set of CSR 
criteria. Due to the these reasons, a CSR reputation may aid in creating a competitive 
advantage within society (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Studies have shown that the type of CSR 
a company is profiling effects the stakeholders product preferences (Sen and Bhattacharya, 
2001a). 
Bierck (2000) mentions that organizations will be perceived as legitimate if their actions are 
considered ethically correct in relation to ensuring safety and security of the involved 
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stakeholders within a crisis. According to Bierck (2000) transparency of information is 
essential in order to avoid reputation damage and is thus an essential part of the organizational 
culture. Being transparent with information may therefore be linked to increased effects of 
positive SCM and reputation legitimacy. Lack of transparency will then be expected to 
increase the probability of experiencing a crisis that will cause reputational damage (Bierck, 
2000). 
Researchers stipulate that there must be a link between the values that the organization is 
promoting through its CSR activities, and the stakeholders‟ values and expectations (Simola, 
2005, Alpaslan et al., 2009b, Coombs and Holladay, 2010a). A company that chooses to 
promote CSR activities that are consistent with the organizations own values, will be viewed 
upon as legitimate by society (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). By acting beyond legislative 
requirements, organizations may increase trust among the society, hence gain legitimacy for 
operating. Fombrun (1996) advocates that a company‟s social performance have an 
imperative role in the self-reinforcing cycle of gaining legitimacy, reputation and competitive 
advantage  
2.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
According to Cortese (2002) “managers are responding to increased stakeholder demands 
for greater corporate accountability and initiatives in all aspects of the enterprises” (Schnietz 
and Epstein, 2005:328). The stakeholder perspective becomes an important aspect of CSR 
with reference to organizational responsibilities, and it deals with issues such as what the 
organizations‟ are responsible for and to whom they are responsible. Stakeholder theory is 
according to Blowfield and Murray (2008) regarded as one of the cornerstones of good CSR 
management. In 1963 the Stanford Research Institute introduced the term “stakeholder” as a 
generalization of the notion of “stockholders” (Zsolnai, 2006). Freeman (1984a) defines 
stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization‟s objectives” (Mitchell et al., 1997:861). 
Freeman (1984) drew a distinction between  (1) “primary” stakeholders which includes 
employees, shareholders and business customers who are essential for the survival, and (2) 
“secondary” stakeholders which represent local communities, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO‟s) and governments (Waddock et al., 2002;, Mitchell et al., 1997). The 
latter refers to stakeholders who are not essential for the company‟s survival, but who can 
influence the company (e.g. the media). A common notion among stakeholder theorists is that 
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the value of an issue for a manager derives from the fact that a stakeholder has legitimized it 
(Blowfield and Murray, 2008). 
Mitchell et al. (1997) have created a more dynamic theoretical framework to understand the 
dynamics between stakeholders and business. He divides stakeholders into three preliminary 
stakeholder classes based on their level of salience; (1) latent stakeholders, (2) expectant 
stakeholders and (3) definitive stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997:878) defines salience as 
“the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims”. Salience is 
shaped by the attributes of power to influence the firm, legitimacy of the stakeholders‟ 
relationship with the firm and the urgency of their claim. Power represents the ability of the 
stakeholders to disrupt organizational operations, such as those who control essential 
resources or may form coalitions (Coombs, 2007a). Legitimacy refers to “actions that are 
considered desirable, proper or appropriate according to a system” (Coombs, 2007a, 
Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholders who possess all three characteristics are referred to as 
salient stakeholders, and are given priority by the management (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Investment in CSR is believed to create value not only for stakeholders of the corporation, but 
also for a corporation itself. By actively giving back to the society that provides the 
foundation for the business‟s existence, a corporation may benefit from enhanced legitimacy 
and reputation among its stakeholders. In addition, CSR may be used as a SCM tool in order 
to diversify an organizations reputation, making it less prone to negative critique (Mitroff, 
1998). “Strong anti-globalization and anti-corporate sentiments generate a need for a 
positive reputation to obtain a social license to operate”(Gjølberg, 2009:611). Thus, 
stakeholders may give a company the benefit of the doubt within a crisis, due to positive 
attitudes towards the organization (Simola, 2005). 
2.1.4 Critique of Corporate Social Responsibility Theory 
Identifying key stakeholders based on perceived influence and interest has raised criticism 
towards the stakeholder theory. This type of approach does little to assist managers in making 
decisions based on stakeholder‟s moral claims, and prioritizing between competing interests. 
This has resulted in situations in which managers pick and choose whom qualify to represent 
a stakeholder, hence whom to listen to. Moreover, managers seem to respond to the 
stakeholders who has the most power or speaks the loudest, whilst ignoring the ones with the 
strongest need and entitlement (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). Freeman (1984) focused on the 
moral responsibility of business and opposed the idea of stakeholders being treated in a 
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utilitarian way, as the means to an end. Based on the lack of acceptance of the ethical 
dimension to the notion of stakeholders, Freeman abandoned the primary and secondary 
stakeholder distinction (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). For Gibson (2000) the term 
stakeholders becomes meaningless if the ethical dimension to the notion of stakeholders is not 
accepted. Moreover, Philips (2003) has raised a critical voice towards the stakeholder theory 
for failing to distinguish between, and prioritize, stakeholders based on a moral rather than a 
business obligation. 
The general notion of CSR has been discussed vigorously – is greed good and is the business 
of business business? Or is business as Annan (2004) states, a necessary tool for 
development? Blowfield and Murray (2008) argue that the meaning of CSR is constantly 
changing as society evolves and that the notion of CSR can alter depending on what 
perspective one uses to understand the world. In an article for the New York Times Magazine 
Friedman (1970) raised his critical view of CSR in the forceful statement that “there is one 
and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engage in open and free-market competition without deception or fraud” (Friedman, 1970). 
Friedman (1970), who represented the traditional capitalistic shareholder view advocated that 
private corporations should get on with making profits, while governments should deal with 
public goods and externalities (Henderson, 2001). Friedman‟s shareholder view is in contrast 
to Freeman (1984b) pluralistic, multi stakeholder view who argue that an active management 
of the stakeholders and their interests will ensure long-term success of the business, because 
no firm may survive without its stakeholders. Freeman (1984) saw companies as integrated in 
the rest of society and argued that stakeholder management is essential to the very survival 
and prosperity the corporation (Blowfield and Murray, 2008).  
Andriof et. al (2002) propose that stakeholder management concerns the interactive, mutually 
engaged and responsive relationship that “establish the very context of doing business, and 
create the ground work for transparency and accountability”(Andriof et. al. 2002:29). 
Compared to Andriof et al. (2002) Freeman‟s stakeholder management is rather business-
centric and instrumental subsuming stakeholder management to the purpose of wealth 
creation (Blowfield and Murray, 2008). Freeman proposed that companies choose who their 
stakeholders are, based on the potential of those who threaten the survival of the firm.  
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2.2 Organizational Crisis 
An organizational crisis will disrupt normal operations and have undesirable outcomes. A 
frequently used definition of crisis is “big trouble that arises suddenly” (Lerbinger, 1997a). 
Fink (1986a) argues that crises are inevitable and that a crisis “looms on the horizon”. It 
strikes with little or no warning (Smith et al., 1996, Reilly, 1987, Lerbinger, 1997a, Kovoor-
Misra et al., 2000). A more precise delineation of the term has been put forward by Heath 
(1997) who describes crisis as “a disruption of normal patterns of corporate activity by a 
sudden or overpowering and initially uncontrollable event”. Ulmer (2007) on the other hand 
defines a crisis as a “specific, unexpected and non-routine event or series of events that create 
uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization‟s high-priority goals”. 
Mitroff (1998:16) explain crises as “a disruption that physically affects a system as a whole, 
and threatens its basic assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its existential core”. Coombs 
(2007a:480) characterizes it as “a significant threat to operations that can have negative 
consequences if not handled properly”. However, it has also been defined as “perception of 
an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can 
seriously impact the organization‟s performance and generate negative outcomes”(Coombs 
and Holladay, 2010a:159). Shrivastava et al (1988:291) argues that a crisis represent “a 
disaster which causes extensive damage, social and economical disruption, and involves 
multiple stakeholders” According to Hermann (1963:10) three elements must be present for a 
crisis to exist; “managers must recognize a threat and believe it will hinder high-priority 
goals, they must recognize the irreparableness and degeneration of a situation if they take no 
action, and they must be faced with a surprise”. The latter definition is similar to that of 
Coombs (2007a) focus on the fact that crises may violate expectations that stakeholders hold 
about how organizations should act. It may disturb stakeholder expectations, which results in 
negative attitudes towards the organization and thus threatens the relationship between the 
parties. 
Morgan Stanley‟s chief spokesperson, Ray O‟Rourke (1997) argues that there are four 
elements that describes a crisis. Firstly, there must be an element of surprise which leads to 
loss of control, and secondly there must exist an information gap. Thirdly, insufficient 
information causes difficulties for stakeholders to separate facts from rumors regarding the 
crisis. A quick pace of events as well as intense scrutiny represents the fourth elements of a 
crisis. Despite numerous differences in the definition of a crisis, they each employ the same 
principle - a crisis is an event that can drastically affect the ability of an organization to 
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sustain itself and may threaten an organization‟s reputation and legitimacy, unless it is 
successfully managed by the organization. For the purpose of this thesis, the authors will 
apply Lerbinger‟s (1997) definition of a crisis; “an event that brings, or has the potential for 
bringing, an organization into disrepute and imperils its future profitability, growth, and 
possibly its very existence”. Lerbinger (1997a) emphasizes three important characteristics of 
crisis; suddenness, uncertainty and time compression. This is supported by Barton‟s 
arguments confirming that crises strike suddenly, giving them an element of surprise or 
unpredictability (Barton, 2001). 
Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) present seven different categories of crises, which are divided 
into abnormal -, normal- and natural accidents. The focus of the thesis will be abnormal and 
normal crises. 
2.3 Strategic Crisis Management (SCM) 
“If your stakeholders define a situation as a crisis, it is a crisis, even if the dominant coalition of 
managers in the organization choose to initially define it as a non-crisis” (Coombs, 2007a).  
Crises cost money which according to Heath (2010) offers incentives for managers to avoid, 
mitigate, and respond in ways that best protects the company‟s vital resources (Coombs and 
Holladay, 2010a). James (1906) argues that: “Crises show us how much greater our vital 
resources are than we had supposed”. One only has to look at the recent crisis that the 
employment agency, Adecco, experienced in Norway to understand that James statement is 
valid. Adecco‟s vital resources such as their reputation, leadership, integrity, as well as 
customer and employee loyalty, has been under enormous strain since the news of labor law 
violations, “social dumping” and illegal practices in nursing homes were leaked by the 
Norwegian Broadcasting (NRK). NRK whose original investigation in February 2011 sparked 
the ever-unfolding scandal surrounding Adecco, has brought about a snowballing crisis for the 
company. They will no longer be tendering for further public nor Parliament contracts (NTB, 
2011). Adecco brings into light the complexity of the relationship between an organization 
and its internal and external stakeholders. Moreover, it is a good example of how 
organizations who disregards their social responsibilities are more prone to face 
organizational crises (Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001).  
SCM is relatively new as an academic field and over the last decades there has been an 
increasing interest in SCM, which emerged in the aftermath of the Tylenol crisis that Johnson 
& Johnson experienced in 1982 that created a torrent of interest (Heath, 2010, Pearson and 
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Mitroff, 1993, Simola, 2005). Their corporate culture (credo) ameliorated the crisis situation 
and emphasizes how important an organizational culture is for effective SCM. This will be 
further elaborated in section 2.6. A quick Google search on the words “strategic crisis 
management” gives 163,000,000 hits and indicates an enormous interest in the broad topic of 
SCM. There is no single definition that is commonly agreed upon of the term SCM (Coombs, 
2007a, Heath, 2010, Mitroff, 1998), which encompasses the process by which organizations 
address negative events or precarious situations. The aim is to support organizations to avert 
crises and enable them to handle those that do occur more effectively (Pearson et al., 1997a). 
To achieve this goal, Pearson et al. (1997a) claims that it is essential that senior executives 
actively sanction and engage in crisis prevention efforts. Moreover, Pearson et al. (1997a:52) 
describes SCM as a “mindset and process that, on a daily basis drives a company‟s decisions 
and actions”. Furthermore the term encompasses active search for information, crisis 
prevention, response and containment, and in the aftermath of crisis learning is a central 
aspect of SCM. The ability to respond to external and internal dynamics is paramount within 
SCM. According to scholars in the field, the process of information gathering and sharing 
within organizations are considered to be key success factors (Augustine, 1995a, Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin, 2003).  
Heath (2001) describes SCM as an organization‟s capabilities to “monitor, identify, evaluate, 
prioritize issues, and respond by implementing a plan”. However for Pearson and Clair 
(1998), SCM is a systematic attempt by organizations to avert crisis or to effectively manage 
those that occur. Fern-Banks‟ (2002:1) emphasizes that conscious organizational efforts can 
mitigate the effects of a crisis even though not all crises are avoidable: “crisis management is 
a process of strategic planning for a crisis or negative turning point, a process that removes 
some of the risk and uncertainty from the negative occurrence and thereby allows the 
organization to be in greater control of its own destiny”. According to Pearson et al. 
(1997a:55) all crisis follow a common pattern where they develop, escalate, and subside. 
2.3.1 Strategic Crisis Management Model 
In general, researchers within the field of SCM acknowledge that crises occur in a cycle of 
different stages (Tombs and Smith, 1995, Fink, 1986b, Mitroff, 1998, Pearson and Mitroff, 
1993, Simola, 2005, Hale et al., 2006). Scholars such as Fink (1986b), Fern and Banks (2002) 
have also developed three stage- and five stage crisis models, though Mitroff‟s five-stage 
SCM model will serve as the backdrop for this study. Mitroff (1988) proposed a model that 
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divides SCM into five stages; signal detection, preparation and prevention, containment, 
recovery, and learning (figure 4). This model is cyclical and proactive. 
 
Figure 4 Five Phases of SCM (Mitroff, 1988) 
2.3.1.1 Signal Detection  
Because organizations constantly are subjected to multiple input from their internal and 
external environment (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Scott, 2003), warning signals precede all 
crises (Simola, 2005, Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Sheaffer et al., 
1998, Hensgen et al., 2003), and if detected crises may be avoided (Mitroff, 1988) or at least 
provide knowledge about an impending crisis before it reaches public domain (Fern-Banks, 
2002). Hence, signal detection may entail a mitigation of the succeeding stages with a 
following alleviation of its related consequences. Past experience and knowledge of crises 
may affect the organizations ability to detect the signals, which is why learning influence 
signal detection. Even clear warnings of impending crises can be overlooked, misinterpreted, 
or ignored (Boin  and Hart, 2003, Moynihan, 2008). Even though research emphasizes the 
critical nature of detecting early warning signals, many organizations fail to detect and 
manage these signals (Sheaffer et al., 1998). According to Pearson and Mitroff (1993) the 
main reason hindering signal detection is due to the belief that no crisis will occur in their 
organization, lack of focus on detection or by disregarding incoming signals due to their 
negative connotation.  
2.3.1.2 Prevention/Preparation 
A primary responsibility of an organization is to prevent crisis from occurring or mitigating 
its effect (Pearson et al., 1997a, McConell and Dreannan, 2006). Research reveals that those 
organizations that are prepared for a crisis before its occurrence are more likely to manage it 
successfully (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). Prevention involves risk aversion and guarding 
intangible assets such as the reputation. Corporate reputation and its importance in regards to 
CSR and SCM will be further presented in section 2.7. Preparation consist of “reducing the 
various triggers to a minimum, and preparation consist of implementing procedures and 
plans to minimize the impact of an impending crisis” (Hensgen et al., 2003:71, Simola, 2005). 
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Thus, this construct is logically deduced from signal detection (Hensgen et al., 2003) Boin 
and Lagadec (2000) in addition to Augustine (1995a) claim that prevention involves senior 
executives adopting a SCM mindset, creating a crisis management team (CMT) and crisis 
management plans (CMP). Moreover, it involves disseminating values and strategies 
throughout the organization as well as simulation exercises (Fern-Banks, 2002, Kovoor-
Misra, 1995, Simola, 2005, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). 
2.3.1.3 Containment 
The third stage of Mitroff‟s (1988) SCM model is containment. The focus of an organization 
should be to limit the duration and effects of the crisis once it has occurred (Pearson et al., 
1997a). This stage of SCM is one of the most important phases within the SCM framework, 
and subsequently the phase were the majority of businesses spend most of their resources 
(Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001, Pearson, 2002, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). According to 
Shrivastava and Simkos (1993) the key to constructive containment procedures lies in rapid, 
well-founded decisions. This stage is therefore the first actual exhibition of the solidity of past 
planning and preparation efforts (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Pearson et al., 1997a). During 
this phase the company is clearly aware that a crisis is unfolding and thus puts forward efforts 
to muster necessary resources, which involves close communication with stakeholders. Crisis 
communication will be further elaborated in section 2.4. 
2.3.1.4 Recovery  
Recovery represents the fourth phase, which entails returning to the pre-crisis norm, and the 
resolution of the crisis event. In this stage Mitroff (1988) emphasizes the facilitation of the 
organizational recovery as well as opportunities to empower crisis managers in a particular 
crisis event. Reestablishing trust and legitimacy is important (Coombs and Holladay, 2010b). 
Recovery involves short- and long term planning with the objective of minimizing the impact 
of a crisis and returning to the level of operation prior to the crisis. (Pearson et al., 1997a, 
Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Runyan, 2006). Organizations should learn internally and manage 
it externally (Hale et al., 2005). Organizations should therefore prioritize restoring their 
reputation and stakeholder trust (Fern-Banks, 2002, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b) by 
ensuring the stakeholders that the crisis is truly over (Robstad and Ihlen, 2004). SCM at this 
stage must also concentrate on ensuring that stakeholders are left with a positive impression 
of the organizations management efforts (Coombs, 2007a). Effective communication with 
stakeholder is thus important in order to prevent reputational damage.  
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2.3.1.5 Learning 
The fifth stage of Mitroff‟s SCM model encompasses organizational learning. The SCM 
literature have mainly viewed this stage as a time for reflection and critical examination, 
where organizational decisions and actions are scrutinized (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, 
Pearson et al., 1997a). “As crises are a natural and inevitable part of business, learning from 
experienced crises are imperative to better manage those of the future” (Simola, 2005, 
Kovoor-Misra, 1995, Ulmer et al., 2007, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b). The literature on 
organizational learning from crises has remained scarce (Carley and Harrald, 1997, Dekker 
and Hansen, 2004, Smith and Elliot, 2007, Lagadec, 1997, Deverell, 2009), but there is a 
general agreement in academia that learning from past experiences greatly influences the 
SCM of future events (McConell and Dreannan, 2006, Kovoor-Misra, 1995). However, 
despite the recognized agreement among scholars, learning opportunities from crisis remain 
an espoused theory rather than theory-in-use (Roux-Dufort and Metais, 1999). Organizational 
learning will be further elaborated in section 2.5. 
2.3.2 SCM in General 
Several prominent researchers such as Mitroff (1998) and Augustine (1995b) have 
underpinned that corporations are overly confident in their abilities to manage crises. A study 
conducted by Augustine (1995b) of CEO‟s attitudes towards crises in Fortune 500 companies, 
showed that 85 percent felt that a crisis was inevitable. However, barely 50 percent of the 
organizations were crisis prepared in reference to a CMP and CMT. A more recent study 
performed by Unsgaard and Silkoset (2006) showed that the management overestimates their 
potential to handle a crises successfully. The study revealed that 93 percent of Norwegian 
organizations believed they would be able to handle a crisis satisfactory. As shown in table 1 
below, merely 49 percent of them acknowledge that the organization has a CMP, and 31 
percent do not believe a crisis will occur within their organization (Unsgaard and Silkoset, 
2006). This study indicates that Norwegian organizations allocate a limited amount of 
resources on SCM. This is in alignment with Burston-Masteller study on SCM in 2002, which 
showed that approximately 90 percent of Norwegian organizations have developed a CMP 
and CMT, only one third of the companies have had crisis scenario tests (Unsgaard and 
Silkoset, 2006). This number is similar to Guth‟s (1995) research which found that only 84 
percent of organizations that have experienced a great number of crises have developed a 
CMP (Lunde, 2005). However, according to a study conducted by Barton (1993) only 13 
percent of organizations that had an operating CMP, had developed this framework in the 
aftermath of experiencing a crisis. In 2001 Tine, Norway‟s dominant dairy company, went 
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through a crisis scenario test, and the results were significantly unsuccessful witch lead to the 
formulation of a new CMP (Blaker et al., 2001, Lunde, 2005). These finding are congruent 
with Pearson and Clair‟s (1998) statement claiming that most corporations are inefficiently 
prepared to mange a crisis. 
Table 1: "Experienced crisis management” (Silkoset and Unsgaard, 2006) 
 Yes No 
Experienced crisis within the past two years 25 % 75 % 
Believes that organization may face a potential crisis in the future 69 % 31 % 
Believes the organization will manage the crisis satisfactory 93 % 7 % 
Have established a crisis team 34 % 66 % 
Have developed a crisis management plan 51 % 49 % 
Have developed a crisis communication plan 42 % 58 % 
Have developed a crisis  hotline 22 % 78 % 
According to Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) one may characterize organizations as whether they 
are crisis prepared (proactive) or crisis prone (reactive). Reactive organizations only prepare 
for crisis events that they previously have been exposed to, while proactive companies 
prepare to face a greater number of various crises that the organization have not previously 
been exposed to (Mitroff and Alpaslan, 2003). According to their research, only 5-25 percent 
of the organizations in the study were operating proactively (Mitroff and Alpaslan, 2003, 
Mitroff and Pauchant, 2001). However, several positive effect stem for operating proactively. 
Proactive organizations seem to survive longer in a hostile environment, achieve higher 
financial benefits as a result of reduced cost related to crisis events, and finally these 
organizations seem to have a higher brand equity or reputation due to their ability to prepare 
and learn from crises. Furthermore, Garcia (2006) argues that proactive SCM may result in a 
competitive advantage. The benefits of proactive crisis management are shown in the self-
designed figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Benefits of Proactive Crisis Management (Inspired by Mitroff& Alpaslan, 2003). 
 
Reactive organizations however, invest merely in SCM that is cost efficient. This indicates 
that reactive organizations believe that the consequences of a crisis is fully controllable, and 
Proactive 
Crisis 
Management
Reduced 
probability 
for crisis 
situations
Organiza-
tional 
survival
Finanical 
benefits
Enhanced 
corporate 
reputation
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
21 
 
thereby may be directly comparable to the costs of preparing for a crisis (Mitroff and 
Alpaslan, 2003, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). 
2.4 Crisis Communication 
“The initial response is critical. It has the power to restore order or chaos; to heal and 
soothe or heighten tension and cause friction; to clarify and reassure or cast doubt and 
increase uncertainty. It is a moment that in many instances can forever shape the 
image, reputation and sometimes destiny of the company”     (Fisher, 1996:102). 
Crisis communication is an important part of the third stage in the SCM model – containment. 
When crises occur, one of the main challenges for companies is to control the information 
flow that reaches the public through media coverage (Marra, 1998). The news media are the 
society‟s watchdog, serving as designators of a crisis where their judgment of an event affects 
how an organization and its management are perceived by the public (Lerbinger, 1997b). “An 
accident or disaster is no longer a private matter. The society‟s stakeholders deserve and 
demands information urgently. The crisis will therefore be subjected to various opinions 
whether the organization likes it or not”(Sjøborg, 1990:1). A major part of damage control is 
evidently to temper the media‟s criticism of management so that the organizations reputation 
is kept intact (Lerbinger, 1997b). 
 
The stakeholder‟s prior impressions towards the company may affect the stakeholder‟s 
interpretation of the message (O'Rourke, 1997). Good crisis communication and an immediate 
response are necessary due to the seeming suddenness of a crisis. Crises are dramatic, which 
makes it newsworthy and if the media can communicate the news the instant it happens, crisis 
communications dictate that a company must be prepared to respond with the same speed 
(Fink, 1986a). Protecting the corporate image and reputation from negative media exposure is 
an important part of SCM (Struges, 1994, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993). Efficient crisis 
communication is thus a key factor in order to achieve a successful reputational outcome post 
crisis (Fern-Banks, 2002, Gillingham and Noizet, 2007, Argeti, 2007, Brønn and Berg, 2005). 
Fink (1986b:96) claims that the time to begin crisis communication is “when there is no crisis 
and when it is possible to create a reservoir of goodwill”. In order to build a reservoir of 
goodwill, he stresses that it is important to have good a reputation as well as building 
relationships with stakeholders prior to a crisis, as it will function as a “buffer” i.e. “a 
reservoir of goodwill”. Coombs (2007b) provides an evidence-based framework for 
understanding how one can maximize the reputational protection afforded by post-crisis 
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communication through his Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). According to 
Coombs (2007b) crisis managers can benefit from understanding how crisis communication 
can be used to protect vital resources during a crisis. SCCT offers a framework for 
understanding and identifying factors that shape how stakeholders‟ perceive a crisis (Coombs, 
2007a).  
The initial crisis response must be quick, and a company must be willing to disclose 
information honestly and consistent in the media (Kellerman, 2006, Coombs, 2007a). “The 
most important thing a company can do when the barbarians are at the gate is to understand 
the rules of the game” (Shannon, 2006:13). Arpan and Rosko-Ewolsen (2005) study indicated 
that an urgent response lead to higher perceived credibility among stakeholders (Heath, 2001, 
Kellerman, 2006, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Larson, 1989, Coombs, 2007a). Empathy 
and emotional involvement is also highly in order to assure stakeholder that their concern is 
the number one priority within a crisis (Coombs, 2007a, Harrion, 2000, Black, 1993, Argeti, 
2007). According to McCroskey (1997) a reputation of being responsible enhances 
stakeholders trust. Failure to relate appropriately to the stakeholders, especially the media, can 
project the crisis to another level and have negative spin-off effects for a company.  
Geelmuyden-Kiese (2010) have developed the “Role Wheel” framework in order to structure 
the communication process. According to the model, it is possible to place all organizations in 
a situation where they play different roles depending on how they are perceived by the 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 6: The Crisis Wheel (Geelmuyden-Kiese, 2010) 
According to the model, a hero is perceived as action oriented and overcoming of challenges. 
The monster role represents a dominant and greedy organization with little concern for its 
stakeholders. The visionary has knowledge and shares expertise that stakeholders believe and 
listen to. The victim does not redeem its challenges and can only be saved by other parties. 
The rebel represents a typical “underdog” who challenge larger opponents (Geelmuyden, 
2010). Geelmuyden (2010) argues that in order to be perceived as legitimate during a crisis, 
the organization must prioritize people first. 
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2.5 Organizational Learning 
Organizational learning represents the fifth stage in the SCM model. Argyris and Schòn 
(1974) made a distinction between single – and double-loop learning. 
 
Figure 7 Single- and Double-loop learning (Argyris & Schøn, 1974) 
Double-loop learning involves restructuring of organizational norms, strategies and 
assumptions associated with those norms (Deverell, 2009, Smith and Elliot, 2007). This 
deeper form of learning presupposes that “error detection becomes not only connected to 
strategies, and assumptions for effective performance (single-loop learning), but also to the 
very norms which define effective performance”(Argyris and Schøn, 1978:22). Double-loop 
learning is focused on how to avoid being subjected to the same or a similar crisis in the 
future (Deverell, 2009). It offers an opportunity to change dysfunctional cultural aspects 
which hinder effective SCM. Scholars critique the ability to effectively learn within a crisis. 
“Despite attempts to apply lessons from one crisis to another, the ambiguity of cause and 
effect relationships allows multiple, contradictory, and mistaken lessons to emerge from 
crises” (Boin  et al., 2005:116). This represents an important view, because misinterpretations 
may increase the severity of the crisis and hinder effective SCM responses. Smith and Elliot 
(2007) argue barriers to organizational learning are caused by single-loop learning. However, 
they also mention that it may be due to ineffective communication and denial, centrality of 
crisis expertise as well as due to the disregard of important information from stakeholders.  
Table 2  “Barriers to Effective Learning During Crises” (Moynihan, 2008) 
Barriers to Effective Learning during Crises 
 The high consequentiality of crises makes trial and error learning prohibitive. 
 Crises require inter-organizational rather than organizational learning. 
 There is a lack of relevant experience, heuristics, or technologies to draw on. 
 The scope of learning required is greater than for routine situations. 
 The ambiguity of previous experience gives rise to faulty lesson drawing. 
 Crises narrow focus and limit information processing. 
 There is a rigidity of response: actors recycle old solutions to new problems 
 Political dynamics give rise to bargaining and suboptimal decisions. 
 Crises provoke defensive postures and denial of responsibility. 
 Crises provoke opportunism as actors focus on their positive role. 
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2.6 Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture is defined by Edgar Schein (1999) as  
“a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way you 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Sims and Brinkmann, 
2003:249).  
According to Pearson et al. (1997a:58) the best-prepared organizations share “convergent 
values and priorities that will drive the organization‟s SCM preparation and response”. This 
is consistent with Mitroff (1989) arguments that culture is perhaps the most crucial factor 
underpinning better crisis preparedness (Elsubbaugh et al., 2004).  
In order to control damage to the organization‟s reputation, the management must 
acknowledge that the values are at stake in a crisis. Schein (1999) asserts, that a crisis tests 
what the leader values and brings these values to the surface (Sims and Brinkmann, 2003). A 
crisis may offer the opportunity to use the occasion of the media attention as an opportunity to 
publicize the organization‟s mission, values and operations (Coombs, 2007a, Sims and 
Brinkmann, 2003, Pearson, 2002). If the company‟s actions are consistent with their values, 
the organization legitimacy and brand value may increase post crisis due to stakeholder‟s 
positive evaluation of the SCM.  
According to Pearson et al. (1997a) the best-prepared organizations are guided by corporate 
values rooted in the business culture when confronting a crisis. J&J‟s successful crisis 
management in the Tylenol incident remains a classic example of values reflected in action 
(Pearson et al., 1997a). James Burke, the CEO at the time, led his organization based on the 
direction provided by the 40 year old J&J credo which placed the company‟s responsibility to 
their primary stakeholder, the customers above that of towards other stakeholders (such as 
shareholders) during the crisis. According to Schein (1999) actions speak louder than words, 
and therefore role-modelling behaviour is a very powerful tool that leaders may apply to 
develop to influence the corporate culture (Sims and Brinkmann, 2003). Enron‟s management 
serves as a good example of the detrimental effects of poor role-modelling behaviour. 
Another case that serves as a good example of negative organizational culture is the Astra 
USA crisis. The pharmaceutical company Astra USA received a great deal of negative media 
publicity and humiliation when knowledge regarding the organizations degrading treatment of 
women became known to society. The female staff was being sexually harassed by the 
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management which led to million dollar lawsuits, a reorganization of the company where 
current management had to step down. As a result of the crisis, the organization suffered 
reputational loss because it neglected to integrate CSR policies (which can be seen in relation 
to the diversity category in the Socrates framework), within the organization and failed to 
recognize warning signals from the environment (Coombs, 1999). 
2.7 Corporate Reputation 
According to David Bernstein “trust has to be earned. You won‟t get it by claiming it. Companies get 
to be admired over time. A good reputation cannot be made over night. It may only be lost over night”
         (Geelmuyden-Kiese, 2006).  
Corporate reputation is defined by Fombrum (1996) as “a perceptual representation of a 
company‟s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm‟s overall appeal to all of 
its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals . Corporate reputation represents 
the organizations intellectual capital (Larkin, 2003) or stockpile of goodwill (Fink, 1986b), 
and it is according to Fombrum (2004) formed based interactions between the stakeholders 
and the organization (Coombs and Holladay, 2010b).“There is a strong consensus in the 
practitioner and academic writings that a reputation is an extremely valuable intangible 
organizational resource” (Coombs, 2007a). A study performed by AON.com (2007) on 320 
organizations in 29 countries on risk management, revealed that a company‟s greatest fear is 
reputational loss (Evensen et al., 2007). According to Aaker (1991) and Keller (1993) 
corporate response to a crisis appears to be the critical determinant of the impact the crisis 
have on consumer beliefs that constitute brand equity (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000). “The 
organizations CSR is based on how it handles nonfinancial concerns, and it therefore has 
significant implications for reputation” (Fombrun, 2005). According to Blowfield and 
Murray (2008) a strong correlation exists between CSR and reputation. This may be linked to 
the fact that CSR commitment enhances corporate reputation, through the development of a 
steady and long-lasting relationship with stakeholders (Perrini et al., 2006).  
“CSR practices that are perceived as sincere by external actors and are an integral part of a 
company‟s business strategy, can potentially contribute to differentiation in developing a 
strong, positive corporate brand” (Hillestad et al., 2010). This is because CSR is an important 
consideration of how stakeholders feel about an organization (Coombs, 2007a). Favorable 
relationships with stakeholders occurs as a result of meeting and exceeding stakeholder 
expectations (Coombs, 2004). According to Ulmer (2001a) favorable organization-
stakeholder relationships are a benefit during SCM. Aslop (2004:17) states that 
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
26 
 
“organizations build up „reputational capital‟ to tide them over in turbulent times. If a crisis 
strikes, the reputation suffers less and rebounds more quickly”. According to stakeholder 
theory, an organization survives and succeed by effectively managing their stakeholders 
(Coombs, 2007a).  
2.8 Genders Assignment of Blame 
Laufer and Coombs (2006) have identified stakeholders traits, such as gender, to influence 
stakeholders perception of blame in a product-harm crisis (PHC). PHC‟s are specific, well-
publicised occurrences where products are found to be defective or dangerous (Simkos and 
Shrivastava, 1993), and are among a firm‟s worst nightmares. Laufer and Gillespie (2004) 
examined the differences between genders attribution of blame in the context of an ambiguous 
PHC, and found that women, more than men, blamed the companies for the PHC. Women felt 
more vulnerable than men when reading about the PHC, because women were more 
concerned that a similar accident could occur to them. This, in turn, caused women, more than 
men, to perceive the PHC to be more severe. Harris and Miller (2000) found similar results – 
women view threatening events as more severe than men due to biological and socialization 
factors. 
2.9 Literature Shortcomings; The Relationship between CSR and SCM 
Even though there seem to exist several shared dimensions of CSR and SCM, the probable 
communalities of the two variables that proves a causal relationship have not been studied in 
any publications (Tombs and Smith, 1995, Mitroff, 2011, Alpaslan, 2011). Tombs and Smith 
(1995) acknowledges that conducted studies isolated focus have failed to embrace the highly 
integrative nature of the disciplines (Mitroff, 2011, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Mitroff and 
Anagnos, 2000, Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin, 2003, Alpaslan, 2011). However, both disciplines 
contain valuable contemporary information in the present complex and dynamic global 
business environment, where CSR concerns represent a high priority because mismanagement 
of such may potentially destroy an organizations reputation (Boin and Lagadec, 2000). 
According to Pearson and Mitroff (1993) and Alpaslan (2009b) the relationship between SCM 
and stakeholders have also been largely overlooked. A common denominator of all crises is 
that they may harm organizational stakeholders (Mitroff et al., 1996). Inevitably, crises focus 
attention on corporate public, social , economic, legal and ethical responsibilities (Carroll, 
1979, Alpaslan et al., 2009b). 
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The future of existence of a company is highly dependent on input from its complex network 
of external stakeholders. Therefore successful stakeholder management in SCM is crucial for 
a company during crises (Kolk and Pinkse, 2006, Mitroff, 1994, Tombs and Smith, 1995, 
Vaaland et al., 2008). CSR have become a priority for today‟s business leaders due to 
stakeholders base their brand evaluations on corporations CSR-activities (Porter and Kramer, 
2006). Negative critique which may harm the organizations reputation may be avoided or at 
least reduced in situations where corporations act socially responsible, because consumers 
will have a more positive reference point for which they base their total judgement of the 
organization legitimacy (Crayer et al., 1997). 
Bhattachayra and Sen (2004) suggest that stakeholders reward socially responsible 
corporations “through their resilience to negative information about the company”, and have 
a greater tendency to forgive a company for mistakes, such as a crisis, if the corporation has a 
prior positive CSR reputation (Coombs and Holladay, 2010b). This is based on the argument 
that CSR represent performing “good deeds” in the community of which it operates, hence 
results in an enhanced favorable corporate reputation (Wigley and Pfau, 2010, Bhattacharya 
and Sen, 2004, Fombrun, 2005, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Hess et al., 2002).  
“CSR beliefs will be activated in response to a crisis, as part of the activation of 
corporate associations that occur because stakeholders engage in making attributions 
about the crisis. This activation enhances the likelihood of the CSR halo having a 
spillover effect on attributional judgments” (Klein and Dawar, 2004:204).  
Hence, the halo-effect in which organization‟s prior reputation and image function as a shield 
to deflect reputational harm resulting from a crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 2006, Klein and 
Dawar, 2004, Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). Fomburn and Van Riel (2004) argues that at 
present, angry stakeholders are increasingly likely to generate crisis (Coombs, 2007a), and 
highlights the increasing importance of integrating the stakeholder approach with an 
organization‟s SCM (Smith et al., 1996). According to Schneiz and Epstein (2005) a 
reputation for CSR protected organizations from stock declines associated with the crisis. 
Several empirical studies found evidence of quantifiable financial benefits from CSR. Firms 
that address the concerns of the stakeholders are less likely to become targets of boycotts 
(Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). If companies prove its social responsibility, honesty and 
concern with stakeholder welfare prior and during a crisis, can improve the organizations 
reputation in the long run (Simkos and Shrivastava, 1993). 
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3 Hypotheses and Research Model 
This section presents the primary research model; the theoretical relationship between CSR 
and the SCM model. Five hypotheses have been established for each stage of Mitroff‟s (1988) 
conceptualization of SCM. The secondary research model demonstrates the theoretical 
relationship between how CSR affect stakeholders assignment of blame in a PHC. 
Accordingly, nine hypotheses have been developed.  
3.1 Primary Research Hypotheses 
3.1.1 Signal Detection  
 
Previous studies have demonstrated Norwegian business managers unrealistic optimism in 
relation to SCM (Unsgaard and Silkoset, 2006). History has shown that failure to detect 
warning signal may lead to severe CSR crises such as is evidenced by the Union Carbide 
Accident in Bhopal, India (Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001, Shrivastava, 2005, Trotter et al., 
1989). To detect and identify triggers of a latent crisis requires awareness towards the 
environment, and therefore it is essential that the company is tuned in to receive signals from 
both internal and external sources (Heath and Ni, 2008). This may best be attained if the 
attention towards detection is embedded within the organizational culture (Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin, 2003). Våland and Heide (2008) claims that socially responsible firms have an 
increased capacity to monitor and evaluate occurrences in the external environment. The 
implementation and practice of clear and open communication channels with various 
stakeholders is paramount (Pearson et al., 1997b), which is why the authors purpose that 
Freeman‟s (1984a) stakeholder approach plays a major role in the detection stage. According 
to Dozier (1992) early identification of discontent stakeholders enhances an organizations 
ability to resolve a problem and keep the stakeholders satisfied. A company that is known for 
its stakeholder approach will not only profit from internal benefits of a sharpened culture, but 
in addition stakeholders will be more inclined to share potentially harmful information which 
illustrates the double-effect of the stakeholder approach. This improves the organizations 
ability to detect warning signals. Thus, the authors purpose that CSR through the stakeholder 
approach is important for signal detection. Based on these facts, the authors hypothesize that; 
H1: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to detect crises. 
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3.1.2  Prevention/Preparation  
 
The rationale behind the positive effect CSR has on crisis prevention/preparation, stems from 
the inherent interest for a responsible company to avoid the damaging consequences of a 
crisis that impacts its stakeholders (Tombs and Smith, 1995). CSR oriented companies adhere 
to their moral obligations to safeguard the interests of their stakeholders (Boin and Lagadec, 
2000), and Alpaslan et al. (2009b) claims that access to stakeholder information and 
facilitation of information increases the organization‟s preparedness. According to Våland and 
Heide (2008) one of the distinguishing features found in socially responsible firms is the 
strong capability to handle great demands put forward by stakeholders. An integrated 
stakeholder approach must incorporate stakeholder communication, a detection-tuned- and a 
double-loop learning culture (as viewed in section 2.5) (McConell and Dreannan, 2006, Boin 
and Lagadec, 2000). Shrivastava and Siomkos (1989) claims that organizations who practice 
proactive communication and interaction with stakeholders, are better equipped to respond to 
changing conditions in their environment, and are more apt to succeed in preventing a crisis 
from escalating (Vassilikopoulou et al., 2009). Kovoor-Misra (1995) suggests that a 
multidimensional approach for a crisis prepared organizations includes implementation of 
CSR activities similar to the Socrates categories. E.g. cooperating with suppliers that adhere 
to CSR standards reduces the probability of being involved in crises stemming from the 
supply chains immoral actions. Such measures can be viewed as part of SOCRATES Non-Us 
Operations, and thus may aid in crisis prevention/preparation. Kovoor-Misra (2000) 
highlights the importance of the values when preparing for crises, where CMP‟s and CMT‟s 
are part of a positive CSR culture. Furthermore, CSR may recognize the aspects of an 
organization‟s operations that potentially can be the source of malfunction (Mitroff, 1994), 
because a CSR-oriented companies are better equipped with effective routines directed at 
handling warning signals and their potential escalation. Hence, CSR is suggested by scholars 
to be a strategy for preempting a crisis situation (Klein and Dawar, 2004, Bhattacharya and 
Sen, 2004, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b). Based on these facts the authors hypothesize; 
H2: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to prevent and prepare for crises. 
 
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
30 
 
3.1.3  Containment  
 
Shrivastava (1988) suggest that companies need to have an adequate conception of CSR in 
order to respond more effectively to crises. Fomburn and Gardberg (2006) stress that CSR 
could be considered an effective strategic tool, through which companies may decrease or 
limit the potential vast consequences of a crisis. According to Våland and Heide (2008) 
socially responsible firms have an enhanced ability to respond to changing conditions in their 
environment. Thus, the outcome of a crisis is largely attributed to the firm‟s pre-crisis 
endeavours (Ulmer, 2001a, Shrivastava et al., 1988, Shrivastava, 2005, Pearson, 2002, Hale et 
al., 2006, Stephens et al., 2005). According to Coombs (2010b) variables such as crisis type, 
prior reputation, crisis history and attributions of responsibility can impact an organization‟s 
reputation during the containment phase. Therefore, it is essential that these factors are 
considered when corporations respond to crises. The time of crisis is the point to which the 
real values and strengths are revealed, and thus a track record of strong stakeholder 
relationships and positive corporate reputation becomes extremely valuable. Organizations 
prior social performance is important, because having a reputation for CSR may provide 
financial value when faced with a crisis (Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). This argument is based 
on the previously mentioned concept of CSR acting as a reservoir of goodwill. Malden Mills 
is a good example of how CSR practises such as strong community involvement (the first of 
the Socrates categories) contained a serious crisis (Ulmer et al., 2007, Ulmer, 2001b). Another 
example that highlights the relationship between CSR and containment is the situation that 
McDonald‟s faced during the riots in LA. McDonald‟s was renowned for their local CSR 
effort which spared them from a potential crisis (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006).One should be 
aware though, that a CSR reputation may result in the reverse effect during a crisis, in that 
expectations are set high and may thus prove difficult to satisfy. According to Ulmer and 
Sellnow (Ulmer, 2001b), a company with no prior CSR profiling will be unsuccessful if it 
tries to renew its CSR profiling throughout the crisis itself. Based on the presented arguments, 
the authors believe that CSR will strongly improve an organization‟s ability to contain crises 
and thus hypothesize that; 
H3: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to contain crises. 
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3.1.4 Recovery      
 
The success of returning to business as usual will be heavily influenced by how the 
organization have managed its stakeholder relationships, the media and the amount of 
goodwill it has prior to the crisis (Hale et al., 2005, Coombs, 2007a). Corporate reputation is 
closely linked to stakeholder trust, and thus the reputation is a valuable resource for SCM. A 
pre-crises CSR reputation may be viewed as a reputation building, protection factor for the 
organizations survival (Whitehouse, 2006, Doh and Guay, 2006, McWilliams et al., 2006). 
Fomburn (2006) employs the term corporate citizenship, and advocates that an organizations 
social performance have an imperative role in the self-reinforcing cycle of gaining legitimacy 
and reputation. Ulmer (2001a) also claims that organizations that focus on maintaining a 
positive reciprocal relationship with stakeholders are better equipped for creating long 
standing trust and loyalty. Scholars have previously suggested that firms with good 
reputations may withstand crises, such as the Tylenol tampering in the 1980s. J&J suffered 
less economic losses than firms without CSR reputation and a culture for stakeholder 
management (Fombrun, 1996). Jones et al. (2000) found that firms scoring highly in Fortune 
Magazine‟s annual survey of the “Most Admired Firms in America” suffered lower market 
valuation losses in 1989 stock market plunge, than did firms with lower Fortune reputation 
ratings” (Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). The authors believe that CSR can be used as an overall 
strategy to restore damaged reputations, by successful stakeholder management, the following 
hypothesis is; 
H4: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to recover from crises. 
3.1.5 Learning      
 
According to KPMG survey (2005), the top drivers for organizations CSR efforts include 
learning and risk management. Many researchers argue that reciprocal relationships between 
organizations and stakeholders are pivotal for learning to occur (Coombs and Holladay, 
2010b). Thus, managers must engage in double-loop learning which requires them to 
reconsider their goals and values (Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001, Alpaslan et al., 2009a). 
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Furthermore, it also depends on the organizational culture, where conscious efforts towards 
conducting transparent operations as well as internal attitudes that supports the learning 
process in times of crises. When a crisis do occur, no organizations may solely rely on its own 
set of discrete skills or knowledge to prevent future crises (Lerbinger, 1997b, Pearson and 
Mitroff, 1993, Brooks, 2005). A crises affects the organizations stakeholders, and thus 
knowledge sharing throughout as well as in the aftermath of a crisis is important for the 
organizational own learning. In addition, it may aid in the process of reestablishing 
stakeholders trust, which ultimately may lead to a stronger corporate reputation. A learning 
culture characterizes CSR-organizations, thus the authors hypothesize that; 
H5: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to learn from crises. 
As an imperative to the research question, the authors will test the direct effect of the CSR 
framework against the SCM framework, thereby affirming or confuting the primary 
overarching research model. Based on this, the following hypothesis was developed; 
H6: CSR has a positive effect on organizations SCM 
3.2 Primary Research Model 
 
Figure 8: The Primary Research Model 
3.3 Secondary Research Hypotheses 
As an extension of the primary research, the authors developed two secondary research 
models (figure 9 and 10). The first model investigates whether CSR moderates the 
relationship between SCM and blame in light of a PHC. The second research model 
investigates whether attributions mediates the relationship between CSR and blame. The two 
research models are comprised in the summary research model in figure 11, in section 3.4. 
The literature review has exemplified how organizations SCM affect stakeholders‟ 
assignment of blame in a PHC. As a result firms may experience (i) loss in baseline sales, (ii) 
reduced effectiveness of its marketing instruments, (iii) increased cross sensitivity to rival 
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firms‟ marketing-mix activities, and (iv) decreased cross impact of its marketing-mix 
instruments on the sales of competing, unaffected brands (Simola, 2005). PHC and product 
recalls can result in negative publicity, threatening the company‟s reputation and image (Van 
Heerde et al., 2007). A PHC resulting in stakeholder blame may cause the erosion of 
consumer trust, brand equity, and consumers‟ willingness to purchase the brand in the future  
(Dean, 2004). Thus, the authors propose that there exists a direct link between SCM and 
assignment of blame in a PHC. 
H7: Effective SCM reduces assignment of blame 
Klein and Dawar (2004) have demonstrated the link between CSR and attributions of blame. 
Stakeholders existing positive expectations may provide organizations with a form of 
insurance policy against the negative impact a PHC have on stakeholders attribution of blame 
(Klein and Dawar, 2004). Siomkos et al (Klein and Dawar, 2004, Dawar and Pillutla, 2000) 
has identified CSR as a factor that influences stakeholders response to a PHC. This can be 
seen in relation to research that reveals that CSR has a “halo effect” on consumer judgements 
(i.e. CSR has an insulating effect on attributions of blame) (2009). “A halo effect is the 
tendency for attitudes about ones salient beliefs to colour attitudes about another (Klein and 
Dawar, 2004, Brown and Dacin, 1997). According to Klein and Dawar (2004) CSR is cast as 
a moderator between CSR and blame. Thus, the authors propose that;  
H8: A positive CSR reputation moderates the relationship between SCM and assignment of blame. 
Social responsible initiatives and corporate reputation can be effective strategic tools for 
controlling and minimising the danger of destroying a favourable reputation among 
stakeholders (Blythe, 2008:68). Laczniak, et al. (2001) identified that a link exists between a 
company‟s reputation and blame attributions for in a PHC, while Laufer and Coombs (2006) 
suggested that managers can interpret the different ways stakeholders react to a PHC based on 
the reputation of the company involved. If a company has a favourable CSR reputation, the 
authors propose that a lower degree of blame will be attributed to the company.  
H9: A positive CSR reputation reduces assignment of blame 
Klein and Dawar (Fombrun, 2005) argues stakeholders spontaneously construct attributions of 
blame in PHC (2004). According to Coombs (Folkes, 1984, Folkes and Kotsos, 1986) it is 
essential for mangers to understand how stakeholders perceive and cognitively process crises 
and post-crisis messages, because successful CSR communication assist in reducing damage 
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incurred by the impacted organization (2010b). Attributions form the basis of revision and 
updating of enduring central stakeholder judgements such as brand evaluations (Fediuk et al., 
2010), because stakeholders search for the cause of the crisis and an understanding of whom 
is responsible (e.g. Whom should they blame) (Folkes, 1984, Klein and Dawar, 2004). 
Attribution theory explain that stakeholders base their judgements on the cause of the crisis by 
analyzing locus, stability and control of causality, which are the three most powerful and 
widely employed dimensions (Folkes, 1984, Fediuk et al., 2010, Folkes and Kotsos, 1986). 
According to Weiner (Kent and Martinko, 1995, Coombs, 1995, Weiner, 1985, Folkes, 1984, 
Davies, 1992) locus refers to whether the event that triggers the crisis is perceived to be 
internal or external. Stability refers to whether the crisis is stable or temporary, and 
controllability refers to the degree the company is in control of preventing similar types of 
crisis from occurring in the future. If the locus is external, the behavior temporary and the 
company in control of preventing similar types of crisis from occurring in the future, less 
blame (responsibility) will be attributed to the company post crisis. However, if the locus is 
internal, the behavior is stable and uncontrollable; the respondents tend to attribute more 
blame (responsibility) to the company post crisis. The intention of studying attributions in a 
PHC setting is to establish whether CSR antecedents bias locus, stability, and controllability 
attributions. Based on the presented arguments, the authors propose that the trigger event for 
the PHC will be judged as more external, less stable and more controllable in organizations 
that have a positive CSR reputation. Hence, the following hypotheses are deducted;  
H10a: A positive CSR reputation will cause the locus of the crisis to be perceived as external rather 
than internal.  
H10b: A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event to be perceived as temporary rather than 
stable. 
H10c: A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event will be perceived as controllable rather 
than uncontrollable. 
Based on Klein and Dawar‟s (2004) research, where they found attributions (locus, stability and 
controllability) to mediate the relationship between CSR and buying intentions when faced by a 
PHC, the author want to test if positive CSR rating can lead to lower levels of blame attributed. 
H11a: Locus mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
H11b: Stability mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
H11c: Control mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
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3.4 Secondary Research Model 
 
 
Figure 9 Secondary Research Model 
 
Figure 10 Secondary Research Model 
The secondary research consists of two research models. The first model is shown in figure 9 
demonstrates the investigation of the direct relationship between SCM and blame, and how 
CSR may act as a moderator on the relationship between SCM and blame. Figure 10 entails 
the investigation of the direct relationship between CSR and blame, as well as the direct effect 
CSR have on attributions (locus, stability and control) concerning the investigation of whether 
attributions mediate the relationship between CSR and blame. Hence, the authors will test 
whether CSR affects the attribution process itself, and if attributions in turn influence blame. 
These attributions are conceptualized as a mediator of the impact of SCM on blame. Overall, 
CSR association are cast as a moderator of attribution as whole in reference to the overarching 
research model. Figure 11 shows the summary of figure 9 and 10, visualizing the proposed 
secondary research model. It should be noted that each research model (moderating and 
mediating effects) will be tested separately.  
 
Figure 11 Secondary Research Summary Model 
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4  Methodology 
“It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above 
all, try something”      Franklin D. Roosevelt (1945 -1982) 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach, including an explanation of the research 
design, data collection and the credibility of research findings. 
4.1  Research Design 
The research design is the “overall plan for relating the conceptual research problem to 
relevant practicable empirical research” (1980). Ideally it would be beneficial for this 
research paper to prove a causal relationship between CSR and SCM, however due to 
challenges of unfeasible isolation and detailed measurement it is difficult to proclaim 
causality within the social sciences (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). The literature review 
disclosed that limited empirical knowledge has been developed to investigate the explicit 
relationship between the two academic fields, which suggests that an exploratory design is 
appropriate. However, the authors have developed several hypotheses based on a descriptive 
choice of research strategy, and assessed this best suitable to answer the research question, 
and moreover meet the set objectives for the thesis. The descriptive design allows for the 
results to be generalized (Saunders et al., 2009). There exists two different types of research 
approaches; induction and deduction (Frankfort-Nachimas and Nachimas, 2005). Deduction 
involves “the gathering of facts to confirm or disprove hypothesized relationships among 
variables that have been deducted from existing knowledge” (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005, 
Gill and Johnson, 2010). Given the research theme and limited empirical knowledge and 
research within this field, a deductive approach was chosen (Hygen, 2005, Vikan and Rostrup, 
2010). Derived from the research question the authors adapted the philosophical stance of the 
natural scientist, i.e. the research will reflect the philosophy of positivism. 
4.2 Research Method 
“Research methods refer to systematic, focused and orderly collection of data for the purpose 
of obtaining information from them to answer a particular research question” (Gill and 
Johnson, 2010, Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005, Saunders et al., 2007). Saunders (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug, 2005:101) mentions two ways of research methods for collecting data; qualitative 
and quantitative methods, however these are not mutually exclusive (2007). Quantitative 
methods are preferable in analytical deductive hypothesis testing, and were therefore found as 
best suitable for the study. 
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4.3  Data Collection  
4.3.1 Survey 
The data collection occured through a web-based questionnaire and represents a primary data 
source. According to deVaus (2002) surveys include “all techniques of data collection in 
which each person is asked to respond to the same set of questions in a predetermined 
order”(Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005:69). The authors will apply a cross-sectional, descriptive 
survey, because it focuses on the accuracy of the findings and whether they may be 
generalized (Saunders et al., 2007). In addition it enhances the ability to generalize finding, 
and indentify the variability in the research phenomena (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005, 
Saunders et al., 2007). Based on the objectives, several issues complicated the data collection. 
This implied an extensive sampling size, great difficulties of accessing requested key 
respondents (business leaders) and a large number of items. Due to this complexity as well as 
restrictions in time, the data collection was outsourced to Norstat, the leading professional 
data collection company in Northern Europe (Saunders et al., 2007). Norstat was chosen due 
to their strong and well repudiated brand name and because they have the region‟s largest 
panel (Norstat, 2011). In addition, the authors believe that outsourcing the data collection best 
inhibits contaminated or distorted answers, increases the sample size, the likely response rate 
as well as being best suited for the type and number of questions being asked. This 
cooperation was rendered possible due to generous financial support from JLK group and 
TINE. The survey represents the type of a self-administered on-line questionnaire which is 
completed by the respondents on their convenient time (Norstat, 2011) which results are 
collected electronically by Norstat through the Internet. 
4.3.2 Instrumentation 
In order to investigate the primary RQ, two empirical frameworks were utilized in the survey; 
SOCRATES and Mitroff‟s five stage SCM-model. In order to investigate the secondary RQ, 
the authors self-designed two fictional cases which were included in the questionnaire. This 
may be viewed in appendix A. When the 60 scale items were designed, room for diversity in 
interpretation was minimized by removing unnecessary words and focusing on wording of the 
scale items to ensure that each respondent interpreted the questions similarly. Furthermore, 
double-barrelled and leading questions were avoided, and the items were placed in a natural 
order (Saunders et al., 2007). The two cases were strategically placed, in order to prevent 
habitual answers and boredom. Attention was paid to the layout, the natural order and length 
of the questionnaire as this may impact the respondents answers (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
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Nachmias, 2005). The questionnaire included a covering letter explaining the purpose of the 
questionnaire, as well as an explanation of how the respondents needed to complete the 
survey (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005). Theories in the field of CSR and SCM are primarily in 
English. To have the questionnaire in English might have a negative effect on the 
respondents‟ rates (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2005). To alleviate this risk, the two 
frameworks were written in Norwegian and to ensure that the original English meaning was 
maintained, a back-translation technique, as recommended by Grewal and Tansuhaj (Selnes 
and Sallis, 2003) was applied. This systematic process of developing the instrument were 
performed thoroughly, as the quality of the survey is directly related to the credibility of the 
questionnaire (2001). 
4.3.2.1 Primary Research: Measuring Corporate Social Responsibility 
To measure Norwegian corporations‟ abilities and aspirations within CSR, SOCRATES; The 
CSR Ratings Monitor was applied as an instrument. The authors‟ made this decision based on 
the fact that SOCRATES is the first and largest socially screened index in the world (Selnes, 
1999). Moreover, the lack of a universally accepted definition of CSR (Fishman et al., 2005) 
lead SOCRATES to be a better option than self-designing an instrument. The authors‟ applied 
these categories and developed 15 scale items on the basis of correspondence with academics, 
but foremost through inspiration from earlier studies and academic articles within the field of 
CSR. In addition 8 general items of CSR was also included in the survey. Prominent 
researcher within the CSR field, such as Lars Jacob Tynes Pedersen, offered their thoughts in 
order to maximize the validity of the instrument and the developed items.  
A five point Likert scale, with the extreme indicators ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree” were utilized. In addition “do not know” category was included. “The 
values of the Liker-scale exhibit the weights and direction of the items based on their level of 
favourableness”(Aupperle et al., 1985). 
4.3.2.2 Primary Research Measuring Strategic Crisis Management 
To measure Norwegian corporations‟ abilities and aspirations within SCM, Mitroffs five stage 
SCM model was applied. This framework have been utilized in other studies and have been 
confirmed valid and reliable by scholars around the world and is widely utilized in the SCM 
literature (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2005, Dillman, 2000). The authors‟ developed 
14 scale items for measuring SCM. In addition 8 general SCM items was included in the 
survey. The items were measured on a five point Likert scale. 
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4.3.2.3 Secondary Research Instrumentation 
In order to measure the secondary RQ, two self-designed, fictional cases (iChocolate and A-
Meieriet) was developed, which may be viewed in appendix A. However, only A-Meieriet 
was chosen to be analysed, as the items in iChocolate contained methodological weaknesses. 
The design involved three between-subject conditions (positive CSR, negative CSR and a 
control condition (in which no CSR information was provided), and accordingly, three 
versions of the questionnaire was developed. Thus, CSR represents the manipulated variable 
in the study. A normal PHC was chosen purposely in order to present a realistic study. The 
authors find this approach more valuable for organizations operating in Norway, as abnormal, 
extreme crisis occurs more seldom and would provoke abnormal. 
The authors chose to utilize Weiner (Simola, 2005) framework as the main inspiration when 
designing the items. Some additional general items were also included. In total the two cases 
comprise of 15 items. In A-Meieriet item 53, 54 and 55 comprise locus, while stability is 
measured by item 56 and controllability represented item 57. SCM was measured by item 58. 
Item 59 measures buying intension and item 60 comprise trust as a measure of blame. Locus 
was measured utilizing a percentage scale ranging from 0 to 100. The other items were 
measured with a five-point Likert scale.  
4.3.3 Pre-testing the Questionaire 
“However pressed for time you are, do your best to give the questions a trial run, as, without a trial 
run, you have no way of knowing your questionnaire will succeed”        (1980) 
A survey pre-test is needed in order to validate the measurement instrument (Bell, 1999:128). 
A web survey pretest (N=20) was conducted in order to check whether issues such as 
understanding, the level of difficulty, the willingness to answer sensitive questions and the 
time it took to answer the questionnaire. The respondents were contacted by telephone after 
the completion and were asked to offer input on potential alterations. Norstat also conducted a 
survey pre-test (N=30) to determine how well the questionnaire worked, and to further 
validate the measurement instrument. This process lasted one week and the data generated 
from the pre-test indicated good variance and sensible mean values. The results after one 
week with pretesting, demonstrated a need to correct spelling mistakes as well as removing 
some items as they were misunderstood.  
4.3.4 Sample 
The population comprises of Norwegian executives, top and middle business managers. The 
sampling frame consists of Norwegian business executives (top and middle) managers 
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represented through Norstats‟ expert panel. The expert panel consists of more than 3000 
respondents from different geographic locations, company sizes, and sectors in Norway. 
Access to the panel ensured a high variance among the respondents. Furthermore, large 
amounts of data from a high amount of respondents, along a fairly good control over the 
process and the ability to generate representative findings strengthened the study (Olsen, 
2009). The sampling technique is a probability (or representative) sampling, indicating that 
the different business leaders of the sampling frame have equal probabilities of being chosen 
(Gripsrud et al., 2007, Selnes, 1999). This enhances the generalizability of the study‟s results. 
Norstat carried out a process which included both reminders and recruitments, until the agreed 
200 respondents had completed the questionnaire. This method minimized the skeweness. The 
sampling frame was divided into three groups; positive CSR priming, negative CSR priming 
as well as a control group.  
4.4 Credibility of Research Findings 
This section addresses reliability and validity issues in relation to quantitative data collection. 
4.4.1 Reliability 
The term reliability refers to the extent to which the results are consistent over time and 
whether the data is an accurate representation of the population, as well as if the collected data 
of the study can be reproduced under a similar methodology (Saunders et al., 2009). If these 
conditions are met and there is a transparency in how the conclusions were obtained from the 
data, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 2005). The data collected from the questionnaire may be subjected to several 
threats to reliability such as respondent error, respondent bias, observer error and observer 
bias (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Respondent error is a term that describes a situation in 
which the researcher receives atypical answers, as a result of the respondent being placed in a 
situation that feels deviant from normal (Robson, 2002, Gripsrud et al., 2007). Questioning 
leaders in regards to their SCM may render some biases, especially if the businesses recently 
have experienced a crisis. Mood swings may  have influenced the responses, which may yield 
inconsistent findings increasing the participant error (Saunders et al., 2009). Participant bias 
will represent a lesser threat due to the insurance of anonymity in the survey. To ensure the 
reliability of the survey, random errors (e.g. misunderstanding items) must be minor (Gripsrud 
et al. 2007). The observer error was reduced due the self administered questionnaire. Skewed 
respondent distribution is a type of bias that occurs when the respondent tries to manipulate 
the research, which normally occurs when answering sensitive questions such as a crisis event 
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and the business perspectives on ethics which is prevalent this research. The Cronbach‟s alpha 
test was applied in order to ensure the internal consistency (Saunders et al., 2009). Insufficient 
knowledge or experience regarding CSR and/or SCM may have led the respondents to 
deliberately guess some answers. 
4.4.2  Validity 
Validity is concerned with whether researchers measure what they intended to measure. 
Internal validity refers to whether the items measured what the study intended to measure 
(Mitchell, 1996). External validity relates to the generalizability of the study – whether the 
results of the study are transmissible to similar studies or research (Saunders et al., 2009). 
When assessing validity of the questionnaire, the concepts of content validity (e.g. if the items 
cover the research question adequately), construct validity (e.g the extent to which the items 
measure the presence of the constructs which the study‟ intend to measure), and criterion 
validity (e.g. whether the items have the ability to make accurate predictions) is central to 
address (Mitchell, 1996). Convergent and discriminant validity are important subcategories of 
construct validity (Saunders et al., 2009). Convergent validity occurs when items that are 
expected to measure the same construct are correlated with each other. Discriminant validity 
occurs when items that measures different constructs have no correlation with each other. 
Robson (2002) has chartered threats to validity such as history, testing, instrumentation, 
mortality, maturation, and ambiguity about causal direction (Gripsrud et al., 2007). To 
maintain the validity of the study, systematic errors (e.g. leave out important questions) was 
avoided (Gripsrud et al. 2007).  
4.5 Methods of Analysis 
This paper will focus on these following statistical tests; 
4.5.1 Factor Analysis (FA) 
The purpose of a FA can be explained as categorizing variables into a smaller number of 
fundamental factor variables (Saunders et al., 2009). FA uses correlations among many items 
to search for clusters and the purpose is to simplify the data structure, by revealing a smaller 
number of underlying factors (Clausen, 2009, Hair et al., 2006). An exploratory FA technique 
was employed. Even though the study has a deductive approach and is concerned with testing 
the extent to which the data and the five developed hypotheses correspond (Hair et al., 2010), 
an exploratory multivariate technique was chosen. The authors found an explorative FA 
appropriate to analyze the underlying structure of interrelationship among the items in the 
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study (Clausen, 2009). An explanatory approach enabled the authors to explore and 
summarize underlying correlation structure in the data set. 
4.5.2 Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
This is a statistical, flexible technique used to determine, on the basis of one dependent 
measure, whether samples are from populations from equal means (i.e. do the groups differ 
significantly) (Hair et al., 2006). In this paper three groups was compared to one another. 
4.5.3 Simple & Multippel Regression 
This is a method for estimating the parameters of a multiple linear regression model; an 
approach to modelling the relationship between a dependent variable y and an independent 
variable x (Hair et al., 2010). The values β and standard error (SE) are utilized in the analyses. 
4.5.4 Simple Mediation and Bootstrap  
According to Preacher and Hayes (Hair et al., 2010) the causal step strategy by Baron and 
Kenny (2004) represents the most commonly used method for testing mediation hypotheses. 
However, several researchers have underpinned weaknesses related to this approach (1986). 
Criticism includes that methodologists have found that the causal steps approach to be among 
the lowest in power. Furthermore, the approach is not based on quantification of the 
intervening effect (Preacher and Hayes, 2008, Preacher and Hayes, 2004, Hayes, 2009). A 
criterion for Baron and Kenny‟s (Hayes, 2009) multistep approach is that the independent 
variable (X) accounts for variability in the dependent variable (Y); hence there must be a 
significant total effect of X on Y for mediation to occur. Researchers have suggested that a 
significant total effect of X on Y (quantified as c) is not essential in establishing mediation 
(1986). The bootstrapping approach is recommended for simple mediation since it is does not 
impose the assumption of normality of the sampling distribution. MacKinnon et al. (Cole et 
al., 2008, Hayes, 2009, Preacher and Hayes, 2008) recommended the use of bootstrapping 
over the Sobel test, on the grounds that the bootstrapping have higher power while 
maintaining reasonable control over the Type I error rate in large samples (2002). 
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric re-sampling procedure, which involves repeatedly 
sampling from the data set and estimating the indirect effect in each re-sampled data set 
(MacKinnon et al., 2004, Preacher and Hayes, 2008). It is a computer-based method for 
assigning measures of accuracy to sample estimates (Preacher and Hayes, 2008:880). This 
technique allows estimation of the sample distribution of almost any statistic using only very 
simple method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). Furthermore, bootstrapping builds an empirical 
approximation of the sampling distribution of ab that is used to construct confidence intervals 
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for the indirect effect, and represents the most powerful and reasonable method of obtaining 
confidence limits for specific indirect effects under most conditions (Varian, 2005). The 
bootstrap confidence intervals will in the secondary study be used as the basis for hypotheses 
testing of the mediator model. The total effect of X on Y is expressed as the sum of the direct 
and indirect effects: c = c`+ ab. c′ is the difference between the total effect of X on Y and the 
indirect effect of X on Y through M - that is, c′ = c – ab (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). 
According to Preacher and Hayes (2008) the assessment of an indirect effect does not require 
an initially present total effect, which is opposite to that of mediation. 
 
 
Figure 12 Illustration of a Mediation Design Preacher & Hayes (2008) 
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5 Data Analyses 
”It is a good morning exercise for a research scientist to discard a pet hypothesis every day before 
breakfast. It keeps him young”.                                      Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) 
This section presents the data analysis of the survey. SPSS will be employed as a statistical 
tool to analyze the data. The results for the primary research will be presented first, followed 
by the results of the secondary research. The sampling frame of N=206 were divided into 
three groups as displayed in figure 13. The pie diagram shows an even distribution among the 
groups. 
 
Figure 13 Sampling frame Percentage Division 
Figure 14 indicate a large sample from the travel & service chain. 
 
Figure 14 Respondents Business Categories 
Figure 15 indicates that approximately 60 percent of the respondents have between 1-9 
employees, however a fair amount of larger businesses are represented.  
 
Figure 15 Number of Employees 
Figure 16 represents the division between male and females in the study. As expected, men 
are overly represented.  
 
Figure 16 Gender distribution 
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5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis was initiated by coding missing values, since the numerical and the categorical 
data were pre-coded by Norstat. Replies representing “don‟t know” were coded as missing 
values in order to avoid skewed results. However, the non-response of some specific 
questions was not coded as missing values, as it provided valuable insight for the research. 
Furthermore, the data was checked for errors such as illegitimate codes. Various items were 
relabeled to simplify the interpretation of the analysis and the results of the descriptive test are 
reported in table 3.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. D Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
CSR_Community_1 195 1 5 3.96 1.121 -1.051 .174 .481 .346 
CSR_Community_2 194 1 5 3.10 1.398 -.084 .175 -1.314 .347 
CSR_Diversity_1 190 1 5 2.99 1.291 -.080 .176 -1.015 .351 
CSR_Diversity_2 193 1 5 3.94 1.261 -1.079 .175 .126 .348 
CSR_Employees_1 193 1 5 3.72 1.313 -.726 .175 -.644 .348 
CSR_Employees_2 189 1 5 3.76 1.205 -.738 .177 -.293 .352 
CSR_Employees_3 193 1 5 3.89 1.171 -.856 .175 -.051 .348 
CSR_Environment_1 196 1 5 3.59 1.264 -.628 .174 -.612 .346 
CSR_Environment_2 194 1 5 3.64 1.359 -.684 .175 -.752 .347 
CSR_NonUSOperations_1 160 1 5 3.39 1.458 -.428 .192 -1.151 .381 
CSR_NonUsOperations_2 179 1 5 3.83 1.261 -.870 .182 -.268 .361 
CSR_Product_1 182 1 5 4.14 1.128 -1.243 .180 .817 .358 
CSR_Product_2 161 1 5 3.88 1.117 -.788 .191 .053 .380 
CSR_Corporate Goverernance_1 183 1 5 3.68 1.355 -.683 .180 -.763 .357 
CSR_Corporate Goverenance_2 192 1 5 3.86 1.235 -.876 .175 -.172 .349 
SCM_Detection_1 189 1 5 3.02 1.238 -.075 .177 -.853 .352 
SCM_Detection_2 190 1 5 2.88 1.238 .019 .176 -.906 .351 
SCM_Prevention_1 193 1 5 3.68 1.127 -.676 .175 -.157 .348 
SCM_Prevention_2 194 1 5 3.56 1.101 -.383 .175 -.628 .347 
SCM_Containment_1 188 1 5 3.82 .997 -.415 .177 -.610 .353 
SCM_Containment_2 155 1 5 3.57 1.013 -.053 .195 -.780 .387 
SCM_Containment_3 186 1 5 3.90 1.006 -.599 .178 -.429 .355 
SCM_Recovery_1 159 1 5 3.46 1.054 -.482 .192 -.128 .383 
SCM_Recovery_2 158 1 5 3.44 1.043 -.273 .193 -.312 .384 
SCM_Recovery_3 154 1 5 3.54 1.042 -.315 .195 -.156 .389 
SCM_Recovery_4 154 1 5 3.60 1.057 -.362 .195 -.310 .389 
SCM_Recovery_5 158 1 5 3.68 1.047 -.514 .193 -.136 .384 
SCM_Learning_1 190 1 5 4.19 .975 -1.196 .176 1.052 .351 
SCM_Learning_2 185 1 5 4.19 1.044 -1.286 .179 1.122 .355 
Valid N (listwise) 97         
The minimum and maximum values indicate that the respondents have utilized the whole 
Likert scale. The mean statistics provides a value of 3.5 and the standard deviation is within 
an acceptable range. Skewness and kurtosis was included in order to provide a more detailed 
presentation of the distribution and its divergence from a normal distribution. Skewness 
indicates whether the distribution deviates to the right or left side (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). 
Kurtosis refers to the peakedness or flatness of a distribution in comparison to a normal 
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distribution (Pallant, 2010, Hair et al., 2006, Hair et al., 2010). Skewness values falling 
outside the range of - 1 to + 1 indicate a substantially skewed distribution (Saunders et al., 
2009). The output has just one skewness value above than + 1 and twenty eight less than – 1, 
which indicates a clustering of scores on the right hand side if the graph. Furthermore, the 
output has a large degree of negative kurtosis values. This indicates that the distribution is 
relatively flat, hence platykurtic (Hair et al., 2010, Pallant, 2010). A descriptive analysis 
which demonstrates the difference between the respondents gender is displayed in appendix 
B. The results indicate that the female respondents‟ answers include more extreme values, 
whereas the men‟s answers include less variation as they are more centralized on the Likert 
scale. Gender differences will be further elaborated in section 5.7.3. 
5.2 Theoretical investigation 
A FA was performed in order to make sure that the theoretical items loaded on the same 
factor, to ensure the validity of the developed items. One of the most widely used diagnostic 
measures for internal consistency is Cronbach‟s Alpha (α)  (Hair et al., 2010). The generally 
agreed upon lower limit for Cronbach‟s Alpha is .70, but in exploratory research it may 
decrease to .60 (Hair et al., 2010, Gripsrud et al., 2007). 
Table 4 Factor matrix for each construct in the CSR Framework 
Diversity Employees Environment Non-US-Operations Product 
 
Corporate Governance Community 
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 
Div.1 .656 Emp.1   .849 Env.1 .827 Non.1 .815 Pro.1 .776 CG.1 .904 Com.1 .719 
Div.2 .656 Emp.2   .805 Env.2 .827 Non.2 .815 Pro.2 .776 CG.2 .904 Com2. .719 
    Emp.3   .667                     
α = .60 α = .82 α = .81 α = .80 α= .75 α = .89 α = .67 
Table 4 shows that only one factor was extracted in each of the seven categories, which 
implies that the items loaded as intended on the constructed category. The Cronbach‟s Alpha 
coefficient is well above the .70 threshold (Hair et al., 2010), indicating that the CSR 
framework has a strong convergent validity. The results in table 5 show that the same 
conclusion can be made for the SCM framework.  
Table 5 Factor matrix for each construct in the SCM Framework 
Detection Prevention/Preparation Containment Recovery 
 
Learning 
 
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor1 Factor 1 
SCM_DET2 .879 SCM_PP1 .857 SCM_CON1 .929 SCM_REC3 .939 SCM_LEA1 .843 
SCM_DET1 .879 SCM_PP2 .857 SCM_CON3 .816 SCM_REC4 .924 SCM_LEA2 .843 
        SCM_CON2 .784 SCM_REC5 .858     
            SCM_REC2 .818     
    
    
    
SCM_REC1 .787 
    
α = .87 α = .85 α = .88 α = .93 α = .83 
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5.3 Factor Analysis 
The suitability of the data for a FA was assessed by taking the sample size into consideration. 
The sample size (N=206) exceeds Hair et al (Hair et al., 2010, Pallant, 2005, Gripsrud et al., 
2007) rule of thumb that the sample size should have 100 or more observations. Next, a 
correlation matrix was performed to ensure that a strong conceptual foundation existed to 
perform the FA. The output is shown in table 6. The results satisfies the criteria set by Bryant 
and Yarnold (2010) that a FA is appropriate where correlations precedes 0.3 percent (1995). 
Table 6 Correlation Matrix 
    
SUM_SCM 
Detection SUM_SCM P&P 
SUM_SCM 
Containment 
SUM_SCM 
Recovery 
SUM_SCM 
Learning 
SUM_CSR 
Community 
PearsonCorrelation .401** .557** .446** .517** .464** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 183 187 150 137 177 
SUM_CSR 
Divecity 
PearsonCorrelation .600** .521** .529** .579** .439** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 181 183 149 136 173 
SUM_CSR 
Employees 
PearsonCorrelation .538** .599** .554** .620** .526** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 180 182 148 136 173 
SUM_CSR 
Environment 
PearsonCorrelation .616** .602** .492** .591** .505** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 186 188 150 137 175 
SUM_CSR Non-
US-Operation 
PearsonCorrelation .527** .481** .486** .558** .510** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 152 153 130 117 144 
SUM_CSR 
Product 
PearsonCorrelation .596** .531** .512** .578** .558** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 152 155 129 118 152 
SUM_CSR 
Corporate 
Governance 
PearsonCorrelation .589** .650** .567** .634** .487** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 177 181 144 132 171 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
In addition, two more statistical tests was employed to determine the appropriateness of a FA; 
Barlett test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) (Clausen, 2009, Hair et al., 2006). 
The KMO index for the CSR framework is .946 and this value is well above the 
recommended minimum value of .60 to run a FA (Hair et al., 2010) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). In addition, Barlett‟s test of sphericity is significant (p<.000 and df = 105) and 
indicates that sufficient correlation exist among the variables (Clausen, 2009). The same 
procedure was employed for the SCM framework, resulting in a KMO index of .904 and the 
Barlett‟s test of sphericity came out as significant (p<.000 and df = 91). Based on these 
measures, both frameworks were assessed suitable to proceed with a FA (Pallant, 2010).  
According to Hair et al (2010) the next step is to derive factors and assess the overall fit. In 
doing so, the method of extracting the factors must be decided. A common FA was chosen for 
extracting factors in both frameworks. The rationale behind this was due to a strong 
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correlation between the factors. Being that the Oblimin (angled vectors) factor rotation allows 
correlation between factors, this method was chosen. This is supported by Pallant (2005), who 
argues that components that are more strongly correlated (e.g. above .30) need to report the 
Oblimin rotation. Based on the aim to analyze the common variance (i.e. leave out the unique 
variance) to uncover the structure among the items, a Principal Axis Factoring method was 
utilized to extract the factors (Hair et al., 2010).  
As Tabachnick and Fidell (Neill, 2011) recommends, an explanatory approach was adopted 
experimenting with different numbers of factors until a satisfactory solution was found.  
5.3.1 Theoretical Factor Analysis 
5.3.1.1 Data Reduction; CSR Framework 
Table 7 shows the total variance explained for the CSR framework.  
Table 7 Total Variance Explained for the CSR framework 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.18 61.19 61.19 8.84 58.95 58.95 
2 1.01 6.70 67.89 .62 4.12 63.06 
3 .76 5.09 72.98    
The cumulative percent indicates that of the 15 items captured in the framework, the first two 
components explain 67.89 percent of the total variance. The two components satisfy the latent 
root criterion of having eigenvalues (latent root) above 1.0. Thus, all factors with eigenvalues 
less than 1.0 theoretically is disregarded and considered insignificant (2007). The authors 
were satisfied with the total variance explained, as the information in social science is less 
precise and according to Hair et al (Pallant, 2010, Hair et al., 2010); “it is not uncommon to 
consider a solution that accounts for 60 percent of the total variance (and in some instances 
even less) as satisfactory.” 
The Oblimin factor rotation method was applied to interpret the factors. Oblimin is a non-
orthogonal factor rotation which is similar to the orthogonal method, but instead of 
maintaining independence between the rotated factors it allows correlation (2010). The output 
from the component correlation matrix showed a strong correlation (.767) between the 
factors. SPSS was programmed to retain communalities above .40 and the output of the 
rotated factor matrix is shown in table 8.  
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Table 8 Theoretical Pattern Matrix CSR Framework 
   Factor 1  Factor 2 
CSR_EMP2 .885   
CSR_EMP3 .851   
CSR_COM1 .815   
CSR_DIV2 .806   
CSR_EMP1 .796   
CSR_CG2 .726   
CSR_ENV2 .680   
CSR_CG1 .679   
CSR_ENV1 .632   
CSR_DIV1 .624   
CSR_COM2 .506   
CSR_NON1   .820 
CSR_PRO2   .786 
CSR_NON2   .718 
CSR_PRO1   .496 
 Cronbach’s Alpha α = .93 α = .85 
The factor loadings were scrutinized for each item by examining the pattern matrix. 
Component 1 is composed by the original items from the Employee, Community, Diversity, 
Corporate Governance and Environment categories. The authors have labelled this component 
as CSR_Umbrella. The rationale behind this is that the only common factor among the items 
is that they embrace many important aspects of CSR. Component 2 is composed of the 
original items from the Product and Non-US-Operations categories. The items share a 
common factor in control, i.e. controlling unethical activities in international subsidiaries, and 
control to avoid product harm crises. Thus, the authors have labelled this component 
CSR_Control.  
Cronbach‟s Alpha coefficient was employed to measure the reliability of the two new factors 
The result show a high reliability of .93 and .85 which indicates adequate convergence or 
internal consistency and ensures the construct validity (Hair et al., 2006). The result implies 
that the respondents more or less perceive CSR as one single concept. The theoretical data 
reduction to only two CSR factors may be seen in relation to the multitude of definitions that 
exist of the term and the ensuing confusion that this creates (Hair et al., 2010). 
5.3.1.2 Data Reduction; SCM Framework 
The authors followed the same procedure regarding the SCM framework. The total variance 
explained is captured in table 9. 
Table 9 Total Variance Explained for the SCM framework 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.95 63.95 63.95 8.65 61.81 61.81 
2 1.17 8.33 72.28 .85 6.07 67.88 
3 .88 6.30 78.58    
Department of Strategy & Management 2011 
 
50 
 
Two factors have an eigenvalues exceeding 1.0, and explain a total 72.29 percent of the 
variance in the SCM framework. Once again, the correlations between the factors were quite 
strong (-.718) and the Oblimin rotation was utilized.  
The Principal Axis Rotation is shown in appendix C. The output indicates four significant 
cross-loadings (Recovery 1, 2 and Containment 1, 3) which were removed. The removal of 
the four items increased the total variance explained with 1.42 percent, but the pattern remix 
showed a significant cross-loading, thus learning 1 had to be removed. The procedure was 
repeated until all cross-loadings were removed, and the new total variance explained without 
cross-loading is displayed in table 10.  
Table 10 Total Variance Explained for the SCM framework theoretically without cross-loadings 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.07 67.81 67.81 3.89 64.89 64.89 
2 1.19 19.77 87.58 1.0 16.63 81.52 
3 .29 4.75 92.32    
Theoretically, a total of 8 items (Prevention/Preparation 1, 2, Containment 1, 3, Recovery 1, 
2, and Learning 1, 2) had to be removed in order to avoid significant cross-loadings. This 
increased the total variance explained from 72.28 percent to 87.58 percent. 
Table 11 Theoretical Pattern Matrix SCM Framework 
Roated Pattern Matrix 
 Factor 1  Factor 2 
SCM_REC4 .988   
SCM_REC3 .948   
SCM_REC5 .904   
SCM_CON2 .749   
SCM_DET1   .929 
SCM_DET2   .843 
 Cronbach’s Alpha (α) α = .94 α = .87 
The factor loadings were scrutinized for each item according to the pattern matrix. Table 11 
revealed high loadings on two components; Recovery/Containment and Detection. The 
pattern matrix revealed that the respondents perceived stage three and four of the SCM model 
as one single component; “Containment/Recovery”, which is comprised in component 1 in the 
pattern matrix. When scrutinizing the items, the authors discovered that time needed to get 
back to business with regards to trust and reputation was a common denominator between the 
components. As for the CSR framework, the reliability of the factors produced by the rotation 
was measured and the output is displayed in the table 11. Both factors have Cronbach‟s Alpha 
coefficients‟ well above the recommended threshold recommended by a plural of researcher 
for the test of scale reliability (Tombs and Smith, 1995).  
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5.3.1.3 Computing The Theoretical Constructs 
 
Figure 17 Construct overview CSR and SCM 
 
The results from the previous chapters can be summarized in figure 17. The 10 items under 
CSR_Umbrella construct were all implemented in the target variable; 
SUMFactorCSRUmbrella. The items under the CSR_Control construct were summarized in 
the target variable SUMFactorCSRControl. After computing the two constructs of CSR, they 
were implemented in the target variable SUMFactorCSR. The same procedure was employed 
for the SCM framework. Firstly, both items under SCM_Detection were summarized in the 
target variable SUM_SCM_SignalDetection. Secondly, containment 2 and Recovery 3 + 4 + 5 
were captured in the target variable SUMFactorContainment/Recovery. Finally, after 
computing the different constructs of SCM they were implemented in the target variable 
SUMFactorSCM_t. A correlation matrix was performed prior to the hypotheses testing. 
Table 12 Correlation Matrix for the Theoretical Construct 
  SUMFactor 
ContainmentRecovery 
SUM_SCM_ 
SignalDetection 
SUMFactor 
CSRUmbrella 
SUMFactor 
CSRControl 
SUMFactor 
Containment 
Recovery 
PearsonCorrelation 1 .478** .551** .538** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
N 142 140 131 109 
SUM_SCM_ 
SignalDetection 
PearsonCorrelation .478** 1 .645** .606** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
N 140 188 166 134 
SUMFactor 
CSRUmbrella 
PearsonCorrelation .551** .645** 1 .774** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
N 131 166 167 126 
SUMFactor 
CSRControl 
PearsonCorrelation .538** .606** .774** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
N 109 134 126 137 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
CSR
CSR_Umbrella
Community 1+ 2
Diversity 1 + 2
Employees 1 + 2
Environment 1 + 2
Corporate 
Governance 1 + 2
CSR_Control
Non-US-
Operations 1 + 2
Product 1 + 2
SCM
SCM_Detection
Detection
1 +2
SCM_Containment
/Recovery
Containment
2
Recovery 
3 + 4 +5
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The output reveals a significant correlation at the .01 level between the various constructs. 
The correlations indicates absence of multicollinearity being that none of the correlations 
have values above the critical level of .90 (Gripsrud et al., 2007, Pallant, 2010, Hair et al., 
2006). The levels of correlations are between .48 and .77 which is satisfactory, because some 
degree of multicollinearity is desirable since the objective is to identify interrelated sets of 
variables (Hair et al., 2006, Saunders et al., 2009). 
5.3.1.4 Theoretical Residual Statistics 
Control for outliers was the last test employed before the hypotheses were tested. “Outliers 
are observations with a unique combination of characteristics identifiable as distinctly 
different from the other observation” (Hair et al., 2006). Appendix D reports the theoretical 
residual statistics and the outliers for each construct from the FA. Standard residual for all 
constructs lie within the recommended range of – 4 and 4 (Hair et al., 2010:73). 
5.3.2 Empirical Factor Analysis 
5.3.2.1 Data Reduction: CSR Framework 
Initially, the latent root criterion was applied as a guideline for extracting factors. The results 
were identical to those found in the theoretical data reduction. The authors found it necessary 
to compare the theoretical, conceptual foundation (how many factors should be in the 
structure) with the empirical evidence (how many factors can be reasonably supported). When 
deciding on the number of factors to retain the authors based the decision on Hair et al (Hair 
et al., 2006) rule of thumb that: “one can retain a predetermined number of factors based on 
prior research”. In addition, one can retain: “enough factors to meet a specified percentage of 
variance explained, usually 60 % or higher.” Since the SOCRATES framework contained 
seven factors, the a priori criterion was applied in order to obtain as many factors as possible. 
The authors did not obtain seven factors from the FA according to Hair et al. (2010) rule of 
thumb. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, Hair et al (2006) recommendation was 
applied to retained factors with eigenvalues above .60. Applying this criterion five factors 
with eigenvalues exceeding .60 was retained. These five factors explain a total of 81.72 
percent of the total variance in the CSR framework. The authors find the result adequate as it 
is close to the original seven components in the SOCRATES framework. The Oblimin 
rotation was assessed as an adequate rotation method, and was run on the CSR framework. 
The output indicated that three items cross-loaded; Environment 1 + 2, and Diversity 2, hence 
were removed. The result of the without cross-loadings is shown in table 13. 
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Table 13 Empirical Pattern Matrix CSR Framework 
 
 Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4  Factor 5 
CSR_CG2 .812         
CSR_CG1 .738         
CSR_COM1 .718         
CSR_COM2 .596         
CSR_EMP2 .512         
CSR_PRO2   .781       
CSR_PRO1   .688       
CSR_NON1     -.591     
CSR_NON2     -.495     
CSR_DIV1       .768   
CSR_EMP1         -.497 
CSR_EMP3         -.452 
 Cronbach’s Alpha (α) α = .86 α = .75 α = .80 
 
α = .73 
The pattern matrix in table 13 revealed high loadings on five significant factors; (1) Corporate 
Governance 1 + 2, Community 1 + 2, Employee 2, (2) Product 1 + 2, (3) Non-US-Operations 
1 + 2, (4) Diversity 1, and (5) Employee 1 + 3. When scrutinizing the items related to factor 
(1), it was discovered that organizational CSR strategy issues were a common denominator 
between the components. Thus it is natural for the items to load on the same component. The 
factors were relabelled (1) as CSRFactorStrategy. The rest of the factors were grouped 
naturally according to the theoretical framework, thus in the proceedings the pattern matrix 
output will be discussed in a chronological order according to the Socrates framework. 
“Diversity” comprise of component 4, thus the original labelling was kept; 
CSRFactorDiversity. Employee is comprised in component 5, and reflects the authors‟ 
expectations of the importance of having good employee relations, thus the original labelling 
was kept, CSRFactorEmployee. Component 3 comprises international operations (Non-US 
Operations), and the original labelling was kept, CSRFactorNon-US Operations. Finally, 
factor 2 comprise of both of the original items which were assessed to fit into this category, 
thus the original labelling, CSRFactorProduct was kept.  
Table 14 shows that the total variance explained for the SCM framework increased from 83.5 
percent to 88.4 percent when the items that cross loaded were removed. 
Table 14: Total Variance Explained for the CSR framework without cross-loadings Empirical 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.11 59.28 59.28 6.86 57.13 57.16 
2 .99 8.22 67.50 .69 5.78 62.94 
3 .77 6.42 73.92 .42 3.47 66.40 
4 .67 5.58 79.50 .34 2.86 69.27 
5 .61 5.12 84.62 .252 2.10 71.37 
6 .42 3.48 88.10    
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As for the theoretical investigation of the framework, the reliability of the components 
produced by the rotation was controlled and the output is displayed in the table 13. All factors 
have Cronbach Alpha coefficients‟ above the threshold (2010). 
5.3.2.2 Data Reduction; SCM Framework 
The authors followed the same procedure regarding the SCM framework. The total variance 
explained is displayed in table 15. 
 
Table 15 Total Variance Explained for the SCM framework Empirical 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.95 63.95 63.95 8.65 61.81 61.81 
2 1.17 8.33 72.28 .85 6.07 67.88 
3 .88 6.30 78.58    
4 .70 4.98 83.56    
5 .56 4.01 87.58    
6 .34 2.45 90.02    
Initially, the latent root criterion technique was employed for extracting factors. Table 15 
shows that two factors have eigenvalues exceeding 1.0 and explain 72.28 percent of the total 
variance. However, it was assessed necessary to compare the theoretical conceptual 
foundation with the empirical evidence. When deciding on the number of factors to retain, the 
decision was based on Hair et al (Gripsrud et al., 2007, Pallant, 2010, Hair et al., 2006) rule of 
thumb that: “one can retain a predetermined number of factors based on prior research”. In 
addition, one can retain: “enough factors to meet a specified percentage of variance 
explained, usually 60 % or higher.” Since the SCM model contained five factors, the a priori 
criterion was applied in order to obtain as many factors as possible. Five factors were not 
obtained from the FA according to Hair et al. (2010) rule of thumb. Therefore, due to the 
exploratory nature of the study, Hair et al (2006) recommendation to retained factors with 
eigenvalues above .60 was applied. Applying these criterions, four factors showed 
eigenvalues exceeding .60, and explain a total of 83.56 percent of the variance in the SCM 
framework. The authors find the result adequate as it is close to the original SCM model. The 
Oblimin rotation was assessed as an adequate method, due to the relative strong correlation (-
.718) between the factors. When the Oblimin rotation was run, the output showed that four 
items significantly cross-loaded, thus Containment 1 + 3, and Recovery 1 + 2 were removed. 
The output without cross-larding is shown in table 16. 
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Table 16 Empirical Pattern Matrix SCM without Cross Loadings 
 Pattern Matrix  Factor 1  Factor 2  FActor 3  Factor 4 
SCM_RECOVERY4 .967       
SCM_RECOVERY5 .941       
SCM_RECOVERY3 .930       
SCM_CONTAINMENT2 .777       
SCM_DETECTION2   .940     
SCM_DETECTION1   .923     
SCM_LEARNING2     -.972   
SCM_LEARNING1     -.759   
SCM_PREVENTION/PREPARATION1       -.940 
SCM_PREVENTION/PREPARATION2       -.871 
 Cronbach’s Alpha α = .94 α = .87 α = .83 α = .85 
The pattern matrix in table 16 revealed high loadings on four significant components; 
Recovery/Containment, Detection, Learning and Preparation/Prevention. The items were 
grouped naturally according to the theoretical framework, thus in the proceedings the pattern 
matrix output will be discussed in a chronological order according to the SCM model. 
“Detection” stage comprise of component 2. The grouping of these items was expected as 
they all regard the identification of potential crises. “Prevention/Preparation” is comprised in 
component 4. The component reflects the authors‟ expectations of the importance of a good 
overview in crisis situations. The respondents perceive the next two stages of the SCM model 
as one single component; “Containment/Recovery”, which is comprised in component 1. 
When scrutinizing the items, it was discovered that time needed to get back to business with 
regards to trust and reputation was a common denominator between the components. Finally, 
component 3 comprises the last stage of the SCM model; learning. The authors have labelled 
the component according to the original framework: Detection, Prevention/Preparation, 
Containment/Recovery and Learning. All four components have Cronbach‟s Alpha 
coefficients‟ well above the recommended threshold of .70. 
Table 17 Total Variance Explained for the SCM Framework without Cross-Loadings 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 6.21 62.06 62.06 6.21 62.06 62.06 
2 1.22 12.20 74.26 1.22 12.20 74.26 
3 .87 8.67 82.93 .87 8.67 82.93 
4 .54 5.43 88.36 .54 5.43 88.36 
Table 17 shows that the total variance explained for the SCM framework increased from 83.5 
percent to 88.36 percent, when the items that cross loaded were removed. It is interesting to 
note that in the empirical approach, utilizing the a priori criterion and extracting factors with 
eigenvalues above .60, the total variance explained increased with approximately one percent.  
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CSR
CSR_Strategy
Community 1 + 2
Employee 2
Corporate 
Governance 1 + 2
CSR_Product Product 1 + 2
CSR_Diversity Diversity 1
CSREmployee Employee 1 + 3
CSR_Non_US-
Operation
Non-US-
Operations 1 + 2
5.3.2.3 Computing the Empirical Constructs 
The results from the previous chapters can be summarized in the figure 18.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The 5 items under CSRStrategy construct were all implemented in the target variable; 
CSRFactor_S. The items under the CSR_Product construct were summarized in the target 
variable; CSRFactor_P. Next, the items in the CSR_Diversity construct were implemented in 
the target variable; CSRFactor_D. The items related to CSR_Employee and CSR_Non-US-
Operations were summarized in correspondingly CSRFactor_E and CSRFactor_N. After 
computing the five constructs of CSR, they were implemented in the target variable; 
SUMFactorCSR_E.  
 
The same procedure was employed for the SCM framework. Firstly, both items under 
SCM_Detection were summarized in the target variable; FactorSCM_D. Secondly, both items 
under SCM_Preparation/Prevention were implemented in the target variable; FactorSCM_PP. 
Thirdly, containment 2 and Recovery 3 + 4 + 5 were captured in the target variable; 
FactorSCM_CR. Finally, both items under the construct SCM_Learning were summarized in 
the target variable FactorSCM_L. After computing the different constructs of SCM they were 
implemented in the target variable SUMFactorSCM_E.  
 
A correlation matrix was outlined, before testing the hypotheses. The correlation matrix for all 
the empirical constructs of both frameworks appears in table 18. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Construct Overview Empirical CSR and SCM 
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Table 18 Correlation Matrix of the Empirical Construct 
 
 Correlations   
CSR 
Factor_S 
CSR 
Factor_P 
CSR 
Factor_N 
CSR 
Factor_E 
CSR 
Factor_D 
Factor 
SCM_D 
Factor 
SCM_PP 
Factor 
SCM_CR 
Factor 
SCM_L 
CSR 
Factor_S 
PearsonCorrelation 1 .627** .689** .722** .488** .554** .703** .555** .569** 
Sig. (2-tail)   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 174 147 144 171 171 170 174 134 166 
CSR 
Factor_P 
PearsonCorrelation .627** 1 .664** .524** .406** .596** .531** .467** .558** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 147 159 137 153 152 152 155 123 152 
CSR 
Factor_N 
PearsonCorrelation .689** .664** 1 .657** .488** .527** .481** .482** .510** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 144 137 155 150 150 152 153 120 144 
CSR 
Factor_E 
PearsonCorrelation .722** .524** .657** 1 .463** .531** .539** .447** .458** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 171 153 150 191 186 183 185 139 175 
CSR 
Factor_D 
PearsonCorrelation .488** .406** .488** .463** 1 .559** .304** .310** .287** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 171 152 150 186 190 183 185 140 175 
Factor 
SCM_D 
PearsonCorrelation .554** .596** .527** .531** .559** 1 .571** .478** .491** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 170 152 152 183 183 188 186 140 173 
Factor 
SCM_PP 
PearsonCorrelation .703** .531** .481** .539** .304** .571** 1 .631** .626** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 
N 174 155 153 185 185 186 192 141 178 
Factor 
SCM_CR 
PearsonCorrelation .555** .467** .482** .447** .310** .478** .631** 1 .626** 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 
N 134 123 120 139 140 140 141 142 138 
Factor 
SCM_L 
PearsonCorrelation .569** .558** .510** .458** .287** .491** .626** .626** 1 
Sig. (2-tail) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   
N 166 152 144 175 175 173 178 138 181 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation matrix output reveals a significant correlation at the .01 level. Furthermore the 
correlations indicates absence of multicollinearity being that none of the correlations have 
values above the critical level of .90 (2010).  The levels of correlations are satisfactory. 
5.3.2.4 Empirical Residual Statistics 
Control for outliers was the last test employed before testing the hypotheses. Appendix E 
reports the empirical residual statistics and the outliers for each construct from the FA. 
Standard residual for all constructs lie within the recommended range of – 4 and 4 (Hair et al., 
2006, Saunders et al., 2009). 
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5.4 Empirical Testing of the Primary Hypotheses 
The following part of the data analysis concerns empirical testing of the hypothesis in the 
primary research utilizing multiple regression. A regression will be performed where the (4) 
empirical SCM factors (retained from the FA) will be utilized as a set of dependent variables 
and SUMFactorCSR was the independent variable. The authors will report according to the 
standards from the American Psychological Association (APA) (Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 19 Summary Empirical Testing of the Hypotheses 
Hypotheses ∆ R2 t B SE B β 
H1 .49 11.00 .81 .07 .70 *** 
H2 .58 12.95 .81 .06 .76 *** 
H3/4 .40 8.35 .65 .08 .64 *** 
H5 .39 8.81 .63 .07 .63 *** 
H6 .62 12.72 .73 .06 .79 *** 
Note; *** p<.001, ∆ R2: Adjusted R Square, t: T-value of t-test, B: Unstandardized Coefficient Standard error Beta, SE B: Unstandardized 
Coefficient Beta, β: Standardized Coefficient Beta. 
H1: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to detect crises. 
The regression demonstrates that H1 cannot be rejected, because the results are significant 
(t=11.00, p<.000). The adjusted R Square indicates that CSR explains 49 percent of the 
variation. 
H2: CSR has a positive effect on organizations prevent and prepare for crises. 
The regression clearly displays that H2 cannot be rejected, because the results are statistically 
significant (t=12.95, p<.000). The adjusted R Square indicates that CSR explains 58 percent 
of the variation.  
The FA suggested that stage three and four “Containment” and “Recovery” of the SCM 
model are perceived as one factor by the respondents. Therefore, adjustments had to be made 
when testing the third and fourth hypothesis. Thus, the two constructs with their additional 
hypothesis were combined into one hypothesis; H3/4. 
H3/4: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to contain and recover from crises. 
The regression clearly displays that H3/4 cannot be rejected, because the results are statistically 
significant (t=8,35, p<.000). The adjusted R Square indicates that CSR explains 40 percent of 
the variation.  
H5: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to learn from crises 
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The regression clearly displays that H5 cannot be rejected, because the results are statistically 
significant (t=8.81, p<.000). The adjusted R Square indicates that CSR explains 39 percent of 
the variation. 
As an imperative to the hypotheses and the discussion, a final test was run on the two target 
variables SUM_Factor_SCM (as the dependent variable) and SUM_Factor_CSR (as the 
independent variable) against each other. 
H6: CSR has a positive effect on organizations SCM.  
The results confirmed the authors underlying assumption that CSR has a significant and 
positive effect on an organization‟s SCM. In Table 19, it is evident that the effect is both 
statistically significant (t=12.72, p>.000). The adjusted R Square is 62 percent. 
 
Since the total variance explained increased for both frameworks in the empirical FA 
investigation, the authors utilized these results in the remaining parts of the study. Moreover, 
when comparing the results between the empirical and theoretical hypothesis testing 
(appendix F) it was evident that the empirical approach generated a higher adjusted R square 
which supports the former decision to exclude the theoretical approach.  
Based on the unexpected findings from the FA where the containment and recovery stage 
were perceived as one stage by the respondents, the main research model was reassessed. 
Thus, the original SCM model with five stages had to be re-examined. The final research 
model is therefore adjusted in alignment to the empirical findings in the study and is displayed 
in figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19 The Final Primary Research Model 
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5.5 Secondary Research 
This section will outline the results of the A-Meieriet case. The complete case text is 
displayed in appendix A. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed in order 
to evaluate whether there were significant differences between the groups (control, negative – 
and positive priming).  
5.5.1 Hypothesis Testing 
H7: Effective SCM reduces assignment of blame 
To measure whether SCM has an effect on blame, a univariate analysis was performed. The 
result (m = 3.41, Std.Dev = 1.19, df = 4, F = 9.94, p<.000) confirms H7. A simple linear 
regression was run to further investigate the relationship. The output (∆ R
2
 = .17, t = 6.13, F = 
37.52, B = .48, SE.B = .08, β = .41) confirms H7, that effective SCM reduces stakeholders‟ 
assignment of blame by increasing trust in the organization. 
H8: A positive CSR reputation moderates the relationship between SCM and assignment of 
blame. In order to assess H8, a regression with interactions effects were performed, where the 
independent variable consisted of SCM and CSR. 
Table 20 Regression with Interaction Effects 
Linear Regression ∆ R2 t F B SE B β 
Positive Priming .11 2.6 6.73 .18 .07 .35 ** 
Negative Priming - .00 .96 .93 .23 .24 .19 
Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01,  ∆ R2: Adjusted R Square, t: T-value of t-test, F: F-value of F-test,  B: Unstandardized Coefficient Standard 
error Beta, SE B: Unstandardized Coefficient Beta, β: Standardized Coefficient Beta. 
 
 
The result for the positive CSR condition is significant, hence H8 is accepted. In the negative 
CSR condition the result is not significant. 
H9: A positive CSR reputation reduces assignment of assignment blame. 
A univariate analysis was performed, and the Scheffe values may be viewed in appendix G. 
 
Table 21 Univariate Analysis Total Effects of CSR on Blame 
   Ind. Var: CSR, Dep.Var: Q60 Mean Std. Dev. 
Control Group 3.84 .83 
Negative priming 2.51 1.27 
Positive priming 2.75 .97 
Note: Q: Question numer. 
Table 21 indicates that the positive priming group attributes more trust, thus reduced blame to 
A-Meieriet compared to the negative priming group, m(P) = 2.75 while m(N) = 2.51. 
However, the control group attributes more trust, thus reduced blame m(C) = 3.84 compared 
to the positive priming group. The results indicate that significant (p=.000) differences 
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between the control and the negative priming group, as well as between the negative and 
positive priming group (p=.000). Test of the total effects (c) show that the locus, stability and 
controllability significantly enhance the effect CSR has on blame. The significant results 
indicate that positive CSR reputation reduces blame, thus H9 must be accepted.  
H10a): A positive CSR reputation will cause the locus of the crisis to be perceived as external rather 
than internal.  
H10b): A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event to be perceived as temporary rather than 
stable. 
H10c): A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event will be perceived as controllable rather 
than uncontrollable. 
Table 22 summarizes the descriptive statistics from the univariate analysis of whether CSR 
affects the attribution process. The Post hoc and Scheffe can be viewed in appendix G. 
Table 22 Descriptive Statistics Univariate Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics Q53 Locus 1 Q54 Locus 2 Q55 Locus 3 Q56 Stability 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Control group 59.51 23.915 29.41 18.461 11.40 11.637 4.63 2.619 
Negative priming 71.64 23.150 20.88 16.710 7.48 10.700 5.98 2.554 
Positive priming 59.40 24.256 28.60 17.472 12.00 13.609 5.31 2.500 
  Q57 Controllability 
     Mean Std. Dev. 
      Control group 6.63 2.195       
Negative priming 5.40 2.570       
Positive priming 6.65 2.259       
Note: Q: Question number  
Table 22 indicate that the positive priming group attribute less responsibility to A-Meieriet 
than subjects in the negative priming condition, as depicted by the authors (m(P)= 59.4 while 
m(N)= 71.64). Appendix G reveals a significance (p=.012) between the control group and the 
negative priming group, and (p=.013) between the negative and positive priming group. The 
positive priming group assigns a larger extent of responsibility to the supplier than the 
negative priming group, (m(P) = 28.6 while m(N) = 20.88). This is significant (p=.019) 
between the control and the negative priming group as well as (p=.042) between the negative 
and positive priming group. The results also indicate that the positive priming group assign a 
larger extent of responsibility to the customer, than the negative priming group, (m(P) = 12.0 
while m(N) = 7.48). However, the results are not significant. Based on these findings, the 
positive priming group perceive the locus of the crisis to be more external compared to the 
negative priming group who perceive the locus to be more internal. Thus, H10a) is accepted. 
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Respondents in the positive priming group perceive the product harm crisis to more temporary 
than those in the negative priming condition (and the control group), m(P) = 5.31 while m(N) 
= 5.98). The results are only significant (p=.014) between the control and the negative 
priming group. Consequently, H10b) is rejected. 
 
The positive priming condition assigns a higher degree of controllability of A-Meieriet to 
prevent similar types of crises from occurring in the future than the negative priming group, 
and a greater amount of controllability within the crisis compared to the negative priming 
subjects, as shown by m(P) = 6.65 while m(N) = 5.40). The results are significant (p=.013) 
among the positive and negative priming conditions, and (p=.015) between the control and the 
negative priming group. Therefore, H10c) is accepted. 
5.5.2 Bootstrap Indirect Effects & Simple Mediation 
H11a): Locus mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
H11b): Stability mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
H11c): Control mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame. 
The syntax macro equation may be viewed in appendix I.  
Table 23 Simple Mediation Effects Results (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
  Coeff. a Coeff. b Coeff. c Coeff. c` 
Locus1 -13.80* -.01* 1.25*** 1.08*** 
Locus2 9.51* .01 1.25*** 1.14*** 
Locus3 4.29 .02* 1.25*** 1.15*** 
Stability -.77 -.03 1.20*** 1.17*** 
Controllability 1.32*** .01 1.24*** 1.22*** 
Note: Coeff: Coefficient, *** p<.001,** p<..01, * p>0.5 
The simple mediation (INDIRECT) macro for SPSS indicates that Locus1 mediates the effect 
of CSR on blame (Field, 2009), which is illustrated in figure 20. A-Meieriets responsibility 
within the PHC mediates the relationship between CSR and blame. 
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * P<.05 
Figure 20 Simple Mediation – Impact of CSR on Locus1 via Blame 
The results indicate however, that Locus2 and Locus3 do not represent mediators between 
CSR and assignment of blame. Thus, locus may not be viewed as a mediator between CSR 
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and blame. Stability and Controllability have no mediation effects on the relationship between 
CSR and blame. 
Table 24 Bootstrap Indirect Effects A-Meieriet 
  Data SE LL95% CI UL95%CI 
Locus1 .16 .08 .04 .36 
Locus2 .10 .06 .01 .27 
Locus3 .10 .06 .01 .26 
Stability .02 .05 -.03 .17 
Controllability .01 .07 -.11 .19 
Note: SE: Standard Error, LL: Lower Level, CI: Confidence Interval, UL: Upper level. 
The bootstrap analysis showed that there was a significant indirect effect of Locus2 & 3 on 
attribution of blame, as indicated by the exclusion of zero in the bootstrapped confidence 
interval (Locus2: 95% CI = {.01, .27, Locus3: 95 % CI= {.01, .26}). The standardized indirect 
effect is significantly different from zero at the .001 level (p=.001). The bootstrap further 
demonstrates that H11b & c includes zero in the CI (Stability: 95 % CI = {-.03, .17} and 
controllability {-.11,  .19}). For stability, the path of c and c` is significant, but not path a and 
b. Whereas for controllability c and c` is also significant, and path a and b is not significant. 
Thus, H11a, b & c must be rejected (though Locus1 did represent a mediator, because the other 
constituents of locus did not). Note in figure 21 that Locus2 & 3 is rejected as mediators, thus 
H11a is only partially accepted. However, Locus is considered to represent an indirect effect. 
 
Figure 21 Revised Secondary Research Model from Bootstrap Mediating Analysis 
5.6 Summary of Primary and Secondary Hypotheses Testing 
Table 25 Summary of Hypotheses Testing Primary & Secondary Research 
Hypotheses 
Accepted 
H1 Yes 
H2 Yes 
H3/4 Yes 
H5 Yes 
H6 Yes 
H7 Yes 
H8 Yes 
H9 Yes 
H10a) Yes 
H10b) No 
H10c) Yes 
H11a)                                No (Indirect Effect) 
H11b)                           No (Indirect Effect) 
H11c)                          No (Indirect Effect) 
All hypotheses evaluated at the 95 % level.   
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5.7 General Commercial Findings in the Primary Study 
The following section comprises the commercial findings from the study by analyzing the 
general items regarding CSR and SCM. The authors developed these items in order to follow 
up general knowledge within the two disciplines from previous research. Firstly, the main 
results from the general CSR questions will be presented, and thereafter the results from the 
general SCM questions will be highlighted.  
5.7.1 General Commercial Findings CSR 
 
Table 26 Commercial Findings General CSR items 
  CSR_Gen Q9 CSR_Gen Q10 CSR_Gen Q11 CSR_Gen Q12 CSR_Gen Q13 
  
Freq. % Freq.  % Freq. % Freq.  % Freq.  % 
1 0 0 12 5.8 5 2.4 2 1.0 11 5.3 
2 5 2.4 11 5.3 12 5.8 1 0.5 11 5.3 
3 25 12.1 51 24.8 44 21.4 33 16.0 40 19.4 
4 64 31.1 61 29.6 73 35.4 89 43.2 60 29.1 
5 99 48.1 57 27.7 52 25.2 61 29.6 70 34.0 
Total 193 93.7 192 93.2 186 90.3 186 90.3 192 93.2 
Do not 
know 
13 6.3 14 6.8 20 9.7 20 9.7 14 6.8 
Total 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 
Note: Q: Question number, Freq: Frequency, 
 
The results above show that 79.2 percent (strongly agree/agree) that CSR has a positive effect 
on corporate reputation (Q9). Moreover, the results indicate that 57.3 percent (strongly 
agree/agree) that CSR represents a competitive advantage, (Q10).When asked about their 
personal opinions if CSR has a positive effect on SCM, 60.6 percent (strongly agree/agree) 
(Q11). The results indicate that 72.8 percent strongly agree/agree) that their organization has a 
positive corporate reputation. (Q12). Approximately 63.1 percent (strongly agree/agree) that it 
is important for the organizations to invest in CSR (Q13). 
Table 27: CSR Standards employed by the Respondents companies 
Range Standard Mean Std. Dev Percent 
1 No stadard 0.48 0.50 48.1 % 
2 ISO 0.36 0.48 36.4 
3 Miljøfyrtårnet 0.11 0.32 11.2 % 
4 Others 0.09 0.29 9.2 % 
5 OECD 0.03 0.17 2.9 % 
6 Kyoto 0.03 0.17 2.9 % 
7 CERES 0.03 0.15 2.4 % 
8 UN Global Compact 0.02 0.15 2.4 % 
9 IFA 26000 0 0.01 0.5 % 
10 UN Global Index 0 0 0 % 
 
Very few organizations follow CSR standards (Q14). ISO represents the most frequent used 
standard, while a mean of 0.48 reveal that they do not follow any of the mentioned CSR 
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standards. The most recognized CSR standard, UN Global Compact, is not widely used as the 
mean is .002. Be aware range 9 and 10 in table 27 are fictional standards. 
 
Table 28 CSR responsible within the organization 
Category Frefquency Valid Percent 
CSR Department 9 4.4 
Head of CSR 13 6.3 
Communication Representative 15 7.3 
General Manager 152 73.8 
Other 6 2.9 
None 21 10.2 
Do not know 17 8.3 
 
Table 28 shows that the general manager is responsible for managing CSR issues in most of 
the respondents‟ organizations. Moreover, 10.2 percent of the respondents have no individuals 
within the organization who is assigned to address CSR issues. In addition, 8.3 percent of the 
leaders do not know who handles CSR matters within their organization. 
 
Table 29 The Prioritization Ranking of Stakeholders 
Factor Mean Std. Dev 
Environment 3.37 1.31 
Employees 2.32 1.09 
Owners 3.25 1.48 
Local Community 3.91 1.14 
Customers/Clients 2.13 1.2 
 
The respondents ranked the stakeholder prioritization (Q44) on a scale from 1-5, where 1 
represented the highest level of priority. The results indicate that customers/clients 
represented the number one priority of the organizations, and employees secondly. The local 
community followed by the environment is given the least priority. 
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5.7.2 General Commercial Findings SCM 
Table 30 Commercial Findings SCM 
  SCM_Gen Q46 SCM_Gen (Q47) SCM_Gen Q48 SCM_Gen Q49 SCM_Gen Q50 SCM_Gen Q51 SCM_Gen Q52 
  
Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% Freq. 
Valid 
% 
Yes 96 46.6 63 30.6 89 43.2 58 28.2 64 31 156 75.7 91 44.2 
No 35 17.0 132 64.1 102 49.5 141 68.4 105 51.0 19 9.2 85 41.3 
Do 
not 
know 
75 36.4 11 5.3 15 7.3 7 3.4 37 18.0 31 15.0 30 14.16 
Total 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 206 100.0 
Note: Q: Question number, Freq.: Frequency 
According to the result, 46.6 percent (Q46) of the respondents believe that their SCM 
procedures are effective, while 36.4 percent of the respondents do not know if their SCM 
procedures are effective or not. Contradictory to this finding, 64.1 percent (Q47) of the 
respondents in the survey have not orchestrated a crisis management team (CMT). 
Furthermore, 49.5 percent (Q48) have not developed a crisis management plans (CMP). Out 
of the 206 respondents‟, 28.2 percent (Q49) have experienced one or several crisis the past 
five years. The percentage of respondents whom does not believe their organization may 
become involved in a crisis within the next five years represent 51 percent (Q50). When asked 
if the respondents expect to manage a crisis in a satisfactory manner, 75.5 percent (Q51) of 
the respondents answered yes. Finally, 44.2 percent (Q52) of the respondents reports that 
SCM is prioritized in the executive management, and 14.6 percent of the respondents do not 
know if the top management prioritize SCM in their own organization. 
Table 31 The Prioritization of Crises Q45 
Range Q45 Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Fatal Accidents 1.75 1.30 
2 Reputational Loss 2.90 1.32 
3 Loss of Resources 3.32 1.25 
4 Corruption 3.45 1.27 
5 Environmental Damage 3.53 1.14 
Note: Q: Question number 
According to table 31 expected, loss of human life is the crises the companies fear the most, 
while environmental damage is faired the least. Reputational loss however, does represent a 
great threat to organization though it was prioritized secondly. 
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5.7.3 Comparing Differences between Genders 
The authors were interested in whether there were any significant differences in responses 
between the genders in the survey and ran a one-way ANOVA. The significant differences 
between the genders may be viewed in appendix J.  
Table 32 Comparing Differences between Genders 
  ANOVA Males Females 
Item  F Sig. Mean Mean 
CSR Enviroment 1(Q21) 5.008 .026 3,48 3,98 
CSR Product 1 (Q25) 4.919 .028 4,05 4,5 
CSR Product 2 (Q26) 7,29 .008 3,76 4,34 
CSR Corporate Governance 2 (Q28) 2,843 .093 3,61 3,95 
SCM Containment 3 (Q35) 6,49 .012 3,8 4,26 
SCM Recovery 3(Q38) 4,022 .047 3,46 3,89 
SCM Recovery 4 (Q39) 3,645 .058 3,53 3,96 
SCM Learning 1 (Q41) 3,032 .083 4,13 4,44 
SCM Learning 2 (Q42) 3,535 .062 4,12 4,49 
Note: Q: Question number 
The authors regard p<.05 to be significant and table 32 indicates that five out of the 29 items 
in the two frameworks have significant differences in the replies between genders. 
5.8 General Commercial Findings in the Secondary Study: 
Inspired by Klein and Dawar‟s (2004) research where CSR attribution effects the assignments 
of blame. If a company has a positive CSR reputation, the authors want to investigate whether 
females will attribute less blame to the company, than men. The low percentage of females in 
the study (N=42) will influences the analysis, however the authors find this angle of 
investigation relevant because it may further the understanding of the factors that can shape 
attributions of crisis responsibility/blame.  
Table 33 Interaction Effects between Genders 
Q53 Mean Std. Dev. N Q54 Mean Std. Dev. N Q55 Mean Std. Dev. N 
Control 
Group 
Male 58.18 25.098 55 Control 
Group 
Male 30.43 19.449 54 Control 
Group 
Male 30.43 19.449 54 
Female 63.82 19.648 17 Female 26.18 14.951 17 Female 26.18 14.951 17 
Neg. 
Priming 
Male 71.35 23.371 49 Neg. 
Priming 
Male 20.84 16.273 49 Neg. 
Priming 
Male 20.84 16.273 49 
Female 72.44 23.185 18 Female 21.00 18.340 18 Female 21.00 18.340 18 
Pos. 
Priming 
Male 60.39 24.711 57 Pos. 
Priming 
Male 28.33 18.067 57 Pos. 
Priming 
Male 28.33 18.067 57 
Female 53.80 21.776 10 Female 30.10 14.310 10 Female 30.10 14.310 10 
Q56 Mean Std. Dev. N Q57 Mean Std. Dev. N 
    Control 
Group 
Male 30.43 19.449 54 Control 
Group 
Male 30.43 19.449 54      
Female 26.18 14.951 17 Female 26.18 14.951 17     
Neg. 
Priming 
Male 20.84 16.273 49 Neg. 
Priming 
Male 20.84 16.273 49      
Female 21.00 18.340 18 Female 21.00 18.340 18     
Pos. 
Priming 
Male 28.33 18.067 57 Pos. 
Priming 
Male 28.33 18.067 57      
Female 30.10 14.310 10 Female 30.10 14.310 10     
Note: Q: Question number 
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A univariate analysis was performed where the independent variable was the interaction effect 
(CSR priming x gender), and the dependent variable was blame (Q60). The output in table 33 
demonstrates that females assign a higher degree of responsibility to A-Meieriet than men on 
a general basis. The scheffe values from table 33 can be viewed in appendix H.  
 
Q 53 indicates that males and females assign more responsibility within the negative priming 
group compared to the positive priming- and control group. Females within the positive-
priming group assign a lower degree of responsibility compared to females in other groups. 
However, males in the control group assign the lowest degree of responsibility to A-Meieriet 
compared to the other groups. The finding of the total effect is significant (p=.012) between 
the control and the negative priming group, and (p=.013) between the positive and negative 
priming. However the interaction effect is not statistically significant between genders within 
the various groups (p=.706). Females within the positive- and priming group assign a larger 
degree of responsibility to the supplier than men; however the opposite is true for the control 
group. The total effect is significant (p=.019) between the control and the negative priming, 
and between the positive and negative priming (p=.042). However, the interaction effect is not 
significant (p=.841). Furthermore, the positive priming group has assigned more 
responsibility to the customer compared to other groups. Females within the positive priming 
group have assigned more responsibility to the customer than men. However, the opposite is 
true for the negative priming- and the control group. Neither the total effect nor the interaction 
effect is significant. On a general basis, females attribute the locus to be more internal than 
men. 
Females in the control group perceive the crisis to be more stable compared to the males 
(Q56). Within the negative priming group females perceive the crisis to be more temporary 
than men, while in the positive priming group both genders view the crisis as more stable than 
temporary. The total effect is significant between the control- and the negative priming group 
(p=.014), and the interaction effect is significant between the genders (p=.11). 
Females within in control group perceive A-Meieriet to be in more control of preventing 
(Q57) similar types of crises from occurring in the future compared to females in the other 
groups. Males within the positive priming group believe A-Meieriet is in a greater degree of 
control compared to the other groups. The total effect is significant between the control and 
the negative priming group (p=.015) and also between the positive and negative priming 
groups (p=.013). The interaction effect is not significant (p=.731).  
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6 Discussion 
”The outcome of any serious research can only be to make two questions grow where only one grew 
before”                     Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) 
This chapter discusses the statistical results presented in the previous chapter and relate them to 
previous research within the area. 
6.1 Primary Study 
The basic premise of the study was to explore the concept and nature of CSR and relate this to 
SCM. The primary research question was “does CSR have a positive effect on SCM”? Even 
though there seem to exist several shared dimensions of CSR and SCM, the probable 
communalities of the two variables that proves a causal relationship have not been studied in 
any publications (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Even though the question is important, many 
researchers‟ acknowledges that conducted studies isolated focus have failed to embrace the 
highly integrative nature of the disciplines (Tombs and Smith, 1995, Mitroff, 2011, Alpaslan, 
2011). Stakeholder theory is regarded as one of the cornerstones within CSR management 
(Mitroff, 2011, Pearson and Mitroff, 1993, Mitroff and Anagnos, 2000, Sheaffer and Mano-
Negrin, 2003, Alpaslan, 2011), and thus the authors‟ made a logical linkage between CSR and 
SCM, where stakeholder relationships enables more efficient SCM (Blowfield and Murray, 
2008). 
The results from the study provided support for the five primary hypotheses which posits that 
CSR has positive effect on an organization‟s ability to detect, prepare/prevent, contain, 
recover and learn from crises. However, the data showed that the respondent perceive the 
third and fourth phase of the SCM model as one stage, thus the SCM model was revised to 
contain four stages where the containment and recovery phase was merged. 
H1: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to detect crises.  
CSR was found to have a positive and significant effect on organizations ability to detect 
crises. Scholars have argued that an organization‟s ability to prevent or effectively respond to 
crises depend on the accuracy of the organization‟s assumptions and knowledge concerning 
its stakeholders‟ behaviour in the context of crises (Ulmer, 2001a). When organizations have 
an emphasis on effective stakeholder management it allows managers to develop a more 
realistic understanding of themselves and the environment (Ulmer, 2001a, Mitroff and 
Kilmann, 1984, Nathan and Mitroff, 1991, Pearson and Clair, 1998, Perrow, 1999, Alpaslan et 
al., 2009a). This leads to increased capacity to monitor occurrences in the external 
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environment (Nathan and Mitroff, 1991, Perrow, 1999) and adequately interpret early 
warning signals sent out by different stakeholders (Vaaland et al., 2008). Thus organizations 
are more likely to provide a wide variety of damage containment mechanisms in advance of 
the occurrence of crises (Pearson et al., 1997:56). The authors suggest that the underlying 
rationale behind this is that socially responsible firms‟ engagement with stakeholders 
enhances the communication channels, which in turn enables access to information which can 
help to disclose important triggers. Therefore, CSR should be incorporated into the SCM in 
order to enhance signal detection. Furthermore, the stakeholder approach can reduce the gap 
between organizational performance and stakeholder expectations (Clair, 1993). Thus, CSR 
proves the double-effect of the stakeholder approach (Heath, 1997, Pearson et al., 1997b). The 
findings supports Heath and Ni (Simola, 2005) and Simola‟s (2003)research which underpins 
that CSR can advance the organizations credibility during the early stages of a crisis. 
 
H2: CSR has a positive effect organizations ability to prevent and prepare for crises. 
The results advocate that CSR has a positive and significant effect on organizations ability to 
prepare for and prevent crises. In the preparation phase, organizations should aim to identify 
and interact with stakeholders to prevent crises from happening and affecting stakeholders 
(2008). The positive effect of CSR on prevention/preparation may stem from the belief that 
socially responsible companies avoids the damaging consequences of crises by adhering to 
their moral obligations, which in turn safeguards stakeholders interests (Simkos and 
Shrivastava, 1993). Furthermore, the authors suggest that an integrated stakeholder approach 
enables stakeholder information and facilitation of this information (Boin and Lagadec, 2000, 
Tombs and Smith, 1995), which in turn is likely to increase an organization‟s preparedness. 
Successful preparation and prevention is affected by the nature of an organization‟s 
established relationship with its stakeholders, and the accuracy of an organization‟s 
understanding of how its stakeholders might behave in the context of crises (Alpaslan et al., 
2009b). The authors recognize CSR as a tool which may equip organizations effective 
routines directed at preparing and preventing the potential escalation of crises (Ulmer, 2001a). 
Thus the authors propose that a greater emphasis on CSR may help firms prevent crises. 
 
H3/4: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to contain and recover from crises. 
The results confirmed that CSR has a positive and significant effect on organizations 
containment and recovery. This may be due to the fact that socially responsible organizations 
that focus on maintaining positive reciprocal relationships with stakeholders, are better 
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equipped for creating long standing trust and loyalty (Klein and Dawar, 2004, Bhattacharya 
and Sen, 2004, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Elsubbaugh et al., 2004, Mitroff et al., 1989). 
The real values and strengths are revealed during times of crises, and therefore a track record 
of strong stakeholder relationships proves to be valuable for crisis containment (Ulmer, 
2001a). This in turn will generate sentiments to obtain a social licence to operate (Coombs 
and Holladay, 2010b). Thus, CSR may render the stakeholders to give a company the benefit 
of the doubt within a crisis, due to prior positive attitudes towards the organization. The 
authors suspect that this reciprocal stakeholder management acts as a reservoir of goodwill, 
helping an organization to contain and recover from crises (Gjølberg, 2009). 
 
H5: CSR has a positive effect on organizations ability to learn from crises. 
The results demonstrate that CSR has a positive and significant effect on learning. Academia 
argues that learning from past occurrences greatly influences all stages of future SCM 
incidents (Hale et al., 2006, Coombs, 2007a). This may be due to engagement in double-loop 
learning, which the authors speculate represents a preventative strategy in respect to reducing 
the risk of experiencing similar crises in the future. Thus learning enables organizations to 
enhance their level of preparedness for future threats (Kovoor-Misra, 1995, Pearson et al., 
1997b). When organizations have emphasis on stakeholder management and engage in 
double-loop learning, more attention may be paid to improve organizational performance 
which in turn is likely to increase the ability to learn from crises. 
H6: CSR has a positive effect on organizations SCM.  
The results confirmed the authors underlying assumption that CSR has a significant and 
positive effect on organizations SCM. Aslop (Simola, 2005) states that “organizations build 
up „reputational capital‟ to tide them over in turbulent times. The findings support Heath and 
Ni‟s (2004:17) research that CSR may be viewed as a “stockpile” of goodwill”, that can aid 
an organization in achieving successful SCM. Waddock and Smith (2000) conducted a 
responsibility audit of eight companies, and found that adoption of proactive, stakeholder 
inclusive, morally responsible practices, lowered costs, legal exposure, and risks to company 
reputation (2008). Mitroff and Alpaslan (Waddock and Smith, 2000) reported a positive 
correlation between successful SCM outcomes and proactive SCM practices of a Sample of 
Fortune 1,000 companies. Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin (2003) compared 82 Israeli business 
firms and not-for-profit organizations, and found that firms that focused strictly on profit 
maximization were more prone to crises. Their results suggested that a stakeholder appraoch 
is at least associated with fewer frequencies of crises. This in accordance with the authors 
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results. Thus the authors propose that developing trusting and cooperative relationships with 
stakeholders enables the organization and its stakeholders to prepare and respond to crises 
more efficiently. 
 
The primary study has shown that both disciplines may contain valuable contemporary 
information in the present complex and dynamic global business environment, where CSR 
concerns represent a high priority because mismanagement of such may potentially destroy an 
organizations reputation (2003). Fomburn and Van Riel (Boin and Lagadec, 2000) argues that 
at present, angry stakeholders are increasingly likely to generate crises (2004), and highlights 
the increasing importance of integrating the stakeholder approach with an organization‟s SCM 
(Coombs, 2007a). The study‟s results corroborate these statements and indicate that CSR 
should become a priority for today‟s business leaders, due to stakeholders base their 
evaluations of companies on their CSR-activities (Smith et al., 1996). In a globalized world 
where stakeholders‟ create news events themselves (e.g. blogs, Face book, forums, personal 
websites etc.), the authors‟ believe that by employing an integrated stakeholder approach 
organizations‟ may decrease the chance to become targets of e.g. boycotts.  
Many organizations‟ may still advocate Friedman‟s (1970) view that organizations‟ primary 
objective is to maximize shareholders‟ value. However, the future of existence of a company 
is highly dependent on input from its complex network of external stakeholders, and a 
common denominator of all crises is that they may harm organizational stakeholders (Porter 
and Kramer, 2006). As a results of globalization crises are on the rise (Mitroff et al., 1996) 
and will occur more frequently (Boin and Lagadec, 2000, Alpaslan et al., 2009b). Inevitably, 
crises focus attention on corporate public, social, economic, legal and ethical responsibilities 
(Coleman, 2006). Crises often raise question about corporations‟ and managers‟ legal and 
ethical responsibilities towards stakeholders‟ (Carroll, 1979, Alpaslan et al., 2009b), therefore 
the authors‟ argue that an integrated stakeholder approach in SCM is crucial in order to 
successfully handle crises. 
From the commercial findings it was revealed that Norwegian organizations can be 
characterized as more reactive than proactive in regards to their SCM. The authors‟ believe 
that an integrated stakeholder approach will redress this imbalance as a stakeholder approach 
enables proactive SCM (Kolk and Pinkse, 2006, Mitroff, 1994, Tombs and Smith, 1995, 
Vaaland et al., 2008, Alpaslan et al., 2009a). Ulmer (Alpaslan et al., 2009a) also claims that 
organizations that focus on maintaining a positive reciprocal relationship with stakeholders 
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are better equipped for creating long standing trust and loyalty. The authors believe that 
increased trust and loyalty may prove to be valuable for the SCM process. Effective SCM is 
essentially about saving image and reputation, while mitigating further possible issues as 
consequence of the existing situation (Khodarahmi, 2009a). If companies prove its social 
responsibility and concern with stakeholder welfare pre, - during and post crisis, the study 
suggests it can improve organizations SCM which in turn protects the reputation. Adopting 
the principals of an integrated stakeholder approach may lead organizations to engage more 
frequently in proactive and/or accommodating SCM (2001a). In addition, we propose that 
stakeholder management aids organizations‟ in more successful SCM, especially in the 
critical phase of prevention and recovery (Alpaslan et al., 2009a).  
The results from the study advocate the important link between CSR and SCM, as CSR 
integrated in SCM may represents a positive capital account during crises. As the 
interdependency between CSR and SCM increases, so too will the impact of crises on 
stakeholders‟. In a world were crises occur more frequent, the need to integrate the concepts 
of CSR and SCM will be of increasing importance. The authors‟ argue that if organizations‟ 
take a step towards developing an integrated stakeholder approach in the SCM process it may 
enable a proactive and timely SCM in a business context where: “the safest assumption is that 
a crisis looms on the horizon” (Fink, 1986: 813). 
6.2 Secondary Study 
The secondary research question was “does CSR impact stakeholders assignment of blame in 
a product-harm crisis?” The frequency of occurrence and the serious consequences of PHC 
demand for more insights concerning the underlying process through which PHC influence 
stakeholders‟ assignment of blame. The importance of investigating this issue stems from that 
CSR may function as an insurance policy against reputational harm in PHC‟s. 
H7: Effective SCM reduces assignment of blame. 
The results of the study provide significant support for the premise that SCM reduces blame. 
This suggests that a CSR reputation enhances stakeholder level of trust in PHC‟s. A-Meieriet 
crisis communication demonstrated empathy and assured the salient stakeholders (customers) 
that their concern was the number one priority within the PHC, thus is in alignment with 
Coombs (Alpaslan et al., 2009a) SCCT (2007c). Effective SCM is eventually about saving 
image and reputation, while mitigating the further possible issues as consequence of an 
existing situation (Coombs, 2007a, Harrion, 2000, Black, 1993, Argeti, 2007). By leaving no 
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room for speculation and possible manipulation by the media A-Meieriet SCM may have been 
perceived as a “hero” in the “Role Wheel”, as the company acted overcoming of challenges, 
and the prioritization of “people first” increased the company‟s legitimacy (Khodarahmi, 
2009b). This may have caused the respondents to view A-Meieriet‟s SCM as effective. 
Research has suggested that CSR is becoming a societal norm instead of reflecting the general 
expectations (Geelmuyden, 2010). This suggests that the response may have reflected the 
basic societal expectations of the stakeholders. The best prepared organizations are guided by 
corporate values rooted in the business culture when confronting a crisis (KPMG, 2008). The 
responsibility towards stakeholders and the alignment of values reflected in action, may have 
contributed to a decreased assignment of blame to A-Meieriet. This is consisted with Klein 
and Dawar‟s (2004), Simkos and Kurzbard‟s (1994), Laufer and Coombs‟ (2006) and Sen and 
Bhattacharya‟s (2004) research. 
H8: A positive CSR moderates the relationship between SCM and assignment of blame.  
The findings confirm that a positive CSR reputation moderates the relationship between SCM 
and blame in a PHC, which also support those of Klein and Dawar (2004). The authors 
underpin that a prior positive CSR reputation may be crucial when handling a PHC. 
Moreover, how actions in alignment with organizational values may positively have 
influenced the respondents. The study indicate that social responsible behaviour and positive 
CSR reputation can be an effective tool for controlling and minimizing the danger of losing 
reputation among stakeholders. The authors‟ believe that A-Meieriets immediate product 
recall before serious harm occurred may have enhanced the company‟s reputation for social 
responsibility, which underlines that CSR and SCM goes “hand-in-hand” in a crisis.  
H9: A positive CSR reputation reduces assignment of blame 
The results of this study provided support for the premise that CSR reduces stakeholders‟ 
assignment of blame in a PHC. This is consistent with Webb‟s research (Pearson et al., 
1997b) that 8 of 10 American stakeholders have an increased consumer trust towards 
companies that have a positive CSR reputation. In addition, it confirms Fink‟s (2008) 
argument that CSR create a reservoir of goodwill, functioning as an insurance policy against 
the negative effects of a PHC. The authors‟ believes that well CSR-reputed companies often 
have fewer difficulties regaining the confidence of their stakeholders. This assumption is 
supported by Bhattacharya and Sen‟s (1986a) and is consistent with Klein and Dawar‟s 
(2004), and Laufer and Coombs (2004) research, that positive CSR causes a reduction in 
negative stakeholder evaluations of the company‟s legitimacy. The authors‟ results revealed 
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that positive CSR priming caused similar attributions among the control group. This may be 
due to when individuals learn about the behaviour of a company whom they have little prior 
information about, they often take the behaviour at face value and attribute it dispositional 
(2004). Another reason may be that stakeholders are willing to give a company the benefit of 
the doubt when they hold limited prior information about the company. The results imply that 
no CSR priming may provide as much protection in a PHC as positive CSR priming. 
However, negative CSR priming represents a liability when faced with a PHC, which is 
similar to Klein and Dawar‟s (2004), Dawar and Pillutla (2000) and Sen and Bhattacharya‟s 
(2001) research. 
H10a: A positive CSR reputation will cause the locus to be perceived as external rather than 
internal.  
H10b: A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event to be perceived as temporary 
rather than stable 
H10c: A positive CSR reputation will cause the crisis event to be perceived as controllable 
rather than uncontrollable 
The results of the study provided support for the premise that CSR affect stakeholders‟ 
attribution of blame in a PHC. However, only two of the three causal dimensions of 
attribution were significant. Locus and controllability significantly affected stakeholders‟ 
perception of CSR, thus stakeholders‟ attribution of blame was found to be a function of 
stakeholder CSR associations. The study indicated that prior CSR information influences 
stakeholders‟ judgements in PHC. This is consistent with Dawar and Pillutla‟s (Yoon et al., 
2006) research which demonstrated that consumers interpretation of a firms response to PHC 
was subjected to their prior expectations about the firm. The authors believe that the positive 
CSR reputation may function as a halo which may have had a spill-over effect on attributions 
blame. 
H11a: Locus mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame 
H11b: Stability mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame 
H11c: Controllability mediates the relationship between CSR and assignment of blame 
The bootstrap results confirmed that only locus1 (partially) mediated the relationship between 
CSR and blame. A positive CSR reputation shaped stakeholders‟ attributions of responsibility 
which in turn determined the assignment of blame (2000). Thus CSR represented a reservoir 
of goodwill in terms of attribution of responsibility in the PHC. The bootstrap analysis 
revealed that locus2&3, controllability and stability did not represent a significant mediator 
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between CSR and blame, but represented an indirect effect. Thus, the mediating hypotheses 
were rejected. The CSR initiative did not act by mitigating stakeholders‟ reactions to a PHC, 
which is contradictory to the findings of Klein and Dawar (2004) and Simkos and Shrivastava 
(1993). The implications of these results underpin how important an integrated stakeholder 
approach can be, as CSR priming has an indirect impact on stakeholders‟ attribution, which in 
turn influences assignment of blame.  
 
In general, based on the results the authors speculate that one of the differentiating factors on 
blame attribution relates to the different level of risk aversion that leaders have towards the 
uncertainties (2004). Another suggestion is that stakeholders (the control group) are willing to 
give the benefit of the doubt to firms that they know little about and consequently they cannot 
draw any safe conclusions. This suggestion is in line with that of Ellen et al. (2006) is 
proposing, - that stakeholders perceive and evaluate CSR initiatives differently based on the 
motives believed to lie behind the initiatives. Recently, a survey in Greece has demonstrated 
that Greek consumers don't trust the companies‟ CSR initiatives as they doubt their social 
intentions (Laufer and Coombs, 2006). Furthermore, it may be assumed that popular 
companies are criticized more severely because the public expectation increases regarding 
these companies CSR actions.  
Although researchers as well as the authors conclude that a positive relationship exists 
between a positive CSR reputation and stakeholders attitudes towards a company (Assiouras 
and Lymberogianni, 2009), stakeholders were found to be more sensitive to negative CSR. 
This negativity bias exists when consumers react more strongly towards corporate 
irresponsibility than towards corporate responsibility (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001b, Du et al., 
2007, Wigley, 2008). Therefore, it may be more likely that consumers want to punish socially 
irresponsible companies by refraining from repurchasing behaviour (Bhattacharya and Sen, 
2004). Series of recent CSR scandals (e.g. BP, Enron, Worldcom, Vivendi, Parmalat) proves 
that many organizations have neglected to consider various stakeholder interests, and that 
some of them actually failed to accommodate salient stakeholder demands (Creyer and Ross, 
1997, Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001b, Mohr and Webb, 2005). In relation to A-Meieriet, 
business who disregards their moral duties to account for stakeholder interests, is assigned 
more blame than socially responsible companies. 
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6.2.1 Primary Study: General Commercial Findings CSR 
Several researchers‟ support that promotion of CSR activities helps minimize harm to an 
organization‟s reputation following a crisis (Kolk and Pinkse, 2006). The authors‟ found that 
approximately 73 percent (Q12) believed that their organization has a positive corporate 
reputation and 79 percent (Q9) assumes that CSR positively influences corporate reputation. 
The results corroborate to Webb‟s (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004, Klein and Dawar, 2004, 
Wigley and Pfau, 2010), findings where 8 of 10 American stakeholders have an increased 
trust towards companies with a positive CSR reputation. Thus, the study suggest that CSR 
may aid in creating a competitive advantage, which is in accordance with Porter and Kramer‟s 
study (2006). This is in accordance with Porter and Kramer‟s (2006) research. Approximately 
57 percent (Q10) believes that CSR represented a competitive advantage. This finding 
corresponds with the study conducted by Argument (2006) who reports that 83 percent of 
Norway‟s 300 largest companies share this opinion. Despite the confidence that CSR 
represents a competitive advantage, only 63 percent of the respondents believe that it is 
important to invest in CSR (Q13). The overrepresentation of small companies (1-9 
employees) may be the reason for this low number. Furthermore, 61(Q11) percent 
acknowledges that CSR has a positive effect on an organization‟s SCM. This is contradictive 
given that only 1/3 of the respondents believe that it is important to invest in CSR. 
The most frequently implemented CSR standard is the ISO (36.4 percent) (Q42). The 
percentage is relatively small and very few organizations (2 percent) have committed to the 
highly recognized CSR standard, UN Global Compact. The results indicate that most 
companies follow the mainstream as for which standards to implement, and thus the CSR 
initiatives may be driven by what is the norm and expectations of the business context to 
which the organization operates within. Further, CSR issues are most frequently handled by 
the company‟s general manager (74 percent), however 10 percent of the respondents claim 
that no member of the organization handles CSR issues (Q43). Knowing that the 
multinational enterprises are in the forefront of developing CSR activities, the result are not 
surprising due to an overrepresentation of small businesses in the sample. 
6.2.2 Primary Study: General Commercial Findings SCM 
The study indicated that 28 percent of the organizations had experienced a crisis within the 
past five years (Q49). Unsgaard and Silkoset (2003) studied the experience of a crisis within 
the past two years, and their findings were similar indicating 25 percent. Furthermore, 51 
percent of Norwegian organizations do not believe that their organization may become 
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involved in a crisis within the next five years (Q50), contra 31 percent in Unsgaard and 
Silkoset‟s (2006) study. Approximately 41 percent of the business leaders acknowledge that 
SCM is not prioritized among the executive management (Q52). A logical deduction form 
these findings are that many corporations are inefficiently prepared to mange crises (2006), 
and that the issue of SCM is not important enough for the corporate management. Mitroff 
(1988), Pauchant and Mitroff (2001), Unsgaard and Silkoset (Pearson and Clair, 1998) and 
Augustine (1995) have debated the underlying overconfidence among organizations own 
confidence in abilities to manage occurring crisis situations successfully. The study 
corroborates these previous findings. Whereas in Unsgaard and Silkoset (2006) study 93 
percent believed they would handle a crisis satisfactory, 76 percent believed they would do 
the same in the authors study (Q51).  
When evaluating the organizations SCM effectiveness, 47 percent consider their procedures 
to be effective whereas 36 percent are uncertain (Q46). This is congruent with the findings of 
Pearson and Clair (2006) who argues that corporations are inefficiently prepared to manage  
crises. Many scholars argue that being crisis prepared entails the establishment of CMT‟s and 
a CMP (1998). The findings unveiled that only 43 percent of the organizations had an 
orchestrated CMT (Q47). Comparing the results to those of Unsgaars and Silkoset (Mitroff, 
1998, Pearson et al., 1997b, Lerbinger, 1997a, Fern-Banks, 2002, Fink, 1995, Coombs and 
Holladay, 2010a), only 34 percent acknowledge that the organization has a CMT. Although 
the organizations that operate with a CMT seem to have increased during the past five years, 
the number is still modest in relation to the ability to perform effective SCM. Furthermore, 50 
percent had not developed a CMP (Q48) which is similar to the 51 percent found in Unsgaard 
and Silkoset (2006) study. According to Guth (2006) only 84 percent of organization that had 
experienced a crisis recently had developed a CMP. Although the number of organizations 
that operates with a CMP post crisis seems to be higher in Guth‟s study, there still exist a 
potential to achieve greater benefits by developing a CMP for organization to more effectively 
manage crises. According to Augustine (1995), barely 50 percent of organizations were 
prepared in reference to a CMT and CMP. The Burston-Marsteller‟s study in 2002 showed 
that among the 90 percent of Norwegian corporations that had developed a CMP and CMT, 
only one third underwent crisis scenario tests.  
The findings uncovered that organizations are poorly prepared to manage crises, due to the 
absence of a comprehensive CMP‟s and CMT‟s in approximately 50 percent of the 
respondents organizations. Thus, Norwegian companies may be considered to be crisis 
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reactive rather than crisis proactive. This is not surprising in view of Mitroff and Alpaslan 
(1995b) findings who unveiled that only 5-25 percent of the organizations operates 
proactively. Another indicator of the company‟s reactive SCM is that 36 percent do not know 
whether their SCM is effective or not (Q46). Thus, the findings have indicated that the 
respondents‟ organizational culture de-prioritizes SCM, especially crisis 
prevention/preparation which according to Pearson et al (1997) and Mitroff (1989) is a crucial 
factor in order to be effective. 
The findings revealed that Norwegian organizations greatest fear within a crisis is the loss of 
human lives, while environmental damage is faired the least (Q45). This is coherent with 
Geelmuyden (2003) argument that in order to be perceived as legitimate during a crisis, the 
organization must prioritize people first. A study performed by AON.com in 2007 showed 
that a company‟s greatest fear in a crisis is reputational loss (2010). Thus, the authors‟ 
findings are not completely congruent with these, as reputational loss was prioritized 
secondly. 
6.2.3 Secondary Study: General Commercial Findings Gender assignment of Blame 
The study found one significant result, stability, at the 5 percent level, indicating that females 
perceive the crisis to be more stable than men in the negative priming condition, and more 
temporary than men in the positive priming condition. This indicates that females 
punish/reward socially (ir)responsible companies more than men do. It suggests that negative 
CSR priming has a larger impact on attributions than positive CSR priming among genders. 
As proposed, the results revealed that females generated more blame due to increased 
perceptions of severity through defensive attributions than men, which is similar to that of 
Laufer and Gillespie (Evensen et al., 2007). Thus, the findings unveiled that genders may be a 
consumer trait that shape perceptions in a PHC through the role of perceived severity. These 
findings support studies in psychology, which found that women view threatening events as 
more severe than men, due to biological and socialization factors (2004, Laufer and Coombs, 
2006). This may stem from the difference in the crisis type, in the ambiguity of responsibility, 
as well as gender differences between the respondents. The findings corroborate those of 
Klein and Dawar (Harris and Miller, 2000), Dawar and Pillutla (2004) on PHC, as well as 
those of Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) on CSR, that a neutral image might provide as much 
protection in a PHC as a positive CSR image. 
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6.3 Concluding Remarks 
Many real-life examples underpin that society judge business from a moral perspective, and a 
great number of business practices have experienced the detrimental consequences of 
disregarding their social responsibilities. The study has supported the premise that there is an 
inherent, symbiotic relationship between CSR and SCM. Moreover, that an integrated 
stakeholder approach may improve an organization‟s SCM; the ability to detect, 
prevent/prepare, contain/recover and learn from crises. Hence, leading a corporation through 
crises requires rational decision-making guided by an ethical approach (2000) to obtain a 
license to operate. According to Berman et al., (Snyder et al., 2006) stakeholders should be 
included in a firm‟s decision-making process because the firm has moral commitments to 
their stakeholders (1999). Stakeholders may reward socially responsible organizations with a 
social licence to operate though reciprocal stakeholder-organizational relationships. The 
authors believe that adopting the stakeholder approach enhances knowledge transfer, and 
cooperating with a broad set of stakeholders in crises increases the availability of critical 
stakeholder resources and information. Establishing strong and sincere relationships with 
stakeholders before a crisis makes crisis prevention and recovery faster and easier, because 
such efforts make stakeholders less likely to withhold resources and information before and 
after crises (Quinn and Jones, 1995). A stakeholder approach may coalesce into global 
collective efficiencies, because managers‟ and stakeholders‟ mutual and sincere treatment of 
each other, may solve inherent problems of coordinated action in the context of crises 
(Alpaslan et al., 2009b, Frooman, 1997, Ulmer, 2001a, Frooman, 2005). Lastly, the 
stakeholder approach may allow managers to prepare for a wide variety of crises, enjoy access 
to the resources of a broad set of stakeholders, and facilitate the flow of critical resources or 
information among stakeholders.  
 
CSR initiatives have been considered to build up a bank of stakeholder goodwill that 
companies can utilize within in a crisis. This is due to the fact that positive CSR activities 
may impact the resilience to negative information during a crisis‟ (Ulmer, 2001a, Jones, 1995, 
Nathan and Mitroff, 1991, Alpaslan et al., 2009a, Clair, 1993, Pearson and Clair, 1998), Thus, 
an organization‟s prior positive CSR reputation may function as a halo-effect that acts as a 
shield, protecting the company against reputational harm from a crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 
2006, Klein and Dawar (2004)). 
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Even though a neutral reputation may provide as much protection as a positive CSR 
reputation, acting irresponsible (negative CSR) may represent a liability (Klein and Dawar, 
2004). Unless stakeholders trust the company‟s pro-social position, they may not be willing to 
reward the company for its CSR activity. Positive priming demonstrates that congruence 
between the organizational action and values increases the credibility of a company. Thus, 
ethical considerations should be a part of any SCM strategy, because a strictly „„economic‟‟ or 
rational approach may produce greater resentment and reputation damage (Hosmer, 1996; 
Snyder et al., 2006) 
The study has highlighted the importance of integrating the concepts of CSR and SCM. Thus 
socially responsible crisis management (SRCM) is proposed as a new theoretical concept 
contributed by the authors, which revises Mitroff‟s SCM model by including CSR. This 
concept embraces the highly integrative nature of the disciplines, where an integrated 
stakeholder approach is intertwined with crisis management. The authors view this to be an 
important contribution in a globalized world where economic, technical, social and 
environmental interdependencies are expanding and crises are on the rise. 
 
 
 
Figure 22 SRCM - Research Contribution Model (Andvik & Vodahl, 2011) 
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7 Implications 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
The relationship between CSR and SCM has been largely overlooked (Wigley and Pfau, 
2010, Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004, Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Hess et al., 2002). In a 
globalized world where crises are on the rise (Coombs and Holladay, 2010b, Tombs and 
Smith, 1995, Alpaslan et al., 2009a, Mitroff, 2011), of are a result of companies disregarding 
their social responsibilities. This study provides scientific empirical evidence for the link 
between the concepts of CSR and SCM, that operating with a CSR profile has a positive 
effect on SCM. Moreover, it proves the need to view the concepts combined as one element, 
contra two separate fields. As a theoretical contribution to reduce the research gap that exists 
between the communalities, SRCM is introduced. The concept integrates the two disciplines, 
and emphasizes the importance of employing a stakeholder approach in SCM. The concept 
may represent several implications if it is found valid in future research. 
The findings from the primary study present empirical and theoretical evidence which 
indicates that the containment and recovery stage should be merged. Thus, the original 
framework presented by Mitroff (1988) should be re-evaluated, and proves the need for 
further theoretical evidence within this area of academia. Coombs (Fink, 1986b, Alpaslan et 
al., 2009a) on the other hand have proposed that SCM consists of three stages. Thus, the 
different results prove the need for future studies, in order to find a common theoretical based 
agreement of the stages of SCM. 
Previous studies have researched the role of SCM on stakeholders‟ assignment of blame 
(2007a).  Their research has found support for the premise that SCM affects blame, which was 
also supported by the authors‟ findings. The authors‟ findings also supported those of Klein 
and Dwar (2004) that CSR moderated the relationship between SCM and blame. A neutral 
CSR reputation may provide as much protection in a PHC as a positive, while a negative CSR 
reputation may be represent a liability. Thus, it corroborates the findings of Dawar and 
Pillutla (Simkos and Kurzbard, 1994, Laufer and Coombs, 2006, Klein and Dawar, 2004, 
Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004), Sen and Bhattacharya (2000)  Klein and Dawar (2004). 
However, opposite to the results of Klein and Dawar (2004), attribution (locus, stability and 
controllability) was not proven to represent mediators between CSR and assignment of blame. 
This implies the need for future research within the area. 
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7.2 Managerial Implications 
There are several findings in the study that may hold great value for business managers. One 
of the findings implicate that managers should see the disciplines of CSR and SCM in relation 
to each other, instead of treating the fields distinctively. The findings may provide insight 
which can aid managers when developing corporate strategies involving the concepts. 
Consequently, the results from the study will hopefully stem as useful decisional support for 
managers. Though operating with a CSR profile is costly, the authors believe that the 
financial benefit from having a positive CSR profile may prove valuable for the organization 
on the long-term perspective in terms of more proactive SCM. 
The study indicated that Norwegian managers are overconfident in their own SCM abilities, 
which should be taken into consideration by corporate executives. Managerial implications 
relate to the importance of continuous stakeholder mapping and stakeholder dialogue, both 
prior and throughout ones SCM. Managers should think about the stakeholders‟ attribution of 
blame, and in this regard either have a positive CSR profile or none. Irresponsible 
organizations may be punished, which could have detrimental consequences. An effective 
SCM aligned with a strong CSR reputation may in a larger degree prevent threatening the 
stakeholder-organizational relationship, and should therefore be used as a strategic tool by the 
management. The rationale for any consideration concerning CSR alongside SCM concludes 
that managers may need to recognize the impacts their decisions have on stakeholders. Given 
that the values and assumptions of managers are intrinsically linked to the decisions that they 
take, it may be argued that there may be a strong link between a company‟s ethical position 
and its stage of SCM effectiveness. The predominance of reactive SCM can result in the 
incubation of crises, unless managers take into consideration the ethical dynamics that their 
decisions have on its stakeholders. 
Gender is an important segmentation variable used by companies, a fact evidenced by brands 
in many product categories that are sold separately to men and women (2001b). As a result, 
determining whether males and females differ in their reactions to PHC is an important issue 
for these companies to examine. The study suggests that companies may need to react 
differently in a PHC depending on whether the product is used primarily by men or women. 
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8 Limitations 
As with all research, this study contains several limitations that need to be taken into 
consideration. They study contains self-reported data, which are commonly identified as a 
potential source of common method bias. The results obtained from the survey reflect 
subjective attitudes of the respondents and may not portray the correct situation. However, the 
common method biases are seldom strong enough to invalidate research findings (Laufer and 
Coombs, 2006).  
The use of a cross-sectional design does not allow one to draw conclusions about causality, as 
it merely represents a snap-shot of reality. The majority of the small and medium sized 
businesses, as well as an overrepresentation of the service sector represent a bias (figure 14 
and 15). In addition, a limited number of female participants lower the validity of the research 
findings in regards to differences between genders in terms of attribution of organizational 
blame (figure 16). 
The lack of research on the synergies between CS and SCM represents a limitation. 
According to Blowfield and Murray (Doty and Glick, 1998, Kark et al., 2003) there is no 
single commonly agreed upon definition of CSR which embraces all the aspects and related 
concepts of CSR such as business ethics, stakeholder management, corporate citizenship and 
community relations. “The concept of CSR is constantly changing as society itself evolves, 
affecting our expectations of business and the ways in which its relationship with society is 
handled” (2008). This may affect the study, and should thus be taken into consideration. CSR 
as a concept has gained far more attraction in Europe than in other parts of the world such as 
the US. This is due to the US interprets CSR mainly in philanthropic terms while the 
Europeans focus more on operating the core business in a socially responsible way (Blowfield 
and Murray, 2008:18). Thus, the results presented in the study are less applicable in certain 
business cultures such as the US. 
In reality stakeholders tend to evaluate a company‟s CSR initiatives over time and will 
employ this information when evaluation the companies‟ assignment of blame when and if a 
crisis takes place. Thus, the priming and forced response in the study may bias the results. The 
moderating effect of the study was investigated from the aspect of social science, and has 
demonstrated that individuals tend to interpret events related information and make 
attributions that are consistent with their prior beliefs.  
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Due to a normal and less severe crisis represented the PHC of A-Meieriet, this may have 
caused a less significant results than a severe crisis would have. It has been suggested that 
weak effects in previous research of the determinants of attributions were due to the use of 
unrealistic stimuli dampened the effects of the intended manipulation (Rowe, 2006).  
A strength of the study is the use of a probability sampling technique. However, as a 
weakness it is important to note that the Likert-scale is on an ordinal scale level, and to utilize 
these data in the data analysis will imply measurement errors. The rationale behind this 
argument is that the data analysis requires the data to be on an interval scale level. To 
“pressure” ordinal data to be on the interval level is common within social science, though 
one must be aware of the measurement errors this implies. It should also be noted that under 
several categories only two items were included which may reduce the validity of the 
findings. Several issues may lower the validity and reliability of the research findings. This is 
addressed in section 4.4. Lastly, the thesis has been written by master students, not 
researchers, and the results must be interpreted accordingly.  
9 Recommendations for Further Research 
There are several opportunities for future research following this study. Longitudinal studies 
can be utilized to investigate whether the findings are significant on a long-term perspective. 
Further research is also needed in order to reach a more common agreement of what CSR 
entails. An area for future research could be an examination of boundary conditions to 
differences between genders in consumer attribution of blame during a crisis. Perhaps when 
product failure is of a minor nature, both male and female stakeholders equally feel that they 
are not personally at risk of harm. In addition, the authors assume that there is a possibility 
that females attribute more blame to organizations with a negative CSR reputation when faced 
with a crisis, because they tend to punish the company in a larger degree than men. This is 
therefore recommended to be studied in future research. Furthermore, the authors postulate 
that individuals who have children tend to pay more attention to health related aspects than 
those that have no children. The authors lacked this information, and thus the research 
outcome may have been different if the sample synthesis was more balanced in relation to an 
even gender distribution and individuals who are parents. Consequently, future research is 
required to examine the degree that consumer segments influence blame attribution in case of 
PHC‟s. Future research should also evaluate the potential for the organizational culture to be a 
mediator of the relationship between CSR and SCM. 
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A less ambiguous crisis and more severe would possibly generate clearer results, and should 
therefore be investigated. In addition, the new proposed concept, SRCM, needs to be 
investigated and validated in future studies. Lastly, the authors also suggest the summery 
model should be tested in terms of the mod-med effects in LISREL. 
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Appendices 
A Survey (Questionnaire)  
Survey (Questionnaire) 
          
            1. Please tick the box that best describes you business category; 
       Production 
           Finance/Insurance 
          Detail 
           Construction 
           Consulting services/Travelling 
         Oil & Energy Sector 
          Transport 
           Other 
           
            2. Please tick the box describes the number of employees your business contain 
      1-10  
           10-50 
           50-100 
           100-500 
           500-1000 
           
            3. Please tick the box that describes your gender 
        Female 
           Male 
 
Case 1: iChocolate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. To which degree is iChocolate responsible for the crisis? (to a total sum of 0-100 % 
between iChocolate and supplier ) 
5. To which degree is the supplier responsible for the crisis?  (0-100%) 
6. Assign the degree of control iChocolate has in relation to preventing similar types of crises in the future. 
7. iChocolate‟s SCM is in accordance with my personal expectations to the company‟s profile. 
8. The crisis has not changed my trust in the company. 
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            Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
         
       
      CSR in general 
     9. CSR has a positive effect on corporate reputation 
        10. CSR represents an important competitive advantage for my organization 
      11. In my opinion, CSR will have a positive effect on strategic crisis management  
      12. My organizations has a positive corporate reputation 
        13. I believe it is important that my organization invests in CSR 
       
            Community Support 
          14. My organization actively makes an effort to engage in dialogue with important stakeholders 
      15. My organization invests in community charity, sports or/and cultural events 
      
            Diversity 
           16. Our employees reflect the society diversity in general (gender distribution, minorities, handicap) 
      17. My organization have clear codes of conducts (to prevent gender-, sexual discrimination) 
      
            Employees 
           18. My organization have developed clear ethical guidelines, organization values (codes of conduct) 
      19. Our guidelines on CSR is incorporated into the organizational culture 
       20. We utilize organization recourses to ensure that employee rights, HMS and welfare arrangements 
       are protected above and beyond legal obligations 
        
            Environment 
           21. We cooperate actively with our stakeholders (owners, employees,  NGO's, the media etc.) 
      in order to increase our knowledge regarding how to operate more environmentally friendly 
      22. My organization is transparent in all areas of information reporting regarding 
      the consequences our business actions affecting the environment and our stakeholders 
      
            Non-US Operations/International Operations 
        23. We control  that our international suppliers prioritizes HMS and acts ethically appropriate 
      (e.g. is not involved in child labor, social dumping, human rights violations, etc.) 
      24. Every employee is familiar with the laws and the organizations guidelines to prevent corruption 
      
            Product 
           25. We allocate resources to ensure our products/services do not  cause harm to our customers 
      26. Our routines for product withdrawal are effective 
        
            Corporate Governance 
          27. CSR is integrated in our business strategy 
        28. Our executive management focus on CSR 
        
            Strategic Crisis Management (SCM) 
    Stage 1: Detection 
     29. We allocate a great amount of resources to identify potential crisis in our organization 
 30. We allocate a great amount of resources to identify potential crisis in the external environment  
 
            Stage 2: Prevention/Preparation 
         31. We actively prevent crisis by building strong relationships with our key stakeholders  
      32. Our organization has developed procedures to gain access to and process important  information   
      from our key stakeholders 
          
            Stage 3: Containment 
          33. Our organization will be able to handle a crisis which imperils the organizations reputation in a good manner 
      34. We will be able to reduce the duration of a crisis better than our key competitor 
      35. We will have good control and general overview during a crisis 
       
            Stage 4: Recovery 
          36. Our ethical profile will reduce the amount of blame put on the organization from our stakeholders 
      37. When recovering from a crisis, we expect to rebuild our reputation more effective than our key competitor 
      38. When recovering from a crisis, we expect to rebuild trust more effective than our key competitor 
      39. When recovering from a crisis, we expect to return to "business as usual" more rapid than our key competitor 
      
            Stage 5: Learning 
          40. Our organization  would be concerned with learning from own success and failures in the aftermath of a crisis 
      41. Knowledge from past crisis would be highly valuable for the organizations future crisis management 
      
            General questions in regards to CSR 
         42. Our organization comply to the following standards 
        ISO 
           CERES 
           UN Global Compact 
          OECD 
           Kyoto 
           UN Global Index 
          IFA 2600 
           Miljøfyrtårnet 
           Other 
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            43. Who is responsible of managing CSR issues within you organization on a scale from 1-5 (1 is the most important, 5 is the least important)
       CSR-Department 
          Head of CSR 
           Communication Representative 
         Manager 
           Other 
 
           
            44. Range the following factors on a 1-5 scale according to which stakeholders your 
      organization primarily prioritizes 
         Environment 
           Employees 
           Owner 
           Local Community 
          Customers/Clients 
          
            45. Range the following crises according to the which crises your organization fear the most 
      Reputational loss 
          Loss of resources 
          Loss of lives 
           Environmental damage 
          Corruption (ethical crisis) 
          
            General questions in regards to SCM 
         Please respond YES or NO to the following questions 
  
YES NO 
    
            46. Our crisis management procedures are quite effective 
        47. My organization has established a crisis management team 
       48. My organization operates with a crisis management plan 
        49. My organization has experienced a crisis during the past five years 
       50. I believe that my organization may face a crisis within the next five years 
       51. I believe that my organization will management a crisis successfully 
      52. The executive management of my organization focuses on strategic crisis management 
 
 
      Case2: A-Meieriet 
Positive Priming Group 
A-Meieriet (AM) is proud to be ranked 1st among 100 companies in the category “most socially responsible” companies in the International 
CSR survey “Fortune‟s CSR index” 10 years on row. AM is known for its environmental efforts, and 5 percent of the profits are donated to 
cancer research and treatments. 
Today‟s news report reveals several serious health-threatening incidents related to the lethal Listeria bacteria. At least 4 patients are 
hospitalized and are receiving medical treatment for the bacteria, which have been traced back to the “camembert” cheese produced by one 
of Norway‟s largest dairy manufacturer, AM. AM‟s spokesman claims that “Our main priority is the consumers‟ health and safety! The 
“camembert” cheese will be withdrawn immediately! We are currently cooperating with the health authorities and are conducting an 
investigation”. The public health authorities inform that refrigerated food must be stored below 4° Celsius in order to prevent bacteria 
growth. Deficient routines on this area in addition to unsanitary conditions at the detailers or consumers, may cause break-outs of the Listeria 
bacteria.  
Negative Priming Group 
A-Meieriet (AM) is indifferent to be ranged at the bottom of 100 companies in the category ”most socially responsible companies” in the 
International CSR survey “Fortune CSR Index” 10 years on row. AM is known for serious environmental scandals such as polluting the 
“Nydal” river, which caused the extinction of an entire fish population due to the company‟s  illegal chemical dumping. 
Today‟s news report reveals several serious health-threatening incidents related to the lethal Listeria bacteria. At least 4 patients are 
hospitalized and are receiving medical treatment for the bacteria, which have been traced back to the “camembert” cheese produced by one 
of Norway‟s largest dairy manufacturer, AM. AM‟s spokesman claims that “Our main priority is the consumers‟ health and safety! The 
“camembert” cheese will be withdrawn immediately! We are currently cooperating with the health authorities and are conducting an 
investigation”. The public health authorities inform that refrigerated food must be stored below 4° Celsius in order to prevent bacteria 
growth. Deficient routines on this area in addition to unsanitary conditions at the detailers or consumers, may cause break-outs of the Listeria 
bacteria.  
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Control Group 
Today‟s news report reveals several serious health-threatening incidents related to the lethal Listeria bacteria. At least 4 patients are 
hospitalized and are receiving medical treatment for the bacteria, which have been traced back to the “camembert” cheese produced by one 
of Norway‟s largest dairy manufacturer, AM. AM‟s spokesman claims that “Our main priority is the consumers‟ health and safety! The 
“camembert” cheese will be withdrawn immediately! We are currently cooperating with the health authorities and are conducting an 
investigation”. The public health authorities inform that refrigerated food must be stored below 4° Celsius in order to prevent bacteria 
growth. Deficient routines on this area in addition to unsanitary conditions at the detailers or consumers, may cause break-outs of the Listeria 
bacteria.  
 
53.  To what degree is A-Meieriet responsible for the crisis? 
54. To what degree is the supplier responsible for the crisis? 
55. To which degree is Customer responsible for the crisis? 
56. How likely is it that a similar crisis will occur in the future? 
57. Assign the degree of control AM have in relation to preventing similar types of crises in the future. 
58. The crisis management is in alignment with my expectations to the company‟s  profile 
59. Assume that you personally like Camembert cheese. I have not lost trust in the company and will continue to purchase the product 
despite of the crisis 
60. I  have not lost trust in the company  
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B Primary Study: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
  Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
CSR_Community_1 Male 154 3.97 1.123 .090 3.79 4.15 1 5 
Female 41 3.93 1.127 .176 3.57 4.28 1 5 
Total 195 3.96 1.121 .080 3.80 4.12 1 5 
CSR_Community_2 Male 154 3.14 1.384 .111 2.92 3.36 1 5 
Female 40 2.93 1.457 .230 2.46 3.39 1 5 
Total 194 3.10 1.398 .100 2.90 3.30 1 5 
CSR_Diversity_1 Male 150 2.95 1.328 .108 2.74 3.17 1 5 
Female 40 3.15 1.145 .181 2.78 3.52 1 5 
Total 190 2.99 1.291 .094 2.81 3.18 1 5 
CSR_Diversity_2 Male 153 3.88 1.277 .103 3.68 4.09 1 5 
Female 40 4.15 1.189 .188 3.77 4.53 1 5 
Total 193 3.94 1.261 .091 3.76 4.12 1 5 
CSR_Employees_1 Male 153 3.68 1.316 .106 3.47 3.89 1 5 
Female 40 3.88 1.305 .206 3.46 4.29 1 5 
Total 193 3.72 1.313 .094 3.53 3.91 1 5 
CSR_Employees_2 Male 151 3.72 1.206 .098 3.53 3.92 1 5 
Female 38 3.89 1.203 .195 3.50 4.29 1 5 
Total 189 3.76 1.205 .088 3.58 3.93 1 5 
CSR_Employees_3 Male 152 3.86 1.174 .095 3.67 4.05 1 5 
Female 41 3.98 1.172 .183 3.61 4.35 1 5 
Total 193 3.89 1.171 .084 3.72 4.05 1 5 
CSR_Environment_1 Male 155 3.48 1.266 .102 3.28 3.68 1 5 
Female 41 3.98 1.193 .186 3.60 4.35 1 5 
Total 196 3.59 1.264 .090 3.41 3.76 1 5 
CSR_Environment_2 Male 154 3.59 1.384 .112 3.37 3.81 1 5 
Female 40 3.85 1.252 .198 3.45 4.25 1 5 
Total 194 3.64 1.359 .098 3.45 3.84 1 5 
CSR_NonUSOperations_1 Male 127 3.34 1.497 .133 3.08 3.60 1 5 
Female 33 3.61 1.298 .226 3.15 4.07 1 5 
Total 160 3.39 1.458 .115 3.17 3.62 1 5 
CSR_NonUsOperations_2 Male 142 3.78 1.294 .109 3.57 4.00 1 5 
Female 37 4.03 1.118 .184 3.65 4.40 1 5 
Total 179 3.83 1.261 .094 3.65 4.02 1 5 
CSR_Product_1 Male 144 4.05 1.190 .099 3.85 4.24 1 5 
Female 38 4.50 .762 .124 4.25 4.75 3 5 
Total 182 4.14 1.128 .084 3.98 4.31 1 5 
CSR_Product_2 Male 129 3.76 1.158 .102 3.56 3.96 1 5 
Female 32 4.34 .787 .139 4.06 4.63 3 5 
Total 161 3.88 1.117 .088 3.70 4.05 1 5 
CSR_Corporate Goverernance_1 Male 145 3.61 1.401 .116 3.38 3.84 1 5 
Female 38 3.95 1.138 .185 3.57 4.32 1 5 
Total 183 3.68 1.355 .100 3.48 3.88 1 5 
CSR_Corporate Goverenance_2 Male 151 3.78 1.290 .105 3.57 3.99 1 5 
Female 41 4.15 .963 .150 3.84 4.45 1 5 
Total 192 3.86 1.235 .089 3.68 4.04 1 5 
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SCM_Detection_1 Male 148 2.96 1.217 .100 2.76 3.16 1 5 
Female 41 3.24 1.300 .203 2.83 3.65 1 5 
Total 189 3.02 1.238 .090 2.84 3.20 1 5 
SCM_Detection_2 Male 149 2.83 1.245 .102 2.62 3.03 1 5 
Female 41 3.10 1.200 .187 2.72 3.48 1 5 
Total 190 2.88 1.238 .090 2.71 3.06 1 5 
SCM_Prevention_1 Male 152 3.63 1.143 .093 3.45 3.81 1 5 
Female 41 3.88 1.053 .165 3.55 4.21 1 5 
Total 193 3.68 1.127 .081 3.52 3.84 1 5 
SCM_Prevention_2 Male 153 3.52 1.101 .089 3.34 3.69 1 5 
Female 41 3.73 1.096 .171 3.39 4.08 1 5 
Total 194 3.56 1.101 .079 3.41 3.72 1 5 
SCM_Containment_1 Male 149 3.79 1.011 .083 3.62 3.95 1 5 
Female 39 3.95 .944 .151 3.64 4.25 2 5 
Total 188 3.82 .997 .073 3.68 3.96 1 5 
SCM_Containment_2 Male 125 3.55 1.004 .090 3.37 3.73 1 5 
Female 30 3.67 1.061 .194 3.27 4.06 2 5 
Total 155 3.57 1.013 .081 3.41 3.73 1 5 
SCM_Containment_3 Male 148 3.80 1.041 .086 3.63 3.97 1 5 
Female 38 4.26 .760 .123 4.01 4.51 2 5 
Total 186 3.90 1.006 .074 3.75 4.04 1 5 
SCM_Recovery_1 Male 131 3.43 1.053 .092 3.25 3.61 1 5 
Female 28 3.61 1.066 .201 3.19 4.02 1 5 
Total 159 3.46 1.054 .084 3.29 3.62 1 5 
SCM_Recovery_2 Male 129 3.43 1.014 .089 3.25 3.60 1 5 
Female 29 3.48 1.184 .220 3.03 3.93 1 5 
Total 158 3.44 1.043 .083 3.27 3.60 1 5 
SCM_Recovery_3 Male 126 3.46 1.056 .094 3.27 3.65 1 5 
Female 28 3.89 .916 .173 3.54 4.25 2 5 
Total 154 3.54 1.042 .084 3.37 3.70 1 5 
SCM_Recovery_4 Male 128 3.53 1.072 .095 3.34 3.72 1 5 
Female 26 3.96 .916 .180 3.59 4.33 2 5 
Total 154 3.60 1.057 .085 3.44 3.77 1 5 
SCM_Recovery_5 Male 130 3.63 1.065 .093 3.45 3.82 1 5 
Female 28 3.93 .940 .178 3.56 4.29 2 5 
Total 158 3.68 1.047 .083 3.52 3.85 1 5 
SCM_Learning_1 Male 151 4.13 1.011 .082 3.97 4.30 1 5 
Female 39 4.44 .788 .126 4.18 4.69 3 5 
Total 190 4.19 .975 .071 4.06 4.33 1 5 
SCM_Learning_2 Male 150 4.12 1.093 .089 3.94 4.30 1 5 
Female 35 4.49 .742 .126 4.23 4.74 3 5 
Total 185 4.19 1.044 .077 4.04 4.34 1 5 
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C Primary Study: Theoretical Data Reduction SCM 
 
Table 34 Theoretical Data Reduction SCM 
Pattern Matrixa 
 Factor 
 1 2 
SCM_DET1 .822  
SCM_PP1 .789  
SCM_LEA2 .725  
SCM_DET2 .711  
SCM_PP2 .687  
SCM_LEA1 .608  
SCM_CON1 .534 -.401 
SCM_CON3 .492 -.408 
SCM_REC1 .443 -.400 
SCM_REC4  -.999 
SCM_REC3  -.920 
SCM_REC5  -.908 
SCM_CON2  -.695 
SCM_REC2 .414 -.456 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
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D Primary Study: Outliers Theoretical 
1. Detection: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .8914 4.1415 3.0556 .80283 126 
Residual -2.54565 1.79607 .00000 .81263 126 
Std. Predicted Value -2.696 1.353 .000 1.000 126 
Std. Residual -3.120 2.201 .000 .996 126 
a. Dependent Variable: SUM_SCM_SignalDetection 
 
 
2. Prevention/Preparation: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.4503 4.6835 3.6032 .79866 126 
Residual -1.64461 2.36423 .00000 .68659 126 
Std. Predicted Value -2.696 1.353 .000 1.000 126 
Std. Residual -2.386 3.430 .000 .996 126 
a. Dependent Variable: SUM_SCM_Preperation_Prevention 
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3. Containment: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.9328 4.5817 3.6697 .62391 111 
Residual -1.65456 2.09596 .00000 .68137 111 
Std. Predicted Value -2.784 1.462 .000 1.000 111 
Std. Residual -2.417 3.062 .000 .995 111 
a. Dependent Variable: SUM_SCM_Containment 
 
 
4. Recovery: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.4913 4.4522 3.4198 .73147 101 
Residual -2.00546 1.92433 .00000 .66133 101 
Std. Predicted Value -2.636 1.411 .000 1.000 101 
Std. Residual -3.017 2.895 .000 .995 101 
a. Dependent Variable: SUM_SCM_Recovery 
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5. Learning: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.4518 4.9627 4.1107 .62345 122 
Residual -2.08390 2.04599 .00000 .77526 122 
Std. Predicted Value -2.661 1.367 .000 1.000 122 
Std. Residual -2.677 2.628 .000 .996 122 
a. Dependent Variable: SUM_SCM_Learning 
 
 
E Primary Study: Outliers Empirical: 
1. Detection 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .9722 4.0000 2.9699 .73735 166 
Residual -2.51831 1.70201 .00000 .87435 166 
Std. Predicted Value -2.709 1.397 .000 1.000 166 
Std. Residual -2.871 1.941 .000 .997 166 
a. Dependent Variable: Factor_SCM_Detection 
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Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .9722 4.0000 2.9699 .73735 166 
Residual -2.51831 1.70201 .00000 .87435 166 
Std. Predicted Value -2.709 1.397 .000 1.000 166 
Std. Residual -2.871 1.941 .000 .997 166 
 
 
 
2. Prevention/Preparation 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.6846 4.6563 3.6497 .72380 167 
Residual -1.98093 2.23478 .00000 .73137 167 
Std. Predicted Value -2.715 1.391 .000 1.000 167 
Std. Residual -2.700 3.046 .000 .997 167 
a. Dependent Variable: Factor_SCM_PreventionPreparation 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Containment/Recovery 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.1901 4.3683 3.6050 .52617 131 
Residual -1.77426 2.56237 .00000 .79664 131 
Std. Predicted Value -2.689 1.451 .000 1.000 131 
Std. Residual -2.219 3.204 .000 .996 131 
a. Dependent Variable: Factor_SCM_ContainmentRecovery 
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4. Learning 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.7093 4.9415 4.1792 .55004 159 
Residual -2.12979 2.29075 .00000 .79093 159 
Std. Predicted Value -2.673 1.386 .000 1.000 159 
Std. Residual -2.684 2.887 .000 .997 159 
a. Dependent Variable: Factor_SCM_Learning 
 
 
 
F Comparing Theoretical and Empirical Hypotheses Results 
Components ∆ R2 t B SE B β 
Detection .49 11.0 .81 .07 .70 *** 
Prevention/Preparation Excluded 
Containment/Recovery .40 8.35 .65 .08 .64 *** 
Learning Excluded 
SCM&CSR .54 11.13 .72 .06 .74*** 
Empirical 
Components ∆ R2 t B SE B β 
Detection .49 11.00 .81 .07 .70 *** 
Prevention/Preparation .57 13.0 .81 .06 .76 *** 
Containment/Recovery .40 8.35 .65 .08 .64 *** 
Learning .39 8.81 .63 .07 .63 *** 
SCM&CSR .61 12.72 .73 .06 .79 *** 
Note: ∆ R2 : Adjusted R square, t: T-value, of the T-test in the Regression, Unstandardized Coefficient B,  SE B: Unstadardized Coeficcient 
Standard Error B:,  β: Standardized Coefficient Beta, *** p<.001, '', p<.01, *p<.05. 
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G Secondary Study: Scheffe Post Hoc Analysis 
Q 53Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming -12.13* 4.037 .012 -22.08 -2.17 
Positive priming .11 4.037 1.000 -9.84 10.07 
Negative priming Control Group 12.13* 4.037 .012 2.17 22.08 
Positive priming 12.24* 4.109 .013 2.11 22.37 
Positive priming Control Group -.11 4.037 1.000 -10.07 9.84 
Negative priming -12.24* 4.109 .013 -22.37 -2.11 
Based on observed means.  The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 565,564. 
 
Q54 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming 8.53* 2.994 .019 1.14 15.91 
Positive priming .81 2.994 .964 -6.57 8.20 
Negative priming Control Group -8.53* 2.994 .019 -15.91 -1.14 
Positive priming -7.72* 3.037 .042 -15.21 -.23 
Positive priming Control Group -.81 2.994 .964 -8.20 6.57 
Negative priming 7.72* 3.037 .042 .23 15.21 
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 309,081. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
 
Q55 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming 3.93 2.043 .160 -1.11 8.96 
Positive priming -.60 2.043 .958 -5.63 4.44 
Negative priming Control Group -3.93 2.043 .160 -8.96 1.11 
Positive priming -4.52 2.079 .096 -9.65 .60 
Positive priming Control Group .60 2.043 .958 -4.44 5.63 
Negative priming 4.52 2.079 .096 -.60 9.65 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 144,808. 
 
Q 56 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming -1.35* .458 .014 -2.48 -.22 
Positive priming -.67 .460 .344 -1.81 .46 
Negative priming Control Group 1.35* .458 .014 .22 2.48 
Positive priming .68 .469 .354 -.48 1.84 
Positiv epriming Control Group .67 .460 .344 -.46 1.81 
Negative priming -.68 .469 .354 -1.84 .48 
Based on observed means.  The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 6,556. 
*. The mean  
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Q 57 Multiple Comparisons 
 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming 1.23* .420 .015 .20 2.27 
Positive priming -.02 .418 .999 -1.05 1.02 
Negative priming Control priming -1.23* .420 .015 -2.27 -.20 
Positive priming -1.25* .420 .013 -2.28 -.21 
Positive priming Control Group .02 .418 .999 -1.02 1.05 
Negative priming 1.25* .420 .013 .21 2.28 
Based on observed means.  The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 5,502. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
Q 58 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming .67* .177 .001 .23 1.11 
Positive priming .07 .174 .922 -.36 .50 
Negative priming Control Group -.67* .177 .001 -1.11 -.23 
Positive priming -.60* .179 .004 -1.04 -.16 
Positive priming Control Group -.07 .174 .922 -.50 .36 
Negative priming .60* .179 .004 .16 1.04 
Based on observed means.The error term is Mean Square(Error) = ,995. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
 
Q 59 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming 1.14* .190 .000 .67 1.61 
Positive priming -.02 .189 .996 -.48 .45 
Negative priming Control Group -1.14* .190 .000 -1.61 -.67 
Positive priming -1.15* .196 .000 -1.64 -.67 
Positive priming Control Group .02 .189 .996 -.45 .48 
Negative priming 1.15* .196 .000 .67 1.64 
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1,108. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the ,05 level. 
 
 Q 60 Multiple Comparisons 
Scheffe 
(I) sett (J) sett 
Mean Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Group Negative priming 1.33* .182 .000 .88 1.78 
Positive priming .09 .176 .880 -.35 .52 
Negative priming Control Group -1.33* .182 .000 -1.78 -.88 
Positive priming -1.25* .186 .000 -1.70 -.79 
Positive priming Control Group -.09 .176 .880 -.52 .35 
Negative priming 1.25* .186 .000 .79 1.70 
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H Secondary Study: Descriptive Statistics Univariate Analysis 
Q 53: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7506.950a 5 1501.390 2.634 .025 
Intercept 533752.125 1 533752.125 936.314 .000 
sett 5368.331 2 2684.166 4.709 .010 
sett * kjonn 798.201 3 266.067 .467 .706 
Error 114011.308 200 570.057   
Total 950131.000 206    
Corrected Total 121518.257 205    
a. R Squared = ,062 (Adjusted R Squared = ,038) 
 
Q54: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3267.070a 5 653.414 2.091 .068 
Intercept 90858.424 1 90858.424 290.810 .000 
sett 1974.685 2 987.342 3.160 .045 
sett * kjonn 260.384 3 86.795 .278 .841 
Error 62173.935 199 312.432   
Total 207843.000 205    
Corrected Total 65441.005 204    
a. R Squared = ,050 (Adjusted R Squared = ,026) 
 
Q 55: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1077.127a 5 215.425 1.479 .198 
Intercept 14947.730 1 14947.730 102.615 .000 
sett 919.675 2 459.838 3.157 .045 
sett * kjonn 262.308 3 87.436 .600 .616 
Error 29133.727 200 145.669   
Total 52152.000 206    
Corrected Total 30210.854 205    
a. R Squared = ,036 (Adjusted R Squared = ,012) 
 
Q56: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 128.882a 5 25.776 4.116 .001 
Intercept 3279.440 1 3279.440 523.604 .000 
sett 3.546 2 1.773 .283 .754 
sett * kjonn 71.779 3 23.926 3.820 .011 
Error 1114.852 178 6.263   
Total 6389.000 184    
Corrected Total 1243.734 183    
a. R Squared = ,104 (Adjusted R Squared = ,078) 
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Q57: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 71.049a 5 14.210 2.559 .029 
Intercept 4487.704 1 4487.704 808.152 .000 
sett 32.628 2 16.314 2.938 .055 
sett * kjonn 7.186 3 2.395 .431 .731 
Error 1010.654 182 5.553   
Total 8388.000 188    
Corrected Total 1081.702 187    
a. R Squared = ,066 (Adjusted R Squared = ,040) 
 
Q58: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 23.743a 5 4.749 4.880 .000 
Intercept 1564.956 1 1564.956 1608.287 .000 
sett 15.550 2 7.775 7.990 .000 
sett * kjonn 6.996 3 2.332 2.397 .070 
Error 180.016 185 .973   
Total 2682.000 191    
Corrected Total 203.759 190    
a. R Squared = ,117 (Adjusted R Squared = ,093) 
 
Q59: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 59.389a 5 11.878 10.981 .000 
Intercept 1178.759 1 1178.759 1089.753 .000 
sett 18.452 2 9.226 8.529 .000 
sett * kjonn 8.019 3 2.673 2.471 .063 
Error 190.375 176 1.082   
Total 2143.000 182    
Corrected Total 249.764 181    
a. R Squared = ,238 (Adjusted R Squared = ,216) 
 
Q60: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 71.476a 5 14.295 13.763 .000 
Intercept 1382.009 1 1382.009 1330.567 .000 
sett 39.107 2 19.554 18.826 .000 
sett * kjonn 4.388 3 1.463 1.408 .242 
Error 193.191 186 1.039   
Total 2506.000 192    
Corrected Total 264.667 191    
a. R Squared = ,270 (Adjusted R Squared = ,250) 
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I Syntax INDIRECT macro (Bootstrap) 
INDIRECT Y =case1_6/X = sett_bin/M = case1_1_1/BOOT =5000. 
INDIRECT Y =case1_6/X = sett_bin/M = case1_1_2/BOOT =5000. 
INDIRECT Y =case1_6/X = sett_bin/M = case1_1_3/BOOT =5000. 
INDIRECT Y =case1_6/X = sett_bin/M = case1_2/BOOT =5000. 
INDIRECT Y =case1_6/X = sett_bin/M = case1_3/BOOT =5000. 
J Comparing Differences between Genders 
ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CSR_Environment_1 Between Groups 7.840 1 7.840 5.008 .026 
Within Groups 303.685 194 1.565   
Total 311.526 195    
CSR_Product_1 Between Groups 6.126 1 6.126 4.919 .028 
Within Groups 224.160 180 1.245   
Total 230.286 181    
CSR_Product_2 Between Groups 8.746 1 8.746 7.290 .008 
Within Groups 190.769 159 1.200   
Total 199.516 160    
CSR_Corporate Goverenance_2 Between Groups 4.293 1 4.293 2.843 .093 
Within Groups 286.910 190 1.510   
Total 291.203 191    
SCM_Containment_3 Between Groups 6.373 1 6.373 6.490 .012 
Within Groups 180.686 184 .982   
Total 187.059 185    
SCM_Recovery_3 Between Groups 4.286 1 4.286 4.022 .047 
Within Groups 161.980 152 1.066   
Total 166.266 153    
SCM_Recovery_4 Between Groups 4.001 1 4.001 3.645 .058 
Within Groups 166.837 152 1.098   
Total 170.838 153    
SCM_Learning_1 Between Groups 2.854 1 2.854 3.032 .083 
Within Groups 176.941 188 .941   
Total 179.795 189    
SCM_Learning_2 Between Groups 3.796 1 3.796 3.533 .062 
Within Groups 196.583 183 1.074   
Total 200.378 184    
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K Secondary Study: Differences between Priming Groups 
ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
General_CSR_1 Between Groups 1.431 1 1.431 2.252 .135 
Within Groups 121.346 191 .635   
Total 122.777 192    
General_CSR_2 Between Groups 2.037 1 2.037 1.587 .209 
Within Groups 243.880 190 1.284   
Total 245.917 191    
General_CSR_3 Between Groups 1.733 1 1.733 1.751 .187 
Within Groups 182.100 184 .990   
Total 183.833 185    
General_CSR_4 Between Groups .046 1 .046 .075 .785 
Within Groups 113.803 184 .618   
Total 113.849 185    
General_CSR_5 Between Groups 3.315 1 3.315 2.556 .112 
Within Groups 246.430 190 1.297   
Total 249.745 191    
 
